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Best wishes.
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A VISIBLE MINORITY VOTES:
EAST INDIAN ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR
IN THE VANCOUVER SOUTH PROVINCIAL
AND FEDERAL ELECTIONS OF 1979

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Students of Canadian electoral behaviour have thus far paid little attention to the voting of Canada's "visible" minorities, and this is hardly surprising. Despite the dramatic increase of Third World immigrants to Canada in the 1970s and their concentration in our larger cities, visible minority voters are still too few and too dispersed to affect election outcomes. For students of ethnicity in Canada, however, the neglect is regrettable: in this country, as elsewhere, a key route to integration in the dominant society runs through the political system. Participation in electoral politics in particular is an important indicator of a minority ethnic group's emergence from social isolation and entrance into the mainstream of Canadian political life. Unfortunately, we lack concrete information on how members of any minority ethnic group compare as voters to voters in the rest of Canadian society. Do they, in fact, exercise their franchise as much as other citizens do? Are they oriented to the same issues? Do they identify with and vote for the same parties in the same proportions as other Canadians? Between elections, do they retain or switch their party preference at the same rate? Can members of an ethnic minority, say in one constituency, be regarded as a "vote bloc" or are they as individualistic in their voting as other Canadians? Above all, if there are significant differences between the electoral behaviour of minority ethnic and other Canadian voters, how are these differences to be explained? This essay reports on some preliminary research into these questions with reference to the voting behaviour of one visible minority ethnic group in one constituency: the East Indians of Vancouver South.¹

Such studies as have been made of the impact of ethnicity on voting behaviour in Canada have focussed principally on the two charter groups and have tended to relegate all minority ethnic voters to an "Other" category.² They have dwelt upon huge aggregates of voters and examined ethnicity as only one variable among many. They have not studied the voting of any particular minority ethnic group nor investigated intra-ethnic group differentiae and their correlates with different voting behaviours. Such research should be manageable at the constituency level; surprisingly, however, constituency-based studies are rare in Canada, and those that feature the impact of ethnicity on voting can

be counted on the fingers of one hand.³

It may be asked why, in view of this general deficiency, the voting of visible minorities such as the East Indians deserves special attention. The answer is not simply because, like Mt. Everest, "they are there." Rather, the time has come to recognize the significant increase in Canadian citizens of Asian, African, Caribbean, and Latin American origins and to understand the special problems of adjustment they face here. Many find themselves on the defensive against racist abuse in public and discriminatory treatment by government officials or agents of the law. In their view, the political system is populated almost entirely by whites, most with scant knowledge about or interest in the cultural backgrounds or needs of visible minorities. The latter have few effective links to the political system, few spokesmen to articulate their grievances, and extremely little political influence. But this situation, as this study will suggest, is beginning to change. In a number of urban constituencies like Vancouver South, visible minorities, such as the East Indians, are becoming numerous enough and self-confident enough to feel that they can increase their political influence through electoral participation.

In order to develop a profile of East Indian electoral behaviour and to compare it with that of the general population, we set out to collect voting behaviour and socio-economic data on a sample of East Indians and a sample of non-East Indians. Vancouver South was selected for study because historically it has been the constituency with the highest concentration of East Indians in Canada. The constituency features a range of East Indian social institutions, enough to make most East Indians conscious of themselves as a community. Moreover, while most of Vancouver South's East Indians have lived unobtrusively and harmoniously with their non-East Indian neighbours, there have been incidents of racial conflict in the constituency during the 1970s which have heightened group visibility and consciousness. The size, visibility and self-consciousness of the East Indian community of Vancouver South may make them atypical when compared to East Indians in other parts of Canada. Nevertheless, the experience of Vancouver South's East Indians with the electoral system clarifies a number of important dilemmas and opportunities which visible minorities face elsewhere, particularly in large metropolitan constituencies.

The Approach

Initially, a questionnaire survey of East Indians and non-East Indians was set up for the spring of 1978 in anticipation of a federal election that summer or fall. Prime Minister Trudeau's decision to postpone the election until May 22, 1979 provided us with an opportunity for a two-stage panel study in which we could assess changes in federal voting preference between 1978 and 1979. The delay also allowed us to study provincial voting behaviour in our second survey, as Premier Bennett called a British Columbia election for May 10, 1979.

As indicated in the adjoining MAP, Vancouver South provincial constituency occupies about two-thirds of the area comprising Vancouver South federal constituency. Samples of East Indian and non-East Indian voters were drawn from relevant voters' lists (the 1975 Vancouver South provincial list and other provincial constituency lists whose voters live within Vancouver South federal constituency) by as random a method as possible. One obvious criterion for inclusion in the survey was possession of Canadian citizenship. Respondents also had to possess telephones, since telephoning was the method of initial contact, and the samples contain only those voters who were willing to be interviewed.⁴ Eventually, student interviewers surveyed a total of 66 East Indian and 81 non-East Indian voters in the summer of 1978; of these, 46 East Indians and 58 Non-East Indians were resurveyed after the elections in 1979.

In the description and analysis which follow, profile statements about East Indians and non-East Indians in Vancouver South are based on the larger 1978 sample. Statements regarding change (in voting preference, for example) are based only on the smaller sample of reinterviewed voters. Comparison tests indicate that the sample of re-interviewed voters is highly similar in its socio-economic characteristics to the larger initial sample.

East Indians in Vancouver South: A Social and Political Profile

Given the inadequacies of Canadian census data on minority ethnic groups, it is impossible to determine precisely how many East Indians there are in Canada or in any of its political sub-jurisdictions.⁵ If one accepts the broad definition of the man in the street for "East Indian" (referring to all people of origins in the Indian

immigration, including those from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, East and Central Africa, the Caribbean, Fiji, South-East Asia, the United Kingdom and elsewhere) and estimates from 1971 census and subsequent immigration statistics, East Indians number somewhat above 200,000, or approximately 1% of Canada's population. Over half of them are in Ontario, some 90,000 in Toronto alone. British Columbia has the next largest group, between 50 and 60,000. About 40,000 live in and around Vancouver, and estimates range as high as 10,000 for Vancouver South.

A number of studies have described how changes in Canadian immigration policy have affected the demography of the East Indian community in Vancouver.⁶ Today there are hardly any members left of the initial "pioneer" group that settled in Vancouver before World War I. Racially discriminatory immigration laws severely threatened the survival of the community from then until World War II, after which, following India's independence and joining of the Commonwealth, Canada allowed a small quota of East Indians to immigrate annually. More open, non-discriminatory immigration legislation in 1962 and 1967 was followed by an upsurge in East Indian immigration. Today, approximately three-quarters of the 40,000 East Indians in Vancouver date their arrival from some time in the late 1960s or early 1970s.

Vancouver South has from the beginning been a concentration point for East Indian settlement because of the large number of sawmills on the banks of the Fraser River which attracted East Indian labourers. The central core of the community is in the working class neighbourhood just north of the river between Main and Knight Streets, reaching as high as 11% of the population in the relevant census blocks. This area has been a seminal point of dispersion for East Indian settlers in Vancouver, many of whom, once they could afford it, moved to the nearby suburban municipalities of Burnaby, Richmond, Surrey, and Delta.

The occupational and educational profiles of the East Indians of Vancouver South, as indicated by our survey, reflect considerable diversity, with category proportions strikingly different from those of our non-East Indian sample:

TABLE I

OCCUPATIONS OF EAST INDIAN AND NON-EAST INDIAN RESPONDENTS

	EI (N=66)		Non-EI (N=79)	
	No.	%	No.	%
Unskilled Labour	33	50.0	4	5.1
Skilled Labour	11	16.7	18	22.8
Professionals	10	15.2	6	7.6
Business/Managers	6	9.1	11	13.9
Students	3	4.5	4	5.1
Sales	2	3.0	5	6.3
Retired	1	1.5	14	17.7
Housewives	0	0.0	16	20.3
Other	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1.3</u>
	66	100.0	79	100.1

TABLE II

EDUCATION LEVEL OF EAST INDIAN AND NON-EAST INDIAN RESPONDENTS

	EI (N=65)		Non-EI (N=80)	
	No.	%	No.	%
Elementary school or less	11	16.9	4	5.1
Some High School	18	27.7	15	18.8
Graduated High School	12	18.5	15	18.8
Technical School	2	3.1	9	11.3
Some University	5	7.7	16	20.0
Graduate University	<u>17</u>	<u>26.2</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>18.8</u>
	65	100.1	80	100.3

The East Indians in our sample cluster into two main groups, a large majority group of unskilled and skilled labourers most with high school education or less, and a sizeable minority group of professionals and businessmen/managers most of whom have university education. The apparently class-like divergence between the groups must be weighed against a marked convergence of country-of-origin, religious, and linguistic factors. Whereas East Indians who have settled in other parts of Vancouver may have come from Uganda or Fiji, adhere to a diversity of religions and speak different Indian languages, in Vancouver South 78.5% of our respondents were born in India -- 71.9% coming from the Indian state of Punjab alone -- and, as Table III indicates, are predominantly Sikh by religion and Punjabi by mother tongue:

TABLE III

RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC AFFILIATION OF EAST INDIAN RESPONDENTS

Religion (N=65)			Mother Tongue (N=64)		
	No.	%		No.	%
Sikh	42	64.6	Punjabi	48	75.0
Hindu	8	12.3	English	7	10.9
Muslim	3	4.6	Hindi	4	6.3
Roman Catholic	2	3.1	Gujarati	2	3.1
Protestant	1	1.5	Marathi	1	1.6
No religion	9	13.8	Other	2	3.2
	65	99.9		64	100.0

The social and political life of the Punjabi Sikh community revolves primarily around the Khalsa Diwan Society temple on Ross Street. This temple, the largest Sikh place of worship outside of India, had its origins in conflict in 1952 when a division occurred in the original Sikh temple on Second Avenue and the more orthodox Sikhs departed to form their own Akali Singh Society temple on Eleventh Avenue. The remaining "pattit" Sikhs (unorthodox because of their non-adherence to symbolic and ritual strictures) built the new temple on Ross Street at a cost of \$500,000. Since it opened in 1970, the internal politics of the temple have been periodically tense, especially during the annual election of the temple management committee. Adherence to rival groups has been based on a complex web of factors including Punjabi kinship and village ties and ideological leanings, but the main division has recurred over matters of religious orthodoxy. Latterly, as Verne Dusenbery has described, the more orthodox group, increased in size by the less-assimilated immigrants of the 1970s, has gained a slight edge over the less orthodox, more established group.⁷ Responses to two questions asked in our survey elicited the approximate dimensions of temple political alignments:

TABLE IV

CONSERVATIVE/REFORMIST ORIENTATIONS AMONG EAST INDIAN RESPONDENTS

Question: How would you describe yourself concerning religious or ritual matters? (N=55)

	No.	%
Very conservative	9	16.4)
Conservative	15	27.3) 43.7
Indifferent	20	36.4
Reformist	4	7.3)
Very reformist	5	9.1) 16.4
Not applicable	<u>2</u>	<u>3.6</u>
	55	100.1

TABLE V

ATTITUDES TO HEAD COVERING ISSUE AMONG EAST INDIAN RESPONDENTS

Question: Do you think the head should be covered or uncovered in the temple? (N=57)

	No.	%
Covered	27	47.4
Indifferent	15	26.3
Uncovered	10	17.5
Not applicable	<u>5</u>	<u>8.8</u>
	57	100.0

As might be expected, among our Sikh respondents there is a strong correlation (Tau C = 0.30990, $p < .0130$) between religious conservatism and preference for head-covering in the temple; the latter issue has been a central, if ostensible, point of contention for several years. Conservatism/reformism are also strongly correlated in our survey with education (low educational achievement: conservative / high achievement: reformist; Tau C = 0.33428, $p < .0053$) and social traditionalism as indicated by adherence to arranged marriage customs (Tau C = 0.3246; $p < 0.0616$). However, there is no significant correlation between conservatism/reformism and occupation, a finding which confirms the impression that temple conflicts are not based on class antagonism. What is interesting is that the proportion of conservative Sikhs is more than double that of the reformists. This suggests an overwhelming predominance of conservatives unless one adds to the ranks of the reformists those Sikhs who are indifferent about

religious or ritual matters.

The fractiousness of temple politics, inflated by sensational media coverage, has hurt the public image of East Indians in Vancouver South. The incidence of reported racial discrimination is high: in our survey, 62.5% of East Indians said they had experienced racial discrimination since coming to Canada. Approximately one half of these said they had experienced discrimination about once a year, but one quarter reported experiences occurring once a month and another quarter once a week. We did not ask non-East Indians about their attitudes towards East Indians but unsolicited negative attitudes towards East Indians and other Third World immigrants were expressed frequently in response to our survey of opinions on Canada's immigration policy:

TABLE VI

ATTITUDES TO CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY

Question: Do you think Canada's immigration policy is too strict, not strict enough, or all right as it is?

	EI (N=64)		Non-EI (N=80)	
	No.	%	No.	%
Too strict	20	31.3	6	7.5
All right	28	43.8	11	13.8
Not strict enough	11	17.2	58	72.5
No opinion	<u>5</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6.3</u>
	64	100.1	80	100.1

What consequences does this situation have for East Indian participation in dominant society politics? It might be expected that dominant society hostility, combined with cultural boundary maintenance by the East Indians themselves, has resulted in political alienation on the part of the East Indians. Our survey reveals that while some evidence exists to support such an hypothesis, East Indian interest and participation in dominant society politics are relatively high and increasing.

When asked about their electoral participation in the federal election of 1974, East Indians who had the vote at the time indicated a participation rate somewhat below that of non-East Indians:

TABLE VII

ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN 1974 FEDERAL ELECTION

Question: Sometimes people find it hard to vote in federal elections, because they can't get away from work, or something like that. In your case, did you happen to vote in the July 8th, 1974 federal election?

	EI (N=64)			Non-EI (N=81)		
	No.	%A*	%B*	No.	%A	%B
Yes	39	60.9	75.0	73	90.1	91.1
No	9	14.1	17.3	5	6.2	6.3
Not eligible	12	18.8		1	1.2	
Don't remember	4	6.3	7.7	2	2.5	2.5
	64	100.1	100.0	81	100.0	100.1

Note: "A": The percentages in this column are based on the total sample.
 "B": The percentages in this column do not include respondents who were not eligible to vote in 1974.

When asked in 1978 about their interest and intention to vote in the coming federal election (whose date was then unannounced), the following pattern of responses emerged:

TABLE VIII

INTEREST IN COMING FEDERAL ELECTION

Question: How much interest do you have in the coming federal election?

	EI (N=66)		Non-EI (N=81)	
	No.	%	No.	%
Very interested	18	27.3)	34	42.0)
Fairly interested	34	51.5)	35	43.2)
Not very interested	13	19.7	12	14.8
Not at all interested	1	1.5	0	0.0
	66	100.0	81	100.0

TABLE IX

INTENTION TO VOTE IN COMING FEDERAL ELECTION

Question: How certain are you right now that you will vote in the coming federal election?

	EI (N=64)			Non-EI (N=81)	
	No.	%		No.	%
Very certain	32	50.0	) 85.9	65	80.2
Fairly certain	23	35.9		15	18.5
Don't know	7	10.9		1	1.2
Will probably not vote	1	1.6		0	0.0
Will definitely not vote	<u>1</u>	<u>1.6</u>		<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
	64	100.0		81	99.9

The pattern of these responses suggests that East Indian respondents were somewhat less eager to vote than non-East Indians but nevertheless exhibited a strong interest in the coming federal election. A parallel pattern emerged in responses to questions eliciting levels of political cognition and feelings of political efficacy (see Tables X and XI). When asked to name their M.P. in Ottawa and their MLAs in Victoria, East Indians and non-East Indians responded as follows:

TABLE X

LEVELS OF POLITICAL COGNITION: KNOWLEDGE OF M.P.'s AND M.L.A.s' NAMES

	EI (N=62, 61)		Non-EI (N=72, 75)	
	No.	%	No.	%
M.P. - Correct Answer	31	50.0	54	75.0
M.P. - Incorrect Answer	2	3.2	4	5.6
M.P. - Don't Know	<u>29</u>	<u>46.8</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>19.4</u>
	62	100.0	72	100.0
M.L.A.s - Correct Answer	16	26.6	30	40.0
M.L.A.s - Incorrect Answer	0	0.0	8	10.7
M.L.A.s - Don't Know	41	67.2	29	38.7
M.A.A.s - Mixed Correct and Incorrect Answer	<u>4</u>	<u>6.6</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>10.7</u>
	61	100.4	75	100.1

With regard to feelings of political efficacy, the following comparison emerged:

TABLE XI

FEELINGS OF POLITICAL EFFICACY

Question: Do you think you can affect government policy?

	EI (N=64)		Non-EI (N=80)	
	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	29	45.3	41	51.3
No	28	43.8	33	41.3
Don't Know	<u>7</u>	<u>10.9</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7.5</u>
	64	100.0	80	100.1

When asked to specify, against a list of possible alternatives, any of the ways in which they felt they might affect government policy, it is interesting that whereas both East Indians and non-East Indians checked "By voting" most frequently, East Indians checked "Through political party work" second most frequently and non-East Indians "By contacting my M.P. or M.L.A.". This finding is congruent with the relative lack of familiarity on the part of East Indians regarding their constituency representatives, but also indicates the route along which an increasing number of East Indians perceive an opportunity for involvement in dominant society politics: political party membership.

When asked if they belonged to a political party, East Indians surprisingly showed a nearly four-times greater incidence of party membership than non-East Indians:

TABLES XII

MEMBERSHIP IN POLITICAL PARTIES

Question: Are you a member of a political party?

	EI (N=64)		Non-EI (N=81)	
	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	18	28.1	6	7.4
No	46	71.9	75	92.4

Breakdown: If yes, which party?

N.D.P.	14	0
Liberal	3	5
Progressive Cons.	0	1
Social Credit	1	0

The marked East Indian interest in the New Democratic Party revealed in these figures may be a temporary phenomenon related only to the upsurge in N.D.P. membership recruitment among East Indians by East Indian N.D.P. nomination candidate prior to the 1979 provincial election (see next section). N.D.P. party membership cuts across the conservative/reformist religious groupings of our East Indian respondents, and it cannot be said that they are conscious of themselves as a "vote bloc." When asked if they thought East Indians would have a special effect as a group on the outcome of the next election, 39.3% of our East Indian respondents said "no", 29.5% said "yes", and the remaining 31.1% said they did not know.

The 1979 Electoral Contests in Vancouver South

Before turning to our comparison of East Indian and non-East Indian voting data, a few words about the nature of the electoral contests in Vancouver South's provincial and federal elections are in order.

1. Provincial election. Prior to the 1979 election, Vancouver South provincial constituency had see-sawed back and forth in its support for the Social Credit and New Democratic Parties ever since it was carved out of Vancouver Point Grey constituency in 1966. Vancouver South provincially is a double member constituency and thus far both M.L.A.s elected have been members of the same party. Although the two incumbent Social Credit M.L.A.s, Stephen Rogers and Gerald Strongman, had won convincingly in 1975, they were expected well in advance of the 1979 poll to face a tough campaign by the N.D.P., which had climbed dramatically in opinion polls across the province. Although Rogers was respected for his constituency services, both he and Strongman were quiet backbenchers in Victoria and not expected to rise beyond that status. N.D.P. activists perceived a chance to win back the Vancouver South provincial seats as early as 1975, and none so enthusiastically as some members of the East Indian community. At one point, three East Indians were said to be in competition for the N.D.P. nomination. The best known was Setty Pendakur, a university professor and ex-Vancouver alderman. The second was school teacher and long-time N.D.P. worker Kehar Sekhon, a "modernist" leader in the Khalsa Diwan Society temple on Ross Street. The last to enter the competition was a young lawyer named Ujjal Dosanjh, who carried a reputation for Marxist sympathies dating from

Ross Street temple conflicts of the early 1970s but who latterly had gained recognition for his community social activities, including a useful series of Punjabi radio programme broadcasts aimed at helping East Indians understand laws relating to immigration, housing, and human rights.

Eventually, Pendakur, a non-Sikh, withdrew from the N.D.P. nomination race and the two Sikhs, Sekhon and Dosanjh, competed feverishly for a ballot position. Each signed up over three hundred new members for the N.D.P. and the question arose as to whether two East Indians could represent the N.D.P. in the Vancouver South election.

Apparently the provincial N.D.P. executive let it be known that only one East Indian should run on behalf of the N.D.P., and that each of the contestants for the nomination should seek a non-East Indian running mate. To run two East Indian N.D.P. candidates, they argued, would risk a racist election campaign and insure a Social Credit victory. In any case, Sekhon and Dosanjh would hardly have run together, as their support groups tended to come from opposing factions within the Sikh community. Both men relied on their associational links with organized labour and both made every effort to capitalize on kinship and friendship ties in their drives to sign up N.D.P. members, but generally, Sekhon's supporters came from the "reformist" ranks in the Ross Street temple while Dosanjh drew support from those opposed to the reformists. The showdown came on April 11, 1979 at a packed, tense, and controversial N.D.P. nomination meeting which featured a major dispute over voting procedure. Eventually, the meeting chairman overrode a party constitutional provision which would have disallowed some 230 of Dosanjh's supporters and 30 of Sekhon's to vote for the nomination.⁸ As a result, Dosanjh and his running mate Jim Duvall won the two nomination by a two-to-one margin. The defeated Sekhon forces subsequently withdrew campaign worker support and finances and it was widely believed that Dosanjh was unable to rally united East Indian community support after the nomination struggle. The large number of East Indians working for the N.D.P. campaign and their enthusiastic solicitation of the East Indian vote in Vancouver South tend to bely any such notion of community support withdrawal, however.

The Social Credit Party in Vancouver South seemed unconcerned about the N.D.P. nomination struggle, although it did take two East Indians into its election campaign

committee. The Socreds could feel confident of victory because a redrawing of constituency boundaries prior to the election was expected to add to the number of Social Credit voters. Nevertheless, by the time of the April 17 Social Credit nomination meeting, Gerald Strongman, after considerable indecision, declined to run again and his position was quickly filled by a prestigious ex-Conservative Party leader, Peter Hyndman. Hyndman, although a stranger to the constituency had become provincial chairman of the Social Credit Party prior to its victory in 1975 and was widely regarded as a strong contender, if elected, for a provincial cabinet post. In the end, the Rogers and Hyndman combination, despite a province-wide N.D.P. resurgence, increased the Sacred margin of victory in Vancouver South. With the provincial Progressive Conservative and Liberal Parties failing to make any impression on voters, the Vancouver South provincial election ended in a bitter two-way race characteristic of many B.C. electoral struggles.

TABLE XIII

VANCOUVER SOUTH PROVINCIAL ELECTION RESULTS

1975 AND 1979

1975			1979		
	Votes	%		Vote	%
Rogers(SC)	18,711	51.9	Rogers(SC)	19,741	53.3
Strongman(SC)	18,559		Hyndman(SC)	19,665	
Harcourt(NDP)	14,213		Dosanjh(NDP)	14,123	
Radford(NDP)	14,260	39.7	Duvall(NDP)	15,258	39.7
Johannson(Lib)	1,988		Westlake(PC)	2,066	
Chambers(Lib)	2,100		Kilby(PC)	2,045	
Walker(PC)	854	2.4	Schmidt(Lib)	859	1.2
Westlake(PC)	833		Dhillon(Ind)	154	
Stevens(Comm)	169		Sorokin(Ind)	81	
Vint(Comm)	67	.3			
Total Valid Vote	71,754	100.0	Total Valid Vote	73,992	100.1

2. Federal election. The outcome of the 1979 federal election in Vancouver South, meanwhile, was never in serious doubt. While the future of Canada teetered uncertainly on the question of which party would gain enough seats to form a government in Ottawa, most observers predicted an easy Progressive Conservative victory in Vancouver South. Although the constituency had been a Liberal Party bastion under the personal dominance of cabinet minister Arthur Laing during the 1960s, John Fraser of the

Progressive Conservatives had won it in 1972 and increased his margin of electoral victory in 1974. Fraser, a lawyer, was widely respected for his constituency work and, with the increasing prospect of a national Conservative win, was expected to acquire a cabinet post in a new Clark government. The Liberal Party candidate, Tony Toth, an M.A. student in Political Science at The University of British Columbia, faced an uphill task of constituency party rebuilding following the defeat of better known Liberal candidates in 1972 and 1974. The New Democratic Party, which had never won a federal election in Vancouver South, was represented by a social worker named Judy McManus. To round out the ballot, the Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist) nominated Amarjit Dhillon, an East Indian plywood mill labourer. In the event, John Fraser defeated his opponents handily in an uneventful local campaign, and increased his popular vote share as follows:

TABLE XIV
VANCOUVER SOUTH FEDERAL ELECTION RESULTS

1974			1979		
	Votes	%		Votes	%
Fraser (PC)	23,247	52.9	Fraser (PC)	22,650	53.8
Oberlander (Lib)	13,881	31.6	Toth (Lib)	10,552	25.1
Howard (NDP)	6,629	15.1	McManus (NDP)	8,805	20.9
Beynon (CPC)	129	.3	Dhillon (CPML)	93	.2
Boylan (MLP)	79	.2	Total valid vote	42,100	100.0
Total valid vote	43,965	100.1			

The anticipated and actual results of the election must be seen in the light of a general Liberal Party decline in British Columbia and Western Canada, largely based on dissatisfaction with its economic performance and focussed on the personality and policies of Prime Minister Trudeau. One question for this study is whether the East Indians of Vancouver South were a part of this trend and shared the same anti-Trudeau sentiment. Our initial assumption was that East Indians would continue to support the Liberals and Trudeau because of their immigration, multiculturalism, and human rights policies, and because of Liberal patronage links dating back to the Laing era. On the other hand, given Fraser's reputation, and the prospect of his and the Progressive Conservatives' national victory, it might be speculated that the East Indians would prefer to support the local and national winner. Meanwhile, the resurgence of the N.D.P. in British

Columbia and the high proportion of East Indian workers, many of them unionized in the sawmills of the constituency, were additional complicating factors affecting the East Indians' federal vote in Vancouver South.

East Indian and Non-East Indian Voting in the 1979 Provincial Election

Our data on East Indian and non-East Indian voting in the 1979 provincial election in Vancouver South suffer from a number of deficiencies owing to the fact that our initial survey in 1978 was aimed primarily at an analysis of federal election voting.⁹ Fortunately, we do have information on how our two samples voted in the previous 1975 provincial election. And in the 1979 survey we closed the information gap somewhat by asking an extensive set of questions regarding provincial election voting.

Data on voter turnout compiled by questionnaire surveys are always suspect because people who do not vote also tend to decline to be interviewed. Whereas the average voter turnout in Vancouver South provincial elections over the past decade has been approximately 65%, 95.7% of our East Indian sample and 94.8% of our non-East Indian sample said they voted in the Vancouver South provincial election of 1979. But these data tell us little about electoral participation realities for a second reason, namely, that East Indians are generally thought to be underregistered as provincial voters. To be eligible to vote in B.C. elections one must be 18, a resident of the province for one year, and hold British subject status. The problem is that registration must be applied for by individuals. According to party workers, there are approximately 1500 East Indian names in the Vancouver South provincial voters list, which, if the overall East Indian population total of 10,000 is correct, suggests a lack of registration.¹⁰ N.D.P. party workers and East Indian leaders say that a voter registration drive will be undertaken among East Indians prior to the next election.

In an attempt to discover what influenced the East Indian and non-East Indian vote, we asked our respondents to rank the importance of provincial party leaders' abilities, party policies, and local candidates' abilities. As Table XV shows, both groups placed party policies first, party leaders' abilities second, and local candidates' abilities third:

TABLE XV

INFLUENCE ON PROVINCIAL VOTE OF PARTY POLICIES, LEADERS AND CANDIDATES

Question: In deciding how to vote, people take a number of different things into account. Could you please rank the following according to how important they were to you in deciding how to vote in the May 10 provincial election (1=most important, 2=next most important, and so on).

	EI (N=46)			Non-EI (N=58)		
	Avg rank	No.	Sample %	Avg rank	No.	Sample %
Party Policy	1.78	40	87.0	1.47	53	91.4
Leader's Abilities	1.78	41	87.0	1.85	53	91.4
Candidates' Abilities	2.39	36	78.3	2.56	53	89.7

When asked to rank campaign issues on the basis of their importance to them as individuals, our East Indian and non-East Indian respondents produced the following rank orders:

TABLE XVI

RANKING OF PROVINCIAL ELECTION ISSUES

EI (N=46)				Non-EI (N=58)			
Rank	Issues	Mean Rank	Sample %	Rank	Issues	Mean Rank	Sample %
1.	Leadership of the Govt	2.57	60.9	1.	Management of Economy	2.17	91.4
2.	Management of Economy	2.97	71.7	2.	Leadership of the Govt	3.13	82.8
3.	Car Insurance	3.84	69.6	3.	Free Enterprise vs Soc'sm	3.29	88.0
4.	Labour Policy	3.96	60.9	4.	Control of Resources	4.36	81.0
5.	Free Enterprise vs Soc'sm	4.09	47.8	5.	Labour Policy	5.13	65.6
6.	Social Welfare Policy	4.47	41.3	6.	Social Welfare Policy	6.23	67.2
7.	Control of Resources	4.52	45.7	7.	Denticare	7.34	60.3
8.	Denticare	5.10	45.7	8.	Pre-election Budget	7.82	60.3
9.	Nuclear Energy Policy	5.69	34.8	9.	Nuclear Energy Policy	7.82	58.6
10.	BCRIC shares	6.06	39.1	10.	Car insurance	8.06	62.1
11.	Pre-election Budget	7.29	30.4	11.	BCRIC shares	8.43	63.8

Apart from differences in the ranking of one or two issues, particularly that of car insurance, which East Indians ranked much higher than did non-East Indians, the two lists are not widely divergent. In the ideologically polarized party politics of British Columbia, however, Social Credit and N.D.P. policies on most of these issues are diametrically opposed. Thus we have no way of predicting from issue ranking the dramatic divergence of party preference indicated by our East Indian and non-East Indian respondents. Table XVII shows the wide gap between East Indian and non-East Indian voting

TABLE XVII

EAST INDIAN AND NON-EAST INDIAN RESPONDENTS' PARTY PREFERENCE IN
VANCOUVER SOUTH PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS, 1975 AND 1979

	EI (N=43)				Non-EI (N=57)			
	1975		1979		1975		1979	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Social Credit	9	21.4	6	14.0	28	49.1	37	71.2
N.D.P.	24	57.1	35	81.4	14	24.6	9	17.3
Liberal	0	0.0	0	0.0	7	12.3	0	0.0
Conservative	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	5.3	3	5.8
Didn't vote	5	11.9	2	4.7	2	3.5	3	5.8
Don't know/ Don't remember	4	9.6	0	0.0	3	5.3	0	0.0
Total	42	100.0	43	100.1	57	100.1	52	100.1

preferences first in 1975, and then to an even greater extent in 1979. Already in 1975 East Indians and non-East Indians indicate a relative polarization of party preference, with over half of the former voting NDP and nearly half of the latter voting Social Credit. In 1979 the polarization intensified greatly, with an additional 24.3% of East Indians voting NDP and an additional 22.1% of non-East Indians voting Social Credit.

The possible implications of these survey findings are somewhat alarming. One is that voting and change of voting preference are occurring along racial lines. This possibility is underscored by the fact that Ujjal Dosanjh polled 1,135 votes fewer than his running mate, Jim Duvall. Secondly, between 1975 and 1979 East Indians and non-East Indians not only voted increasingly for opposing parties, but East Indians increasingly supported the losing party while non-East Indians supported the winner. According to our survey, the Social Credit Party owed little of its 1979 victory to East Indian support in Vancouver South. The N.D.P., meanwhile, gained a substantial share of the East Indian vote between 1975 and 1979 but lost 7.3% of the non-East Indian vote during the same period.

Let it be hastily said that our survey findings provide no evidence that non-East Indians are turning to Social Credit because East Indians are increasingly supporting the N.D.P. Only two out of 57 non-East Indian respondents said they did not like Dosanjh because of his race. The non-East Indians who had voted N.D.P. in 1975 and

switched to Social Credit in 1979 may have concealed their true feelings, but in any case cited non-racial reasons for their change.

There is evidence that the N.D.P. picked up East Indian support because it ran an East Indian candidate, Ujjal Dosanjh. Respondents were asked in the survey to tell what they liked or disliked about individual candidates, and in the case of Dosanjh, a majority of East Indian respondents said they liked him because he was an East Indian, or because they knew him personally, or because they approved of his activities in the community. Moreover, it appears that despite the bitter Sekhon-Dosanjh competition for the N.D.P. nomination, all but one of our East Indians respondents who had voted N.D.P. in 1975 continued to do so in 1979.

To return to a point made earlier, the huge increase in East Indian support for the N.D.P. may be less a function of Ujjal Dosanjh's candidacy and more an indication of a general East Indian increase in political participation via party membership. In effect, the Dosanjh candidacy was as much a symptom as a cause of East Indian electoral participation. This is indicated by a surprising increase in party membership, which was reported by 18 out of 64 (28.1%) of the East Indian respondents in our 1978 sample and rose to 23 out of 44 (52.3%) respondents in our 1979 sample. Even allowing for the probability that our 1979 sample contains proportionately more political activists than our 1978 sample, the increase -- almost all of it in the direction of the N.D.P. -- reflects the frantic competition for support during the nomination struggle. Some non-East Indian N.D.P. executive members are said to have complained that the nature of the competition, which increased N.D.P. membership in the constituency more than threefold, resulted in a substantial number of meaningless "paper memberships." From both sides of the Sekhon-Dosanjh rivalry have come allegations that the other side bought party memberships for friends or followers who were ready to apply. So far I have not been able to find evidence to support this allegation. Rather, it appears that a large number of East Indians have invested in an N.D.P. membership, albeit for intra-communal rivalry reasons in many cases, and actively support the party. It was quite clear on election day that East Indians contributed a disproportionate share of energy to the N.D.P. campaign. It might

be expected that a considerable amount of that energy, and voter support, would diminish if the N.D.P. ran only non-East Indians in its next provincial campaign in Vancouver South. Nevertheless, it currently appears that the transference of East Indian participant energy from the arena of intra-communal politics via the political party route to the arena of dominant society politics represents an integrative gain. The East Indians have successfully established a bridgehead in Vancouver South provincial politics.

East Indian and Non-East Indian Voting in the 1979 Federal Election

The 1979 federal election in Vancouver South might be thought to provide a more accurate reflection of "typical" East Indian voting behaviour, since no major party ran an East Indian candidate. As we began our resurvey in May 1979 we nevertheless wondered whether any effects of the provincial election campaign would spill over into the federal election.

With regard to rate of participation, our federal turnout data are as unrepresentatively high as our provincial data, with 91.3% of our East Indian and 98.3% of our non-East Indian respondents reporting that they voted on May 22. The East Indian federal election turnout is slightly lower than in the provincial election, but there is little evidence of apathy or alienation. It is assumed that voter underregistration is less of a problem in the federal election, because enumerators canvass on a door-to-door basis in an effort to make the federal list complete.

As in the case of our provincial survey, we asked our respondents which had influenced their vote most: the federal party leaders' abilities, federal party policies, or local candidates' abilities. If Table XVIII is compared with Table XV, it can be seen that East Indians ranked these influences in the same order as they did for the provincial election, giving priority to the importance of party policies. The non-East Indians, meanwhile, gave priority to the importance of the federal party leaders:

TABLE XVIII

INFLUENCE ON FEDERAL VOTE OF PARTY POLICIES, LEADERS, AND CANDIDATES

Question: In deciding how to vote, people take a number of different things into account. Could you please rank the following according to how important they were to you in deciding how to vote in the May 22 federal election (1=most important, 2=next most important, and so on.).

EI (N=46)				Non-EI (N=51)			
	Avg rank	No.	Sample %		Avg rank	No.	Sample %
Party policies	1.58	38	82.6	Federal party leaders	1.88	56	96.6
Federal party leaders'	1.73	37	80.4	abilities			
Local candidates	2.34	32	69.6	Party policies	1.96	55	94.8
				Local candidates'			
				abilities	2.20	55	94.8

It cannot be concluded from these data that East Indians were any less concerned about the federal leadership issue, despite their primary orientation to party policies. One indication is found in Table XIX, which reports our respondents' opinions regarding which party leader convinced them he would make the best Prime Minister:

TABLE XIX

FEDERAL LEADER CONSIDERED BEST PRIME MINISTERIAL PROSPECT

Question: Which federal party leader convinced you that he would make the best Prime Minister?

EI (N=43)			Non-EI (N=56)		
	No.	%	No.	%	
Ed Broadbent (NDP)	12	27.9	8	14.3	
Joe Clark (PC)	5	11.6	14	25.0	
Pierre Trudeau (Lib)	24	55.8	18	32.1	
None were convincing	<u>2</u>	<u>4.7</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>28.6</u>	
	43	100.0	56	100.0	

Surprisingly, in these post-election responses it is the non-East Indians who indicate a considerable degree of alienation from the existing leaders. The East Indians seem much more definite as to which leader they prefer and the conviction of a majority of them that Pierre Trudeau would make the best Prime Minister is quite noticeable.

As regards campaign issues, the ranking of issues by East Indians and non-East Indians reveals, with a few exceptions, a largely similar sequence (see Table XX).

TABLE XX

RANKING OF FEDERAL ELECTION ISSUES

Question: What issues that emerged in the federal election campaign were the most important to you? Please rank the following in order of importance (1=most important, 2=next most important, and so on.).

EI (N=46)					Non-EI (N=58)				
Rank in 1979	Rank in 1978	Issues	Mean Rank	Sample %	Rank in 1979	Rank in 1978	Issues	Mean Rank	Sample %
1.	1.	Unemployment	1.98	89.1	1.	2.	Cost of Living	2.34	91.4
2.	2.	Cost of Living	2.77	67.4	2.	1.	Unemployment	3.31	87.9
3.		Leadership of the Country	4.04	54.3	3.		Leadership of the Country	3.90	89.7
4.	6.	Immigration	4.61	50.0	4.	4.	Value of Dollar	5.49	81.0
5.	3.	Value of Dollar	5.04	58.7	5.	3.	National Unity	6.94	86.2
6.	5.	National Unity	5.35	50.0	6.	7.	Treatment of West in Canada	7.09	79.3
7.	4.	Foreign Control of Canada's Economy	6.40	43.5	7.	6.	Foreign Control of Canada's Economy	7.35	79.3
8.		Medicare	6.42	41.3			Medicare	8.03	69.0
9.		Mortgage Deduct- ability	6.75	43.5	8.		Immigration	8.60	77.6
10.	7.	Capital Punishment	7.94	34.8	9.	5.	Capital Punishment	9.41	67.2

The importance assigned to the unemployment and cost of living issues by both East Indians and non-East Indians is clear. The edge in priority given to unemployment by East Indians is probably related to the fact that in our 1978 survey, 38.5% of our East Indian respondents, as compared with 27.3% of our non-East Indian respondents, reported that they or a member of their household had been unemployed during the past two years. Another issue of note is immigration policy, which rose in importance for East Indians, but declined considerably for non-East Indians during 1978-79. The rankings on this issue may reflect a perception by East Indians of enhanced restrictiveness in Canadian immigration policy with the promulgation of the new Immigration Act in 1978.

The most interesting finding in our two surveys is in the changing patterns of federal party preference indicated by East Indians and non-East Indians. Table XXI shows three measures of the change for each group. The first indicates how each group reported, in 1978, their party preferences in the previous federal election of July 1974. The second indicates how the same two groups said in 1978 they intended to vote in the coming federal election (which was unannounced at the time). The third measure

indicates how the two groups actually voted on May 22, 1979.

The noteworthy development in these measures is the nearly even three-way split of the East Indian federal vote in 1979, despite the indication only one year earlier that half of our East Indian respondents intended to vote Liberal, over a quarter to vote N.D.P., and only 4.8% to vote Progressive Conservative. The East Indian defection rate from the Liberals between 1974 and 1979 (30.8%) is almost twice as great as that of the non-East Indians (15.8%) and most of it occurred within the year prior to the

TABLE XXI

EAST INDIAN AND NON-EAST INDIAN RESPONDENTS'
PARTY PREFERENCES IN VANCOUVER SOUTH FEDERAL ELECTIONS
1974 AND 1979

	EI				Non-EI							
	Voted		Intention		Voted		Voted		Intention		Voted	
	in		in		in		in		in		in	
	1974		1978		1979		1974		1978		1979	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Liberal	21	61.8	21	50.0	13	31.0	24	44.4	15	26.8	16	28.6
PC	3	8.8	2	4.8	13	31.0	21	38.9	29	51.8	36	64.3
NDP	7	20.6	11	26.2	15	35.7	6	11.1	3	5.4	4	7.1
Communist	-	-	1	2.4	1	2.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other/ND	3	8.8	1	2.4	-	-	3	5.6	-	-	-	-
Undecided	-	-	6	14.3	-	-	-	-	9	16.1	-	-
	34	100.0	42	100.1	42	100.1	54	100.0	56	100.1	56	100.0

election. Meanwhile, whereas non-East Indians indicated a steady build-up of support for the Progressive Conservatives between 1974 and 1979, one-third of our East Indian respondents in 1979 reversed a 1974-78 trend of alienation from the Progressive Conservatives and voted for that party. East Indian support for the N.D.P. increased steadily over our three measures; however, non-East Indian support for the N.D.P. declined by 4.0%.

How are we to interpret these findings? The easiest to explain is the rising support federally for the N.D.P. among East Indians, much of which is apparently a spill-over from the provincial election. It must be remembered that membership in the provincial N.D.P. -- to which 52.3% of our 1979 East Indian sample were so eagerly signed up -- means membership in the federal N.D.P. as well. According to our survey, 48.3% of

East Indians who voted N.D.P. in the provincial election voted N.D.P. federally, while 27.6% of them voted Liberal and 20.7% voted Progressive Conservative.

All of our East Indian respondents who voted Liberal in 1979 had done so in 1974: there was a residuum of loyal East Indian Liberals, but not a single new Liberal voter among East Indians in our 1979 sample. Meanwhile, 60.0% of East Indians who had voted Liberal in 1974 voted Progressive Conservative (35.0%) or N.D.P. (25.0%) in 1979. Among the East Indian Liberal loyalists, ten out of thirteen said they approved of Liberal policies, and of these five specifically mentioned immigration policy as their main reason for continuing to support the Liberals. On the whole, the East Indians who voted Liberal did not come from any one group, occupationally, educationally, or in religious attitudes.

The most intriguing question is, who were the East Indians who voted Progressive Conservative in 1979? Only two of our East Indian respondents had voted Progressive Conservative in 1974; the rest of the Progressive Conservative voters must have made a conscious decision to change their party preference during 1978-79. Most who made the switch had voted Liberal in 1974, but beyond that, the profile of East Indian Progressive Conservative voters is not very clear. There is an even mixture of labour versus professional occupations, although more professionals voted Progressive Conservative than they did for the other parties. Apparently, John Fraser was equally attractive to East Indians with high or low educational attainment, and of conservative or reformist religious orientation. When asked why they shifted to the Progressive Conservatives, the East Indians who had done so gave reasons much like those of their non-East Indian neighbours, variants, usually, of the recurrent theme: "It was time for a change."

Conclusion

The results of our investigation of East Indian and non-East Indian voting in Vancouver South reflect a preliminary attempt to understand Canadian minority ethnic voting behaviour in one constituency. Given that ours was a low-budget survey carried out by non-professional interviewers on an admittedly small sample of voters, it would be unwise to generalize too confidently from our conclusions. Minority ethnic voting in Canada undoubtedly varies greatly according to constituency context and in relation

to national or provincial voting trends, and among minority ethnic groups depending on a range of historical, demographic, socio-economic and other factors peculiar to each group. It would be hazardous to generalize even about East Indian voting behaviour in other constituencies, given the special features of the Vancouver South context and the diversity of East Indian settlement patterns in other parts of Canada. Nonetheless, our findings represent a beginning in a potentially fruitful area of study and suggest guidelines for the pursuit of this kind of research in the voting behaviour of "other" Canadians of a dozen different national origins.

The first notable finding of our survey is that East Indians are not now, if they were before, significantly less apathetic about or alienated from the electoral politics of the dominant society than non-East Indians. Hitherto it has been a widespread impression that East Indians, retreating from discriminatory attitudes and practices of the dominant society and preoccupied with preservation of their own cultural values, expended most of their political energies in intra-communal competition, much of it petty and unproductive. Our evidence indicates that even if this is still partially true, levels of electoral participation, of political cognition, and of feelings of political efficacy among East Indians are relatively high and rising. Inevitably those East Indians with higher educational attainment, professional occupations, and a reformist/modernist orientation to religious and social issues score higher on these measures, but the overall participant trend is clear for the whole community.

Speculation about the reasons for the participation increase must venture beyond the range of our empirical evidence, but a number of possible explanations might be suggested. One is that the participation increase is a product of the huge rise in East Indian immigration in the 1970s. In effect, the size of the East Indian community has reached a "critical mass" level such that (1) East Indians are more visible to their non-East Indian neighbours and their increased social and economic interaction necessitates some degree of mutual political accommodation; and (2) East Indians have become sizeable enough as a pool of voters to attract attention from dominant society politicians and political institutions, especially political parties. Another concomitant explanation recognizes the burgeoning of an East Indian professional and business class

with an economic and political stake in Canadian society. The latter are highly sensitive to non-East Indian attitudes towards East Indians and are anxious simultaneously to defend East Indian policy interests (as, for example, on immigration and human rights) and to improve the public image of East Indians. The founding of the National Association of Canadians of Origins in India is clear evidence of these concerns. In sum, it appears that the numerical increase of East Indians and the increased stake in Canadian society of their leaders have propelled them out of the arena of temple politics into the arenas of dominant society politics.

As this study has shown, in Vancouver South the East Indians' major breakthrough into dominant society politics has been into provincial politics and particularly into the New Democratic Party. There is a dilemma in this, and also an opportunity. The dilemma is that in order to maximize the influence of their limited numbers, East Indians have consolidated their support behind one party, the N.D.P., and in doing so may have alienated non-East Indian support from that party and the sympathies of the other party, Social Credit, which happens at present to form the government of the province. If the East Indians were to diversify their party preferences and memberships there might be less risk of racial polarization, and more responsiveness to East Indian interests by both parties. However, this would probably decrease the possibility of reaching the goal of sending an East Indian M.L.A. to Victoria. If present trends continue, a province-wide tide in favour of the N.D.P., such as occurred in 1972, might be enough to make that goal a reality. At the moment, it seems that East Indian support for the N.D.P. will continue, and even increase if voter registration is actively pursued; moreover, there is every indication that the N.D.P. will choose an East Indian candidate for Vancouver South in the next provincial election.

The federal electoral trend of East Indians is less clear. The arena of federal politics appears to be more distant and there are no indications of East Indian candidates seeking to enter it. One obvious reason for this is the apparent invincibility of the incumbent M.P., John Fraser. But another reason is that there is no consensus among East Indians regarding their federal electoral interest. One section of the community remains loyal to the Liberal Party because of its historically liberal

policies towards immigrants and minority groups; another supports the N.D.P. for economic reasons and because of the spin-off of the provincial pro-N.D.P. connection. And latterly, a new group of East Indians sees an interest in supporting a strong incumbent Progressive Conservative M.P. and a new national Progressive Conservative government. The logic of each party preference is clear; in combination, although no such collective and strategic consciousness can be attributed, it might well be concluded that the East Indian community is hedging its bets in Vancouver South federal electoral politics.

As a final observation, I would argue that the provincial and federal electoral behaviour patterns of East Indians in Vancouver South represent two interesting extremes of visible minority political choice: the all-eggs-in-one-basket choice versus the bet-hedging choice. As a visible minority, East Indians have been and will continue to be both vulnerable and defensive: their federal voting currently reflects such cautiousness. However, as they increase in numbers and self-confidence they seem prepared, in provincial elections at least, to weigh political risk against potential political gain. East Indians and students of Canadian ethnic politics must wait to learn the consequences of both kinds of electoral calculus.

NOTES

1. The research on which this study is based was funded by the U.B.C. Office of Research Administration and the Youth Employment Programme of the B.C. Department of Labour. The assistance of John Calder, Barbara Sage, Paul Sekhon and Kathy Teghtsoonian in carrying out the voter survey is gratefully acknowledged. Ms. Teghtsoonian's expert preparation of the survey data for computer and statistical analysis is especially appreciated.
2. See, for example, the otherwise excellent study by Jean A. Laponce, "Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics in Canada: A Comparative Analysis of Survey and Census Data," in M. Dogan and S. Rokkan, eds., Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969.
3. See Grace Anderson, "Voting Behaviour and the Ethnic-Religious Variable: A Study of a Federal Election in Hamilton, Ontario," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXXII (February 1966); John C. Courtney and David E. Smith, "Voting in a Provincial General Election and a Federal By-Election: A Constituency Study of Saskatoon City," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 33 (August 1966); John Wilson, "Politics and Social Class in Canada: The Case of Waterloo South," Canadian Journal of Political Science, I (September 1968); Nelson Wiseman and K.W. Taylor, "Ethnic vs. Class Voting: The Case of Winnipeg, 1945," Canadian Journal of Political Science, VII, 2 (June 1974).
4. One deficiency in our East Indian sample is a lack of female respondents. Generally, East Indian women who were selected for the survey either refused to participate or preferred their husbands to respond on their behalf.
5. According to the Census of Canada, Profile Studies: Ethnic Origins of Canadians, by John Kralt, Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1977, p. 7, there were 67,900 people in Canada of East Indian origin in 1971. Statistics on East Indian immigration since 1971 can be obtained from the annual Immigration Statistics reports published by Employment and Immigration Canada (formerly The Department of Manpower and Immigration, Ottawa). A mid-year census was carried out in 1976 but asked only for the language spoken by respondents, thereby missing, for our purposes, many second and third generation East Indians who are English speakers.
6. For an excellent overview, see Tom Hodgson, "A Review of the Historical and Sociological Literature on East Indians in Canada," Canadian Ethnic Studies, IX, 1 (1977). See also Adrian G. Mayer, "A Report on the East Indian Community in Vancouver," Working Paper of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, U.B.C., 1959; Brij Lal, "East Indians in British Columbia, 1904-1914: An Historical Study in Growth and Integration," Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Department of History, U.B.C., 1976; Sushil K. Jain, "East Indians in Canada," Research Group for European Migration Problems Bulletin, Supplement 9, June 1971; and John R. Wood, "East Indians and Canada's New Immigration Policy," Canadian Public Policy, IV, 4 (Autumn 1978).
7. Verne A. Dusenbery, "Canadian Ideology and Public Policy: Its Impact on Vancouver Sikh 'Ethnic' and 'Religious' Adaptation," paper presented at these meetings, p. 14 (draft).

8. This was the sixty-day rule which precluded party members signed up within sixty days of the nomination meeting from voting for the nomination of N.D.P. candidates. The nomination meeting had originally been scheduled for May 13, 1979, but Premier Bennett's surprise announcement of an election on May 10 meant that the meeting had to be updated to April 11. Since Dosanjh had entered the nomination race late, his membership recruits were more affected than Sekhon's by the sixty-day provision.
9. Essentially, we do not have panel data for provincial voting, except for how our respondents voted in the 1975 and 1979 provincial elections.
10. It may also suggest a lack of citizenship among East Indians, presuming that citizenship is a prerequisite for British subject status.