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Canada and the Far East 1940-1953.



Japanese resettlers in the east, the apparently slight animus which they verbalized as a result of evacuation, the brief publicity given to the few who were taken into the army in February, 1945, and the first-hand experience which has belied the stereotypes—all of these have worked to make easterners feel that citizens of Japanese ancestry should have legal equality.<sup>18</sup>

As a matter of fact, legal equality came very quickly and, what is even more important, with every symptom of permanence. The restrictions imposed by Orders-in-Council under the War Measures Act, and legislation prolonging certain extensions of the restrictions, came quietly to an end. No permanent disabilities were imposed, either by defining the "disloyalty" of which Japanese had been vaguely accused, or by defining and forbidding "concentration" in British Columbia. The movement in favour of a Canadian Bill of Rights, and Canada's signature of the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights, would both make any such legislation politically, though not constitutionally, difficult to enact.

The legal disabilities in force in British Columbia applied to all persons of Asiatic race and were closely related to the right to vote. This right was very quickly conceded to persons of Chinese and "Hindu," that is, East Indian, race;<sup>19</sup> and a few years later to persons of Japanese race as well.<sup>20</sup> Professional disabilities imposed on persons not eligible, if of proper age, to be on the voters' list lapsed. The clause in provincial government contracts providing for heavy penalties if Orientals were employed, was dropped in 1949.

The *de facto* prejudice against the employment of Japanese disappeared rapidly. They could compete on their merits with others as long as they did not invade any one occupation in overwhelming numbers or threaten to do so. And their merits were high. Deportation itself, if only by reducing the numbers in the higher age groups and the proportion of foreign-born, improved their average competence. Japanese came to be met in the professions and in the government service, both provincial and federal. They were no more "foreign" in outlook than many of their contemporaries of other racial origins. Popular apprehensions came to be concentrated

<sup>18</sup>Ia Violette, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

<sup>19</sup>Of course all voters must be British subjects or Commonwealth citizens. By Statutes of British Columbia, 1947, c. 28.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, 1949, c. 19; amending R.S.B.C., 1948, c. 106, ss. 2 and 4.

against "communists," an ideological rather than a racial category, and Japanese communists were practically unknown. In 1953, a Canadian Japanese won a Navy League of Canada scholarship enabling him to study for a naval commission in the Naval Training Division at the University of British Columbia.<sup>21</sup>

Reparation was made, if not on a wholly satisfactory scale, for property losses inflicted on innocent men by measures taken in the course of the war. For the almost total loss of earning power which had occurred in many cases during and immediately after the war no compensation was given.

To all these changes the Japanese themselves responded in an exemplary manner, displaying an attachment to their status as Canadians which it was impossible for anyone to associate with disloyalty. They had suffered but, as displaced persons go in the present century, not in an extreme degree, and moderate suffering, bravely borne, commands respect and strengthens people of character. On the whole, good had come out of evil. There is no Japanese problem in Canada today.

By vastly different processes two other minorities of Asiatic race have been rapidly Canadianized. China had won Canadian sympathy and had achieved the status, first of an ally, and then of a member of the Security Council. Chinese in Canada had benefited correspondingly. They had not been the object of suspicion. In the second and third generations, they are not numerous. There was somewhat less concentration than in the case of the Japanese. They had been both "acculturized" and accepted, before the emergence of Communist China. Indeed, this unexpected political development has, in a sense, cut them off from their cultural roots and made their acceptance of Canada as their primary loyalty inevitable.

East Indians in Canada have always been British subjects. They became, if they so chose, Canadian citizens under the terms of the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1946. It seemed, at one time, as if their status might be disturbed. But the decision of India to remain in the Commonwealth and the creation in 1950 of the status of Commonwealth citizen has preserved it. Their somewhat incongruous position of being Canadian citizens disaffected because of the political subjection of India has completely disappeared, and, as they no longer have any reason to press on the Canadian Govern-

<sup>21</sup>Vancouver Province, January 3, 1953.



ment demands connected with the status of India, they emphasize in every possible way their own status as Canadians.<sup>22</sup>

The status of minorities of Asiatic race was powerfully, if indirectly, affected by the enactment of the Canadian Citizenship Act.<sup>23</sup> In a general way very few disabilities had been imposed on aliens because Canadian provinces, unlike states of the United States, were constitutionally incompetent to legislate on such a subject.<sup>24</sup> While the new enactment in no way decreased the number of people who could be prejudiced by provincial legislation discriminatory on racial grounds, the tendency was to suggest that Canadian citizens, as defined by the Act, were somewhat more genuinely Canadian than other British subjects resident in Canada and that they were entitled to equal treatment irrespective of racial origins. No category corresponding to aliens ineligible for citizenship was created. And no Canadian citizens could possibly be considered as having been forced on Canada as part of the British Empire.

Because of the peculiar position of Canada in relation to the British Empire and the Commonwealth, the provisions of the Act, as amended in 1950,<sup>25</sup> are somewhat complicated. In addition to the categories of natural-born Canadian citizens and aliens, there are British subjects or Commonwealth Citizens (for the purposes of the Act the two terms mean the same thing) who have become Canadians, Citizens of the Republic of Ireland (other than Commonwealth) who have become Canadians, aliens who have become Canadians, and those British subjects, or Commonwealth Citizens, and those Citizens of the Republic of Ireland who are not Canadians but are also not aliens. All Canadians are British subjects.

The acid test of a change of heart in racial questions is to be

<sup>22</sup>The writer was a guest at a dinner of the Khalsa Diwan to celebrate the anniversary of the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Among the guests of honour were members of the provincial and federal governments including members who had, a few years before, been conspicuous as anti-Asiatic. The tone of the speeches demonstrated a number of things: the Canadianization of the Indians; the value of the franchise which they had acquired, both in making them feel that they were really Canadian and in making politicians remember that they had votes; the general dislike, in Canada, of disabilities based on race, which itself is largely the outcome of dislikes based on ideologies, and the wish for allies.

<sup>23</sup>10 Geo. VI, c. 15.

<sup>24</sup>For the extent of discrimination against aliens in certain states of the United States see M. R. Konvitz, *The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law* (New York, 1946), chap. 6.

<sup>25</sup>14 Geo. VI, c. 29.

found in the immigration law. Each of the three Asiatic races must be considered in turn.

The long-standing "gentlemen's agreement" with Japan ended with the war and has not been replaced. Although, in principle, immigration from Japan is not permitted it does occur in certain cases: the wives of soldiers; Canadian nationals resident in Japan and who did not fight against the United Nations; close relatives of Canadians of Japanese origin. Canada also receives Japanese students who do not intend to remain and who are, therefore, not immigrants.

The Chinese Immigration Act,<sup>26</sup> which was a standing insult to a friendly people, has been repealed.<sup>27</sup> Nominated immigration has been permitted in the case of wife and children. But no quota agreement was reached with the National Government of China and none has been attempted with the Central People's Government, which Canada does not recognize.

In the case of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon the virtual prohibition of all but the wives and children of residents of Canada<sup>28</sup> has been superseded by quotas mutually agreed on by an exchange of notes with the government concerned. Canadian quotas differ from those in use in the United States. They do not apply to all countries. They are not based on a formula but are established by negotiation with the country to which they apply. It remains to be seen whether they can be made the basis for a comprehensive and permanent policy. As yet the quotas are employed only within the Commonwealth.

The year 1953 has furnished further evidence of the improvement of race relations in Canada. The welcome extended to the Japanese Crown Prince, Akihito, was warm and friendly. The participation of Canadians of Japanese race on this occasion was particularly significant and met with general approval by other Canadians.

<sup>26</sup>13 and 14 Geo. V, c. 38.

<sup>27</sup>11 Geo. VI, c. 19.

<sup>28</sup>See *E.A.*, vol. III, no. 11 (November 1951), p. 376, for text of exchange of notes in Karachi, on October 23, 1951, according to which a quota of 100 per annum in addition to husband, wife, or unmarried children under 21 of a citizen of Canada if the settlement arrangements in Canada are shown to be satisfactory. The annual quota of 100 citizens of Pakistan, including both sexes and all ages, is authorized, provided the immigrants comply with the provisions of the Canadian Immigration Act. In addition a citizen of Pakistan, who can comply with the provisions of the Act, may be admitted for permanent residence if he or she is the husband, wife, or unmarried child under 21 years of age of any citizen legally admitted to and resident of Canada, and if the settlement arrangements in Canada are shown to the Canadian authorities to be satisfactory.



They did not appear to forget for a moment that Canada was their country of primary allegiance. They naturally desired, as Canadians of other races desired, the most friendly relations with their country of ancestral origin. Many of them go so far as to say that, great as was the moral shock and great as were the hardships of the deportation, good has come out of evil and that they have benefited in the long run. They have made homes and friends throughout the country and have begun to establish themselves in occupations barely open to them before the war. Twenty-four are in the army, of whom eleven are in Korea and twelve in Japan. They are accepted in both the Navy and the Air Force. Their chief concern today is with the immigration question. What they ask is not a general quota, such as has been established by agreement for India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, but the admission, perhaps by a system of decreasing quotas, of relatives of Canadian residents. The restrictive measures of which they complain are those excluding Canadians who accompanied their parents to Japan under a wartime exchange agreement, men who served (perhaps by compulsion) in the Japanese armed forces, persons who left Canada as children under sixteen because their parents had elected for "repatriation," former residents of Canada who went back to Japan but who regret their decision, and Japanese nationals barred by immigration laws. Representations to the Government of Canada have met with a sympathetic reception.<sup>29</sup>

Canadians of Chinese race, too, are fast coming to feel more Canadian and less Chinese. Their interest in the political vicissitudes of China is difficult to appraise because support for the Central People's Government is less likely to be overt than support for earlier revolutionary movements. The obvious cleavage is between those prepared to give active assistance to the National Government and those who consider that, as Canadians, they should be neutral.

Canadians of East Indian race, as has been noted, are emphatically Canadian. Greater ease of communication with India and relaxation of barriers to immigration on a small scale have made them more contented and, at the same time, more aware that they are much better off in Canada than they would be in India.

In all three cases, Canadians in general and British Columbians in particular are receiving the reward for their enfranchisement of

<sup>29</sup>See, for instance, *The New Canadian* (Toronto), vol. XVI, nos. 31, 35 (April 22 and May 6, 1953).

Asiatics and their condemnation of racial discrimination as between Canadian citizens. A bill which is (as at May, 1953) before the Parliament of Canada, where it is meeting little opposition, would forbid discrimination in employment, not by amending the criminal law, but by applying the rule to enterprises controlled by the federal government. This increasingly generous attitude to racial differences has not yet been put to the test of mass unemployment which provides the real criterion of sincerity in such matters.



that of the Chinese and now largely confined to the older age groups. Apart from this their group exhibits all the earmarks of a strong, close-knit society. Thus there is virtually no inter-marriage with other peoples. Again, occupationally they tend to follow callings which suggest a certain physical vigor. Thus 22% are in agriculture, 18.3% in the fishing, hunting, trapping group, which in their case means fishing, and "considerable numbers" in logging. Only about 6% are in commercial callings and about 8.5% in personal service.

Both the Chinese and the Japanese compare quite favorably with the more primitive white immigrant groups in such matters as literacy and ability to speak English. Nearly one Chinese in five is illiterate (17.4% in 1931), and about one Japanese in nine (11.2%), a record exceeded by the Ukrainians among the whites. About three-quarters of them have learned to speak more or less English, the Japanese in this respect being slightly ahead of the Chinese. Infant and maternal mortality among them is not greatly different from that of the whites, the Chinese rates being higher than the Japanese but both being lower than, say, the French. Both Asiatic groups have very poor naturalization records, the Chinese much poorer than the Japanese. In the case of the Chinese this figure is very probably a direct reflection of the segregated and lonely nature of so many individuals in their group. They are strangers and remain strangers, on the outside of any community in which they live, and consequently have no inducement to become citizens. To a considerable degree the explanations for the Japanese would be the same. In addition, they have a compact community of their own, a group within a group, and even if they were not denied the political rights of citizenship by the larger group, it is improbable that many of them would feel the need for going beyond their own group and associating themselves with the larger group of the Canadian nation.

For some reason which is not clear, the Chinese head the list of peoples—other than negroes—in respect to numbers in penitentiaries. Their rate per 100,000 is 203 as compared with a Swedish rate of 26, an Italian rate of 157 (the highest white rate) and a Japanese rate of eight. The two Oriental races thus apparently stand at opposite ends of the scale in respect to serious crime. However, it would be necessary to go further, before pronouncing so harsh a judgment on a people of so quiet and

acquiescent a disposition as the Chinese, and find out what their offences had been. Almost certainly they would not have been crimes of great violence; much more probably they were offences against the *mores* of the white community, probably associated with gambling, drugs and sex. The extreme contrast between the two groups indicates the harmful influence that a distorted social pattern exerts upon the members of a group. Detached males are apparently a menace to any community.

In conclusion, the opinion may be hazarded that, providing there is no more immigration, the Oriental question in British Columbia, in so far as numbers go, has a good chance of more or less solving itself within the space of a generation or two. The Oriental is certainly not going to die out, but it appears as if he may take up his weight and then remain a more or less constant factor. The Chinese will decrease in total numbers, but the present population will be replaced by a native-born Chinese group, whose behavior, demographically, may be expected to conform more or less to that of the general community about it.

The Japanese, on the other hand, apparently will increase rapidly for some time yet without immigration. They are a hardy people, engaged in hardy occupations and it is unlikely that the bulk of them will embrace the bourgeois view of life that has played such havoc with the birthrate of the English-speaking peoples. Yet probably with them, too, the subtle virus of "the standard of living" will have its effect. Let the Chinese and Japanese develop the Anglo-Saxon's tastes for motor cars and expensive schooling and the day when their proportion of the population attains equilibrium will not be far distant.

#### D. *The Continuing Problem*

The problem of the Oriental in Canada has two major aspects. The first relates to immigration; the second to the treatment of the immigrant after arrival.

Today there is almost unanimous agreement in Canada that immigration of people differing greatly from the prevailing stock is unwise, and that measures must be devised, or if already taken, must be retained, to curtail it. As has been shown above, Canada in the past has pursued three policies with respect to immigration from Asia.

Hindus, although British subjects, have been prevented from coming by the rule of a continuous voyage.



Chinese were allowed to come in on payment of a head tax until 1923, after which they were completely barred by the Chinese Immigration Act. This act was the counterpart of the American act excluding the Japanese and is said to have been received by its victims in much the same way. China has a standing grievance against Canada on account of the slight on her national honor.

With Japan still another method has been followed, a method that, if anything, has erred in excess of tact. This has consisted in the "Gentlemen's Agreements" and in Canadian adherence to the Anglo-Japanese Treaties of 1894 and 1911. While Canada, after the war, arbitrarily established, by regulation, a "preferred list" which discriminated among European immigrants according to their region of origin, she has never, in view of the treaty provisions for reciprocity of entry interfered unilaterally with Japanese immigration. Each "Gentlemen's Agreement" has been a matter of negotiation, a method which has left no room for official recriminations.

All three methods appear to have attained, or nearly attained, their objects. Hindu immigration has practically ceased; Chinese are apparently excluded (though some may still come in illegally); and Japanese have come in at about the prescribed rate.

The method pursued in respect of Japanese immigration has been the best one from the point of view of international relations. The Japanese were quick to recognize that Canada could no more be a solution for their population problem than it could for China's. Therefore they were quite willing to accept a "token immigration." Such being the case it is probable that for the sake of continued good relations with Canada (from which Japan has just as much to gain as Canada, if not more), the Japanese would consent to reduction in the size of the token. From their point of view it can make no practical difference whether they send to Canada 150 immigrants a year or one immigrant. Neither number, and indeed no number that Canada could absorb, will have the slightest effect on what has been described as almost a national Japanese malady, "a sort of collective claustrophobia,"<sup>6</sup> population pressure.

The period of Oriental immigration to Canada may now be considered as virtually ended. It still remains for Canada to

<sup>6</sup> *Problems of the Pacific*, 1936, p. 82.

devise and apply a solution for the problem of what to do with the Orientals already established in the Dominion.

While a country is in its first stages of pioneering, heterogeneity of tongues and races is not a matter that gives rise to much difficulty. A frontier community needs labor above all else, and it is almost completely tolerant because it is so essentially shapeless. Moreover, strangers, at first mostly men, tend to be hidden out in the "bush" or in other remote corners and not to come very directly under the observation of the original inhabitants. It is only after the initial phases of settlement have been gone through and the newcomers are settling down that the original settlers make the unwelcome discovery that they will have to live with foreigners whose habits, language and life are very different from their own.

Thus while agitation against Oriental immigration in British Columbia has been going on for a long time, it is really only within the last generation that the second problem has arisen and the task been confronted of adjusting two different ways of life, not on the pioneering basis of the "bush" and the "camps," but on the permanent basis of ordinary communal life.

In the rest of Canada, this confrontation of the old and the new has frequently been solved by the withdrawal of the old. English-speaking people will make few compromises where their way of life is concerned and seem to prefer "to get out" rather than to stay and see the contest through. Hence in many places on the prairies they are disappearing from the countryside as they had previously disappeared from the Eastern Townships of Quebec, preferring to abandon their homes rather than live in communities increasingly French or foreign. In British Columbia, however, they seem more inclined to fight for their way of life—perhaps because they sense that they are on the last frontier and cannot once again "get up and get out" to greener pastures. Hence the bitterness that arises from "the Oriental problem" for there are no more limitless horizons.

There is no lack of white Canadians to declare that if the Oriental can work harder than the white and thus run him out, he proves himself a better man and should not be interfered with. If industry and survival value be taken as the criteria, there is little answer to such an argument. But the days when mere industry was the supreme criterion have long since passed. Most people believe that humanity does not find its



highest or best expression in conditions of unremitting toil, and that what is socially desirable is not more work, certainly not more mechanical toil, but less. Those who praise the ceaseless industry of the Chinese are not, as a rule, among the classes that stand in danger of having to go and do likewise. The danger of the Chinese immigrant peasant "running out" the white man is today not very great, and the immigrant peasant himself, thanks to restrictions on immigration, is on the way out. His children, where he has any, present rather a different problem. They display the phenomena of any immigrant second generation, falling into that dangerous gulf reserved for those who are neither wholly of one group or of the other and not very welcome in either. Nevertheless, even if they will not work 18 hours a day in the fields, women as well as men, they seem to have a turn for at least petty commerce and are steadily invading certain fields of business in British Columbia, notably the fruit and vegetable trade. They are probably the pioneers of a new "Oriental invasion," already provoking comment and which in the near future may be expected to provoke much more.

The complex of interrace relationships as between whites and Japanese is roughly the same as that between whites and Chinese, but additional factors also present themselves. The most conspicuous of these lies in the fact that the Japanese have behind them not a weak, chaotic state but a powerful nation and that they are one and all imbued with a racial and a national pride, a proud self-consciousness, that is largely lacking in the Chinese. Their group has thus much greater solidity, much greater power both for resistance and aggression, much greater resourcefulness and initiative. They have a morale which sustains them in trying situations and enables their children to bridge the gulf between the generations with fewer social lesions than mark most immigrant groups. Not able to sustain life quite so far down the scale as the Chinese—though far enough, according to white standards—they make up for that disability by their more alert and energetic qualities of adaptation and imitation. They thus have very quickly assumed many of the more obvious aspects of Canadian life and would appear to be quite competent in the task of shifting for themselves in a strange land. But this has not made the Japanese more popular with their white neighbors, nor does it preshadow social assimilation.

Socially the Oriental has undergone, in an exaggerated form, the experience that is common to nearly every immigrant group; in the country where he has gone on the land, he has either been ignored by his white neighbors or accepted by them with reluctance and with contacts confined to the necessary relationships of business. In the city, he has taken up the areas abandoned by the whites on the edge of the expanding business district, where overcrowding produces slums. Not until years have passed and certain individuals have achieved a measure of prosperity—as a rule by climbing up on the backs of their compatriots—does the marginal urban community begin to disperse a little. In Vancouver, where nearly all the urban Japanese congregate and most of the Chinese, this dispersal now seems underway, and Japanese residents are to be found occupying reasonably good houses in predominantly white sections. But social intercourse does not develop on that account, both peoples keeping to themselves. It is hardly a matter of social ostracism—rather of unfamiliarity.

Meanwhile, it is not the well-to-do Canadians but those who rub shoulders with the Orientals who are most zealous in circumscribing their activities. This is entirely natural, as it is people of this sort who feel least secure. Hence in British Columbia, the pressure against the Oriental has largely come from plain people and those who represent them.

Economically, the threat of Oriental cheap labor has been countered by such devices as minimum wage laws<sup>7</sup> and the threat of Oriental domination in other industries by other methods, in some cases more direct. Thus in salmon trolling, an important branch of fishing, the number of licenses issued to Japanese fishermen has, since the war of 1914-18, been greatly reduced, so that they have for some years formed a smaller proportion of all fishermen than formerly. There have been various other legal discriminations of the sort, all designed to prevent the Oriental either monopolizing a given occupation or entering it in such numbers as to pull down wage rates or returns to a point where the whites could not or would not compete.

There is evidence to support the view that the net effect of economic discrimination against the Oriental has been mainly

<sup>7</sup> See Young and Reid, *The Japanese Canadians*, pp. 49-50, for some discussion of these.



to shove him out of one calling into another, and in many cases it has shoved him a little farther up the scale. From being a mill-hand he became a fisherman and from a farm-laborer a farmer. The land seems to have been his last retreat and in proportion as he has been shoved out elsewhere he seems to have gone on the land. The ability of the Oriental to undercut the white is not in dispute. Long hours, numerous children, humble housing and a low scale of expenditure on education and recreation enable him to raise his products much more cheaply than the white. Moreover, as long as immigrants come from Japan, they constitute a source of cheap labor for the Japanese farmers already established. The growers apparently pay them next to nothing while they are learning the ways of the country and during the five-year period required to obtain domicile. To the ordinary citizen of Canada, hundreds of miles removed, the ultimate destiny of a little strip of land in a distant Pacific river valley may not seem of much significance, but to the people on the spot, who see the communities once built up slowly disintegrating under pressure of the type described, it means much, and it is not to be expected that they will give up without a fight. But whether the prevailing anti-Oriental sentiment in British Columbia and the measures which result from it have not injured their white authors more than they have assisted them is an open question. If there is no work for the Japanese laborer in the fishing industry, he is likely to look to berry-growing as a means of support. It would be ironical if the efforts of transient labor in the lumber industry, or the mines or elsewhere had merely insured that the very soil of the province should be seized and held by the Oriental; a safe citadel from which generation after generation, long after the forest and the mine had vanished, his surplus children could march forth to the conquest of new occupations in the cities.

The most forthright instances of legal exclusion lie within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Government. Thus in contracts awarded by the Department of Public Works, two successive clauses in the common form of contract bind the contractor to give preference to British subjects, and not employ any Asiatic "directly or indirectly, upon and about, or in conjunction with" the works. Similarly, by unbroken custom, employment in the public service of either province or municipality is not given to Orientals.

Resident Oriental aliens are, as aliens, subject to all the local restrictions and also to the one great power in the Dominion's possession, the discretionary power of the Secretary of State to grant or deny certificates of naturalization to such as he sees fit, with no reasons given, and no right of appeal. This power since 1923 has not been lavishly used and the number of naturalizations in proportion to entries does not seem to indicate discrimination against Orientals.

The legal restrictions imposed upon the Asiatic fall into two classes: those dealing with their public rights and civil status; and those which regulate and restrict their economic activity. The exclusion of the Orientals from the franchise is the basis of their difference in civil status from other citizens of the province. The Provincial Government, by virtue of its constitutional powers, has excluded them from the right to vote in both provincial and municipal elections. This affects all Orientals who are British subjects, save for those who have seen Great War service. By the current Dominion Election Act, this provincial disability also excludes them from the vote in the Federal elections.

All other restrictions upon their civil status follow from this exclusion from the franchise, inasmuch as the voters' list is almost invariably used as the basis of eligibility for public office. No Asiatic in British Columbia may in consequence be elected to the Legislature, be nominated for municipal office of any sort, or for school trustee, nor can he be selected for jury service. In theory these disabilities do not apply to federal offices, but as yet no Chinese or Japanese has made his debut in the House of Commons or Senate of Canada.

Orientals, like persons of all other races, have free access to the courts of the Dominion and have the ordinary protection of the law. The whole of the civil disabilities imposed upon them arise from the action of the province. The one restriction in the federal jurisdiction, namely, the franchise, is indirect, and of effect only where there is a prior restriction of a similar nature imposed by the provincial authority.

It is the political discrimination which has attracted most attention and against which the Japanese have fought hardest. (The Chinese on the whole have seemed comparatively indifferent.) The Japanese have produced some educated persons born in Canada who feel their disabilities keenly, and these



Pre-war policy, as regards the Far East, was given its final form by an Order-in-Council passed in 1930,<sup>21</sup> "having regard to the unemployment conditions now existing in Canada," which prohibited "the landing in Canada of any immigrants of Asiatic race."

There is an exception for "the wife or unmarried child under 18 years of age of any Canadian citizen, legally admitted to and resident in Canada, who is in a position to receive and care for his dependents." The prohibition does not apply "to the nationals of any country in regard to which there is in operation a law, a special treaty, or agreement, or convention regulating immigration." At the time of its passage, the Order-in-Council did not, therefore, affect either China or Japan.

Unemployment, the reason usually assigned for restrictive measures, has not been a serious menace to Canada since the war. The general lines of Canada's post-war immigration policy were indicated by Mr. Mackenzie King in the House of Commons on May 1, 1947.<sup>22</sup> The objective was to secure the numbers of immigrants who could be absorbed in the national economy; to avoid a fundamental alteration in the character of the population (and, therefore, large-scale immigration from the Orient); and to avoid the charge of racial discrimination by the offer of special agreements on "a basis of complete equality and reciprocity." This phrase may seem a little disingenuous. It reminds us of the equality of law which, in the language of Anatole France, "forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under the same bridges." People do not habitually migrate from richer to poorer countries and to restrict their movement in that direction imposes no hardship.

However this may be, the Canadian policy is clear. Its objective is courteous and humane exclusion of Asiatic labour. It is courteous because it proposes to operate by agreements which, in form at least, are reciprocal. It is humane because it permits the entry of the husband, wife, or unmarried child under 21 years of age of a resident Canadian citizen who can show that the settlement arrangements are satisfactory. These entrants are in addition to any who may be admitted under a quota established by agreement.<sup>23</sup> The admission of non-immigrants, such as diplomatic personnel, students, and tourists, is on liberal terms.

<sup>21</sup>P.C. 2115, September 16, 1930.

<sup>22</sup>E.A., vol. I, no. 5 (May 1949), p. 3.

<sup>23</sup>This has been done by an exchange of notes with India, Pakistan (see chap. III), and Ceylon.

# 11

## Canadian Opinion about the Far East

THERE is very little Canadian opinion about the Far East. The primary interests of Canadians, even when they are extra-territorial in character, lie elsewhere. Only very small groups, largely regional in composition, are immediately concerned with oriental immigration, trade with the Orient, or cultural contacts with Asiatic countries. Even those groups have other and more important interests. Attitudes and opinions about events in the Far East are largely derivative from those concerning the world at large. It is paradoxical that Canada should be waging active war in an area of tertiary interest. But it is none the less true. The Far East is, at the present time, primarily a theatre in which world policies have to meet the stern test of events, and ideas and ideals formed in the abstract and accepted rather unimaginatively and uncritically have to be tested on living targets.

It is admittedly difficult, if not impossible, to prove this or any other statement concerning Canadian opinion. However, some corroboration is available. When the Department of External Affairs first published its bulletin, *External Affairs* (to which reference has been so frequent in preceding chapters) in November 1948, mention was made of the resolutions in which the main political parties set out their policies concerning the external affairs of Canada. Only one of them referred to the Far East. This was the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation which ended its paragraph about the urgency of peace treaties by saying "Likewise, Canada should demand early action toward drafting a peace treaty with Japan."<sup>1</sup> In this short sentence the first word indicates the subordinate interest of Far Eastern affairs and the fourth word indicates the tone of the approach which Canada ought to make to its associates, a tone more significant than the character of the "demand."

<sup>1</sup>E.A., vol. I, no. A (November 1948), p. 29.



With this abstract statement, by the only Canadian political party which considered the matter worth mentioning, we may contrast the insistent apprehensions of fishermen on the Pacific coast that the Japanese might invade what they considered their exclusive preserves and the reassuring statement which the Minister of Fisheries thought it prudent to make.<sup>2</sup> In the same way, fears are sometimes expressed of Japanese competition in trade, and protests made against the export from British Columbia of iron ore which might be used on the spot if facilities were created. In cases such as these opinions are genuine but the number holding them is numerically unimportant.

Basic attitudes are of greater interest than opinions arising from immediate self-interest. They determine what opinion would be in hypothetical contingencies. But it is not easy to discuss basic attitudes with any confidence. They can easily be in conflict with one another and those of which we are conscious today may, in an unexpected situation, give way to others which have escaped our attention. At the present time, for instance, Canadians are highly conscious of their desire for removing discriminations based on race, creed, and colour. In British Columbia the right to vote is no longer withheld from persons of Asiatic race.<sup>3</sup> Entry into professions and into trade unions presents little difficulty. Quotas have been established for immigration from India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. However, if a depression were to occur, with mass unemployment, or immigration barriers were to be challenged at the United Nations, smouldering hostilities which seem at the point of extinction would burst into flames. In the meantime Canadians rather enjoy priding themselves on superiority to countries in which race barriers are believed to be excessive, for example South Africa or the United States.<sup>4</sup>

On larger issues the same sort of potential conflict of attitudes appears. Those most emotionally affected by the horrors of war and

<sup>2</sup>On the former point see an item in the Vancouver *Sun* of March 22, 1950, and two in the *Sun* of April 19 of the same year. The statement of the Minister of Fisheries had appeared in the *Sun* of February 9. See also above, chap. VII.

<sup>3</sup>Chinese and East Indians were enfranchised in 1946, Japanese and North American Indians in 1949.

<sup>4</sup>It came as a surprise to the writer to find how strong feeling in his classes at the university was, largely among returned men, concerning the situation in the southern states of the United States, of which they knew nothing at first hand.

most anxious to promote international<sup>5</sup> peace and goodwill minimize, in Canada as elsewhere, the causes of dispute and almost deliberately close their eyes to awkward possibilities. Yet, if these possibilities were to be realized, other emotions would become active and might even become dominant. Many would desert the ranks of the peace-makers to become crusaders.

It is not much use to ask people, who consciously or subconsciously exclude unpleasant contingencies from their minds, what they would do in imaginary circumstances. It is doubtful if reliable information can be obtained even if willing victims can be found who will submit to questioning which they consider unreasonable. A university teacher has, perhaps, exceptional opportunities for finding victims and the writer has on occasion been tempted to use or abuse his opportunities. An example will show the limitations of this type of investigation.

If there were to be a war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. a number of possibilities would (if we disregard treaty commitments) be open to Canada. There would be neutrality; we might resist the first invasion of our territory or the air space above it; or we might protest and remain quiescent. There would be participation: on the side we thought right in the immediate dispute, that is, against the "aggressor"; or on the side of the prospective winner; or on the side of our long-term sympathies, the United States right or wrong, win or lose, or the U.S.S.R., right or wrong, win or lose. Roughly speaking, then, there are six choices. In 1946, I asked a class of upwards of a hundred students to express preferences. The first choice was to resist attack from any quarter and, in the absence of attack, to remain neutral. But the plurality was not great and at least a quarter of the votes went to each of two other policies, viz., the policy of fighting against the aggressor and the policy of inert neutrality. I made no attempt to complicate the simple expression of preferences by alternative choices, and no attempt to point out the intellectual difficulties involved in any choice. Of course, I fully realized that the case for siding with the United States would be, in practice, immensely strong because it was expected not to be the aggressor, to be the ultimate winner, and to be the country with which we should naturally sympathize.

<sup>5</sup>There is almost no emotional dislike of civil war, and yet, within a world-wide federation, all wars would be civil wars.