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
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Dealing With Interracial Conflict: Policy Alternatives

Dhiru Patel



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DEALING WITH INTERRACIAL CONFLICT
POLICY ALTERNATIVES

by

Dhiru Patel

The Institute for Research on Public Policy
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FOREWORD

Canadians have traditionally prided themselves on their fair treatment of minorities. It has been a matter of pride that non-whites are not the victims of the sort of prejudice practised in some countries that damages self-esteem, prevents advancement in education, employment, and life status, and creates cleavages within a community.

Such satisfaction may not be justified. It is true that Canada has never institutionalized a "back of the bus" mentality, but outbreaks of racial violence indicate that interracial tensions do exist. In some large Canadian cities, whites and Asians maintain an uneasy truce. West Indians have also been the focus of recent racist incidents. Orientals have been accused of flooding our universities, provoking racial slurs and attacks.

Racial violence in Canada is not yet as pervasive or destructive an issue as in some other countries. It is clear, however, that preventive measures must be taken to prevent the possibility of its escalation. By examining how other nations have dealt with the problem of interracial conflict and by suggesting policy alternatives for Canada, this report attempts to contribute to the resolution of what is potentially, if not in present reality, an important national concern.

Gordon Robertson
President
October 1980

AVANT-PROPOS

Les Canadiens s'enorgueillissent depuis toujours du traitement équitable qu'ils accordent aux minorités. Le fait que les non-Blancs ne connaissent pas les préjugés, en cours dans d'autres pays, qui bloquent les progrès en éducation, dans l'emploi et dans l'édifice social, en plus de diviser les communautés, est devenu une question d'orgueil.

Une telle complaisance n'est peut-être pas justifiée. Même s'il est vrai que le Canada n'a jamais reconnu officiellement la ségrégation, les flambées de violence raciale témoignent de l'existence de tensions. Dans certaines grandes villes canadiennes, Blancs et Asiatiques observent une trêve agitée; les Antillais ont récemment été victimes d'incidents raciaux. On a accusé les Orientaux d'inonder nos universités, ce qui leur a attiré des menaces et des attaques à caractère racial.

La violence raciale ne constitue pas encore un problème aussi répandu ou destructeur au Canada que dans d'autres pays. Il est clair, cependant, qu'il faille adopter des mesures préventives afin d'éviter l'escalade des conflits. En se penchant sur les moyens utilisés par d'autres pays pour faire face aux problèmes interraciaux et en proposant différentes lignes de conduite pour le Canada, ce rapport cherche à contribuer à la solution d'un important problème national, sinon actuel, du moins éventuel.

Le président,
Gordon Robertson
Octobre 1980

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Racial incidents in some major cities in Canada in recent years have attracted attention to a problem generally thought by most Canadians to be absent or insignificant in Canadian society--racism. The incidents which attract the most attention and concern are those involving racial violence.

While such violence is not yet comparable in scale or intensity to similar phenomena in some other countries, it must be taken seriously and dealt with urgently. Otherwise, we might find ourselves faced, in the near future, with problems that may be very difficult and costly to solve precisely because we will have neglected to act now. The grave consequences in some countries of inaction or half-hearted actions in this respect should alert us to the dangers inherent in such neglect.

Although there have been some policy responses in this area over the last few years in Canada, they have been very limited, piecemeal, and inadequate, as we shall see later. This study hopes to contribute to the effort that is required to deal with the problem of racial conflict, and particularly violence, by examining these phenomena as well as the policies and programmes developed in some countries to deal with them, and by suggesting the kinds of policies which will be necessary to deal with them in Canada.

It should be emphasized here that studies show that racial conflict and violence are often symptoms of more basic problems in society. In order to resolve these issues in any meaningful and effective way, one would have to resolve the more basic problems which lead to conflict and violence in the first place. Therefore, this study will attempt to identify some of the major causes, suggested by researchers and scholars, that lead to racial conflict and violence. These explanations may be useful in the Canadian situation, although the levels and scope of racial violence have not yet reached the same proportions as in the other countries we shall consider.

The major explanations advanced for racial violence and conflict are reviewed briefly in Chapter One, together with the outbreaks of racial violence experienced in the United States, Canada, and Britain. This is followed by a review in Chapter Two of the policy responses in these countries to deal with these problems; in addition, we will very briefly look at the situation in the Netherlands, which provides a sharp contrast to the others (at least up to the early 1970s).¹

In the final chapter, we suggest the kinds of policies Canada will have to pursue if it is going to attend seriously to the problems of racism and their consequences. These suggestions are based mainly on the experiences examined in the earlier chapters. Given the fact that the Canadian experience is not as well documented and analysed as the American or the British, we have to rely more on inferential analysis in proposing the policy suggestions. The drawbacks

of limited evidence, however, should not blind us to the reality and urgency of the problems that exist and that need to be tackled immediately. While further evidence would certainly be useful, the inevitable delay involved in gathering it should not be used as an excuse for inaction in the meantime. For, as the British have discovered, the problems cannot be put into cold storage; if anything, they become more serious and more difficult to tackle later.

It is necessary to point out at the outset that this study focuses on the issue of racial conflict and violence as it affects certain groups only--the "blacks" and those of Asian origin and of course the "whites."² The French Canadian and native groups were specifically excluded from the purview of this study because they constitute very special cases and need to be treated separately, although some of the analysis may be applicable to these cases as well.

Furthermore, given the fact that the major concern in this study is the current and future development of racial conflict and violence, and given the evidence of the last few years that the "visible" groups (particularly blacks and 'browns') seem to have become relatively more central to this concern, the primary attention for policy and programme purposes in the immediate and near future will be focused on these groups.

There is yet another important reason, especially for policy purposes, for not lumping together the "racially visible" groups with the racially non-visible "white ethnic" groups.

Often, "racial" issues are seen as being similar or even the same as "ethnic" issues. The assumption here is that "racial" (black, brown, yellow) groups are analogous to, if not just another set of, "ethnic" (white, European) groups. Thus, analogies have been frequently drawn between the present position of racial groups, especially blacks, and that of white ethnic immigrant groups in an earlier period.

However, although there may be some superficial similarities, the ethnic analogy is basically false. Barnett (1976) points out that, at least in the United States (and very likely elsewhere), blacks are external to the American ideological system and not effectively integrated into the political system. In contrast to the position of white ethnic groups, racism ranks blacks as a group below all others because of the falsely presumed inherent genetic inferiority. Definitions of humanness were crucial from the earliest days to decisions about the composition of the political community: for a long time, blacks were regarded as less human and, hence, were systematically excluded and continue to be excluded in many areas of life (see also Grove, 1974).

The literature reviewed later suggests that the position of non-whites in Canada has not, at least until recent times, been very different: they too were systematically excluded in many areas of life and indeed from immigrating to Canada. Today, they are still regarded as inferior to all the white groups and continue to be excluded in subtle as well as direct ways. The essential qualitative dividing line, therefore, is between the "white" (including "ethnic

white") and "non-white," which places the focus of this study on "interracial" rather than "interethnic" issues. This is not to say that the interethnic issues are unimportant or irrelevant; indeed, one could certainly find parallels between the two issues, but these are less important than the differences.

Given this, the issue of "racism" becomes a central concern. Definitions of racism vary considerably. For the purposes of this study, the term is used to mean the making of invidious distinctions between individuals as groups on the basis of their socially defined "race." In practical terms, this includes such everyday manifestations of racism as personal prejudice against non-whites; ideological (cultural and biological) rationalizations and justifications for the superior position of whites; and institutional discrimination in the form of systematic practices that deny and exclude non-whites from access to social resources. It should be noted that, as will become clear later, it is often not possible to separate these three aspects of racism in real life because they are so closely intermeshed and part of each other (see, for example, Wellman, 1977).

It was originally intended to focus on the term "tension" in the analysis, but the review of the literature suggested that it might be too misleading and hence was not so used. As Skolnick (1972) argues, it tells at once too little and too much: too little because it does not encompass the subjective meaning or objective impact of subordinate caste position or political domination; too much because it may mean almost anything--a catch-all phrase that can easily obscure the specificity of political grievances.

This study does not pretend to be exhaustive or detailed, given the vastness and complexity of the field. All we can do in the space and time available is to sketch out the broad, general outline and draw attention to the major aspects which need closer consideration.

Finally, a note of caution needs to be entered here. As will become clear in the following pages, the issues we are dealing with are complex, sensitive, and controversial and often arouse strong emotions; in addition, there is little agreement over the causes and solutions. It is certainly hoped, however, that the conclusions reached and the suggestions put forth will make a constructive contribution towards resolving, peacefully and justly, the actual and potential problems in this area.

NOTES

1. This study was going to look also at French policies in this area. However, not only is information about racial problems in France most difficult to come by but, more importantly, the French government has stated that "the situation in France has not so far prompted the Government to establish a special administrative service or organization to deal with cases of discrimination" (United Nations, 1976). From this, it would seem that, beyond the 1972 anti-discrimination law, there are no specific policies to deal with racial problems because the government sees no serious problem at present; however, France is not entirely free from such problems (see, for example, Castles and Castles, 1971; Girard, 1977; Edmond-Smith, 1973), and the government may have to revise its position in the near future.
2. We will come across this problem of terminology which is a tricky one; there is no really satisfactory way to get around it without becoming cumbersome and stilted. A simple use of the common terms "white"/"non-white," to refer to the "interracial" or "racial" problems we deal with, carries so many value connotations that such terms have been used with the greatest reluctance and only because there were no suitable alternatives.

It goes without saying that "blacks" or "whites" are not one homogeneous mass or group. Although these terms are used in the text as if they were, this is done purely for the sake of convenience.

ABRÉGÉ

Au cours des dernières années, des incidents raciaux dans certaines grandes villes du Canada ont porté à l'avant-plan un problème qui, en général, était jugé inexistant ou sans importance par les Canadiens--le racisme. Les incidents les plus remarquables et ceux qui suscitent la plus grande préoccupation sont les incidents de violence raciale.

Bien que cette violence n'ait pas encore atteint la proportion et l'intensité que l'on connaît dans d'autres pays, il est important que l'on se saisisse du problème et que l'on prenne les mesures nécessaires à l'enrayer. Autrement nous risquons bientôt de nous heurter à un problème difficile et coûteux à solutionner justement parce que nous aurons négligé d'agir immédiatement. Les conséquences graves qu'ont eues, dans certains pays, l'inaction ou le manque de vigueur dans la recherche de solutions devraient nous faire prendre conscience des dangers de l'insouciance.

Bien qu'au Canada, au cours des dernières années, on ait cherché à instituer certaines mesures dans ce domaine, les efforts, comme nous le verrons plus loin, ont été très limités, fragmentés et inadéquats. Cette étude veut contribuer à la recherche de solutions en examinant le problème des conflits raciaux, et en particulier de la violence, ainsi que les mesures et programmes mis au point à l'étranger, et en proposant des mesures nécessaires pour enrayer le problème au Canada.

Il est bon de souligner ici que certaines études ont démontré que les conflits raciaux et la violence sont des symptômes de problèmes plus fondamentaux dans la société. Pour venir à bout de ces problèmes de façon constructive et efficace, il faudrait trouver des solutions aux problèmes fondamentaux qui engendrent les conflits et la violence. Cette étude cherchera donc à identifier certains des facteurs qui, selon l'avis des chercheurs et des spécialistes, sont les causes principales des conflits raciaux et de la violence. Ces éclaircissements pourront être utiles dans le contexte canadien bien que la violence raciale n'ait pas atteint l'intensité et l'envergure qu'elle connaît dans certains pays qui font l'objet de notre étude.

Le premier chapitre présente brièvement les principales raisons évoquées pour expliquer la violence raciale et les conflits, et donne un aperçu des manifestations de violence raciale aux États-Unis, au Canada et en Grande-Bretagne. Suit, au chapitre deux, un compte rendu des mesures adoptées dans ces pays afin de faire face à ces problèmes; en plus, nous examinerons très succinctement la situation aux Pays-Bas, où l'on observe un contraste marqué (du moins jusqu'au début des années 1970)¹.

Dans le dernier chapitre, nous proposons les types de mesures que le Canada devra mettre en vigueur s'il entend s'attaquer de façon sérieuse au problème du racisme et à ses conséquences. Ces suggestions se fondent principalement sur

les études des chapitres précédents. Étant donné le fait qu'au Canada, la situation n'est pas aussi bien documentée et analysée qu'aux États-Unis et en Grande-Bretagne, les mesures que nous proposons doivent plutôt s'appuyer sur une analyse déductive. Toutefois, les difficultés imposées par la carence de données ne devraient pas nous empêcher de voir la réalité et l'urgence des problèmes qui existent et qui doivent être affrontés immédiatement. Bien qu'il serait certainement utile de recueillir d'autres données, on ne saurait, dans l'intervalle, rester inactif. Car, comme l'ont constaté les Britanniques, on ne peut renvoyer ces problèmes aux oubliettes; ils n'en deviendront que plus sérieux et plus difficiles à résoudre.

Il importe de signaler au départ que le cadre de cette étude se limite aux questions des conflits raciaux et de la violence du point de vue de certains groupes spécifiques : les "Noirs" et les individus d'origine asiatique et, évidemment, les "Blancs"². Nous avons spécifiquement exclu les Canadiens-français et les autochtones parce qu'il s'agit de cas spéciaux qui doivent faire l'objet d'un examen séparé bien que certains éléments de l'analyse puissent être pertinents.

De plus, étant donné que le sujet principal de cette étude est l'évolution actuelle et future des conflits raciaux et de la violence, et compte tenu du fait que les données récentes attribuent, depuis quelques années, un rôle relativement plus important aux groupes "visibles" (les "Noirs" et les "Bruns" en particulier), ils feront l'objet de notre attention particulière lorsqu'il s'agira de définir des mesures à court et à moyen terme.

Il existe une autre raison importante, particulièrement en ce qui a trait à la mise au point de mesures, pour laquelle il n'est pas recommandé de traiter en même temps des groupes "visibles" et des groupes ethniques "blancs" non visibles.

On considère souvent que les questions "raciales" sont semblables ou identiques aux questions "ethniques". On suppose alors que les groupes "raciaux" (les Noirs, les Bruns, les Jaunes) sont analogues aux groupes "ethniques" (les Blancs, les Européens) ou ne constituent qu'un autre type de ces groupes. Ainsi, on a souvent fait l'analogie entre la situation dans laquelle se trouve actuellement les groupes raciaux, en particulier les Noirs, et celle, à une période antérieure, des groupes d'immigrants blancs.

Toutefois, bien qu'il puisse y avoir des ressemblances superficielles, l'analogie est essentiellement fausse. Barnett (1976) indique qu'aux États-Unis tout au moins (et tout probablement ailleurs), les Noirs se situent à l'extérieur du système idéologique américain et ne s'intègrent pas de façon efficace au système politique. Par contraste avec les groupes ethniques blancs, le racisme place le groupe des Noirs à un niveau inférieur à tous les autres en vertu d'une fausse croyance à une infériorité génétique inhérente. Dès les premiers temps, les définitions de l'homme constituèrent un facteur primordial dans les décisions relatives à la composition de la communauté politique : pendant longtemps les Noirs furent considérés comme des êtres inférieurs, et par le fait même furent exclus et continuent d'être exclus de plusieurs domaines (consulter également Grove, 1974).

Les sources bibliographiques que nous examinons plus loin laissent entendre que la situation des non-Blancs au Canada n'a pas été bien différente, du moins jusqu'à récemment : ils furent également exclus systématiquement de plusieurs secteurs de la vie, et l'immigration au pays leur fut refusée. Aujourd'hui, on les considère encore comme inférieurs aux groupes de Blancs et on continue de les exclure, autant par des moyens cachés que directs. Au plan qualitatif, la ligne de démarcation se situe donc essentiellement entre les "Blancs" (y compris les "Blancs ethniques") et les "non-Blancs"; cette étude portera donc sur les questions "interraciales" plutôt qu'"interethniques". On ne prétend pas par là que les questions interethniques ne sont pas importantes ou pertinentes; même que l'on pourrait certainement établir des comparaisons entre les deux sujets, mais elles sont moins importantes que les différences qui les séparent.

Compte tenu de cela, la question du racisme devient primordiale. Les définitions du racisme diffèrent considérablement. Le sens accordé au mot dans cette étude est le suivant : l'établissement de distinctions désobligeantes entre individus considérés comme groupes sur la base de leur "race", telle que définie par la société. De façon pratique, cela comprend des manifestations de racisme aussi courantes que les préjugés personnels contre les non-Blancs; les rationalisations idéologiques (culturelles et biologiques) visant à justifier la supériorité des Blancs; et la discrimination institutionnelle par l'emploi de méthodes administratives qui empêchent les non-Blancs de profiter des ressources sociales. Il importe de noter, comme on le précisera plus loin, qu'il est souvent impossible, dans la réalité, de traiter séparément de ces trois aspects du racisme parce qu'ils sont trop intimement liés (consulter, par exemple, Wellman, 1977).

À l'origine, notre analyse devait porter sur la "tension", mais le terme fut abandonné à la suite des recherches bibliographiques parce qu'on jugea qu'il portait trop à confusion. Comme le soutient Skolnick (1972), son sens est à la fois trop restreint et trop général : trop restreint parce qu'il ne traduit pas le sens subjectif ou les répercussions objectives qu'impliquent la domination politique ou le fait de subordonner une caste à une autre; trop général parce qu'il peut vouloir dire presque n'importe quoi--un mot polyvalent qui peut facilement cacher le caractère spécifique des revendications politiques.

Cette étude ne prétend pas être complète et détaillée, étant donné l'étendue et la complexité du sujet. Tout ce qu'il nous est possible de faire à l'intérieur des délais et de l'espace permis est de tracer un aperçu général du problème et de souligner les principaux aspects qui méritent une attention plus particulière.

Enfin, une mise en garde s'impose. Comme le révèle les pages qui suivent, il s'agit de questions complexes, délicates et controversées qui peuvent éveiller des émotions fortes; de plus, peu s'entendent sur les causes du problème et sur les solutions à y apporter. Toutefois, il est à espérer que les conclusions que nous tirons et les suggestions que nous présentons contribueront à résoudre, de façon pacifique et juste, les problèmes actuels et potentiels dans le domaine.

NOTES

1. Cette étude devait également examiner les mesures adoptées en France. Toutefois, non seulement est-il difficile d'obtenir des renseignements relatifs aux problèmes raciaux en France, mais, plus important encore, le gouvernement français a déclaré que "la situation en France est telle que le gouvernement ne s'est pas senti obligé de créer un service administratif spécial ou un organisme chargé de voir aux cas de racisme" (Nations-Unies, 1976). Il semblerait donc qu'en dehors de la Loi de 1972 sur le racisme, il n'existe aucune mesure spécifique relative aux problèmes raciaux parce que le gouvernement ne perçoit, pour l'instant, aucun problème important; toutefois la France n'est pas à l'abri de ces problèmes (consulter, par exemple, Castles et Castles, 1971; Girard, 1977; Edmond-Smith, 1973), et il est possible que le gouvernement ait à remettre sa position en question sous peu.
2. Nous aurons à faire face à cette difficulté terminologique délicate; il n'existe aucune façon satisfaisante de l'éviter sans verser dans la lourdeur et la rigidité. Le simple usage des termes courants "blanc/non blanc" en relation avec les problèmes "raciaux" et "interraciaux" qui nous intéressent sont tellement lourds de sens associés à des valeurs que c'est avec beaucoup d'hésitations que nous les avons utilisés et seulement parce qu'il n'y avait pas de solutions de rechange adéquates.

Il va sans dire que les "Noirs" et les "Blancs" ne constituent pas des groupes ou des masses homogènes. L'usage des termes en ce sens n'est qu'une question pratique.

Chapter One

PERSPECTIVES AND EXPERIENCES OF VIOLENCE

Public policies, in general, are developed on the basis of the understanding of the issue or problem they are designed to deal with; that understanding is based on what are considered to be the main causes of the problem, which are in turn influenced by the particular perspective that is used. Thus, different perspectives or ways of looking at an issue or problem will emphasize different causes or factors and, hence, suggest different solutions. It is therefore essential that we briefly examine the major perspectives that have been used in the attempts to understand and deal with racial conflict in general and racial violence in particular.

It will also be necessary to examine the experiences of different countries to see how they fit the different perspectives on which public policies have been based. From this, it will become evident that the two perspectives that have been usually employed by policy makers (and hence their policy responses) have often been inadequate in the past to deal with the more basic issues of racial conflict, partly because these perspectives often lead to a focus almost exclusively on only *one* aspect of conflict, that is, violence; they tend to neglect or underplay basic institutional or structural aspects which give rise to the violence. This is because it has usually been assumed that the basic social institutions and structures are sound. More recently, however, there are indications, as we shall see, that the deficiency is at least recognized now.

Even when considering violence alone, the different perspectives offer quite different views of it and, hence, propose different solutions for it. Thus, if the violence is seen as caused by deviant, "pathological" individuals, then the policies developed to deal with it will be quite different from those that are based on the view that it is part of a "normal," "rational," collective response.

Similarly, whether the violence is seen to be caused or initiated by the dominant group(s) or by the subordinate group(s) will be of importance in determining the kinds of policies that are developed. Since the racial violence initiated by dominant and privileged groups in society has often attempted to maintain the racial *status quo*, the most important policy question is what kinds of concessions or changes will reduce the groups' anxieties. Conversely, the most important policy question, in the case of the subordinate groups, is what kinds of policies will reduce racial injustice and inequality.

Of course, the different options are not mutually exclusive; indeed, they are interlinked and may often have to be pursued simultaneously and in conjunction. The difference lies in the focus or emphasis of each of the perspectives as will be apparent below.

1. PERSPECTIVES

The explanations used and solutions offered for racial violence may be grouped under three basic perspectives.¹ Each of these uses a different level of analysis (e.g., individual versus group) and different assumptions about human behaviour (e.g., complex psychological and social psychological versus rational choice), which lead to different insights and conclusions and, hence, to different kinds of policies. For convenience, we will call these the "deviant-individual," the "social-forces," and the "institutional-structural" perspectives.²

The "deviant-individual" perspective sees violence and disorder as essentially purposeless and irrational, deviant and aberrant, because it is destructive and threatening to the fundamental norms of society. It is resorted to by "underclass," "pathological" groups consisting of irresponsible deviants (criminals, unassimilated immigrants, the unemployed, or wild adolescents) with the instigation of outside agitators and conspiratorial leaders. This view assumes that existing institutions are adequate to resolve problems peacefully and fairly, hence making violence useless and futile. The solutions offered, therefore, stress repression and control through improvements in law enforcement techniques and mechanisms in the short run, and moral re-education of violent individuals, through the basic traditional institutions of home, church, and school, in the long run. It should be noted also that public authorities' use of force against protesting groups is rarely viewed as violence.

The "social-forces" perspective sees collective violence as generally inevitable under certain historical or societal conditions and only moderately useful in alleviating such conditions; it is caused not so much by deviants as by relatively impersonal social conditions like the presumably neutral problems of migration, family structure, urban overpopulation, or historical underprivilege of minorities, which lead to "breakdown," "relative deprivation," "alienation," and so on. Sometimes, this view stresses the role of racial prejudice in contributing to violence by minorities. The solutions consist of socio-economic reforms, sometimes far reaching, together with some emphasis on "law and order." But these reforms are usually of the "token" or "tinkering" kind, which correct certain malfunctions in the system but which leave basically untouched the existing political and economic system.

Finally, the "institutional-structural" perspective, a relatively recent development, sees collective violence as basically structured, purposeful, rational, and politically meaningful. Thus, this view stresses the normality, legitimacy, and efficacy of violence as a rational strategy in the struggle for power employed only after non-violent strategies have failed or when societal structures are incapable of accommodating basic demands. Hence, this perspective views such violence as caused basically by those in power who systematically exclude other groups. The purpose of such violence can vary from being a "catalyst" for social change to acting as a danger signal of a serious social or political malfunctioning. Certain types of collective violence, especially racial violence, are seen here as incipient, colonial rebellions and as manifesta-

tions of the "proletariats" world-wide struggle against capitalism. Such violence may also serve a therapeutic function for the rebels.

The remedies stress, therefore, significantly increasing power and resources for the powerless and even making major changes to the political system, whose institutionalized behaviour may be equally, if not much more, violent and destructive than that of the disaffected groups. These changes would include not only a modification of institutional behaviour, but also the removal of fundamental structural barriers faced by such groups.

Each perspective locates its "causal" centre, and hence policy focus and direction, at a different place: the first perspective locates it in the individual, the second, in impersonal social forces, and the third, in basic social structures and institutions. In reality, however, they are closely interlinked: the social structure, in a number of ways, affects and controls the social processes and thereby the personality system. Thus, the long-standing structural separation and subjugation and subordination of blacks in the United States, for example, directly resulted in their exclusion from key social processes in American society, which in turn shaped the values, attitudes, and behaviour patterns of individual whites as well as blacks towards each other and towards the social processes and structures. The primacy of structural influences is underlined in this case by the fact that, *despite* the important changes that have taken place, the central debate in the black community today is the same, according to Julian Bond (quoted in Barnett, 1976), as it was in the 1860s--what form and under what terms will their *relationship* with majority America be defined.

As will become apparent later on, studies of racial conflict and violence have generally used, implicitly or explicitly, the "deviant-individual" or the "social-forces" perspectives as isolated, mutually exclusive categories. The solutions proposed and the policies pursued so far in attempts to deal with this conflict in the United States, Canada, and Britain have *not* been very successful, precisely because they have been based on these limited perspectives. In addition, political considerations have usually pre-empted the kinds of policies and programmes that might attempt to modify basic social structures and institutions because such policies might turn out to be quite unpopular. Yet unless modifications are made at these levels, the problems will persist. Making changes only at the levels of the individual or social conditions will not be sufficient since the broader social institutional and structural contexts will remain largely unaffected. For instance, attempting to change the racist attitudes and behaviour of, say, individual teachers or policemen without changing the norms and roles of their respective institutional settings (e.g., schools and police departments) and related structures (e.g., the educational and justice systems), which govern the individual's attitudes and behaviour, would be like trying to change the nature of a game by changing the players but not the *rules* that govern the play. Similarly, just as providing better equipment and facilities will not change the game, improving social conditions alone will not resolve the problems of racism at the structural and institutional levels, which play such a vital role in creating those conditions.

This is underlined by the observation that most of the violence, especially collective violence, of the so-called "race riots"³ has manifested itself as attempts either to maintain the racial *status quo* (on the part of the privileged white majority) or to challenge or register a protest against it (by the underprivileged black minority). In other words, whites attempt to use the violence to oppose and blacks, to support fundamental institutional and structural changes that would alter significantly the unequal relationship between the two groups in favour of the latter and at the expense of the former, who would lose the advantages of being white.

The racial violence perpetrated at the level of the individual or small 'gangs', as opposed to the large-scale disorders, can also be traced ultimately to the racism built into the institutions and structures of society. The white attacker (as well as other whites and even blacks for that matter) has been socialized, often implicitly or unconsciously, by the key institutions of family, school, mass media, peer groups, public authorities, and so on, into falsely believing that blacks and other non-whites are inherently inferior (and a threat) to whites and, hence, can be mistreated with impunity, even to the point of using violence. The personality and the personal situation of the individual(s) as well as the social conditions at any particular time will be important factors in determining when such violence might surface.

The black individual(s) and groups might react with violence not only to specific instances of mistreatment but also to the more pervasive, patterned, and continuous, albeit often subtle, mistreatment throughout society that flows from the racism built into the social structures and institutions. Furthermore, since the structural and institutional racial barriers deny such individuals and groups access to conventional and legitimate means for becoming successful, unconventional and illegitimate opportunity structures--involving potentially violent activities such as gambling, stealing, fencing, drug dealing, and so forth--are created from the opportunities immediately available to them. Thus, not only are the three levels interlinked, but it is the institutional-structural level that is critical. For, as Hughes and Kallen (1974, p. 106) note, it is the structural racial inequalities rooted in the system-wide operation of society that exclude most members of minority groups from significant participation in its major social institutions. It is not just a question of equal opportunity for those with equal qualifications, but of the minority groups' access to the very qualifications (educational, occupational, political, legal, and social skills and resources) required by the majority group(s) for full participation in the life of the society.

As these writers observe, even if

...prejudice could be (suddenly) totally eliminated from the system, the structural inequalities rooted in the everyday *impersonal* (that is *non-intentional*) operation of the ethnic hierarchy would continue to exclude substantial portions of members of some ethnic minorities from full participation...

Yet most of the studies on racial violence and conflict (and hence the policies based on them) often overlook or ignore the crucial importance of the institutional-structural dimension and concentrate instead solely on racial prejudice or social forces for explanations. They are unable to explain satisfactorily why racism, in both objective and subjective terms, persists precisely because they fail to see that, as Wellman (1977, p. 41) puts it, "...on the simplest level, racist attitudes persist because racial inequality persists and the beliefs reflect it." Or as Hughes and Kallen (1974, p. 82) elaborate:

Racist attitudes and beliefs will persist irrespective of their truth or falsity, largely because of their potential usefulness to those in power. Racist ideologies can provide persuasive arguments whereby those in power may attempt to justify and perpetuate existing social, economic and political inequalities between diverse populations, and thereby maintain their position of power.

These ideologies, to be sure, are dynamic in that their content changes to accommodate new realities of changed relationships. Thus, for example, the justification for the changed position of blacks, from indentured servants to slaves, changed from their being just "different" to their being innately inferior; and today, many people attribute the persistence of racial inequality to shortcomings in the culture of the racial minorities (Wellman, 1977).

It is with these critical observations in mind that we now turn to a brief review of the results of research on racial violence and conflict.

2. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

In his survey of the studies on the 1960s' events in the United States, Williams (1975, pp. 143-48) indicates: "From the complex and sometimes contradictory data and inferences contained in the post-1967 writings, some conclusions elicited partial but substantial critical consensus." He goes on to cite a few examples and concludes:

Although the data are fragmentary and often unsatisfactory, some interpretations at least can be rejected or substantially discounted: riots were not primarily produced by a dislocated *lumpen proletariat* (riff-raff) nor by "radical conspiracy," nor by irrational crowd behaviour of frustrated aggressive and alienated masses. Explanations in terms of relative deprivation not only fail to account for the transformation of individual discontent into collective action, but rest on uncertain factual bases.

Some studies⁴ have presented evidence to the effect that the "riots" had important elements of political protest and collective goals. The black protest was against police malpractice, racial discrimination, economic deprivation,

consumer exploitation, involuntary residential segregation, and other indignities of ghetto life, all of which stem from the racism rooted deeply in the American social structure.

It is instructive to note that some of the "riots" earlier in American history can also be seen as "political" in that they were often started by whites when blacks challenged the racial *status quo*. As Grimshaw (1962, p. 4) has noted: "The most savage oppression, whether expressed in rural lynchings and pogroms or in urban race riots, has taken place when the Negro has refused to accept a subordinate status. The most intense conflict has resulted when the subordinate group has attempted to disrupt the *status quo* or when the superordinate group has defined the situation as one in which such an attempt is being made...." Silberman (1978) makes a similar point when he states that blacks have been systematically excluded, with bullets when necessary, from sharing in the nation's wealth. Whenever they began to gain strength and upward mobility in a particular occupation, whites have used force and violence to suppress or drive them out;⁵ what is remarkable then is not how much, but how little black violence there has always been.

However, the differences between the two periods (pre- and post-1960) are notable. The 1960s' riots were precipitated, as a rule, by routine police actions against blacks, and were directed against selected local stores and the police and only incidentally involved assaults on passersby, while the earlier white rioters mostly attacked people (blacks), not property; the government authorities, especially the local police, made no attempt to restore law and order in the earlier white riots with the same firmness they showed in the 1960s' riots; and few responsible white leaders laboured so valiantly, if vainly, to prevent the riots and restrain the rioters in 1917, 1919, and 1943, as the moderate black leaders did in the 1960s (Fogelson, 1971 and Grimshaw, 1962 and 1963).

One should also note the difference, suggested by Lieberman and Silverman (1965), between the immediate "precipitants" (e.g., the killing or arrest of a black by a white policeman or a white attacking a black), which actually initiate large-scale, interracial violence, with the more long-term, "underlying" causes (e.g., long-standing grievances and *status quo* situations). However, as Lipsky and Olson (1977) point out, studies searching for reasons why some cities experience civil disorders and others are spared have failed to identify any causal city characteristics, probably because the critical conditions are very similar.

Finally, it is important to note, as Williams (1975) points out, that much social conflict in the United States is not "collective" but individual, for example, the vast harassment-and-arrest activity of police. Indeed, he suggests that, if accurate estimates could be obtained, "it is entirely possible that agents of authority initiate most of the activity that leads to violent conflict in American society."

From his review of American studies, Williams concludes that adequate accounting for intrasocietal collective violence requires specification of the following: (1) sources of widespread discontent; (2) communicative and organizational resources available to the protestors and the authorities, including locations in social structure; (3) cultural values and beliefs concerning priorities of goals and means, attribution of responsibility and efficacy, legitimacy of power justifications, social trust, and effectiveness of protest and rebellion; (4) resources and organizational support for authorities and institutions and for their protesting opponents; (5) "crucial events" that signal intentions and strength/weakness of opposing social formations and movements.

Thus, American research suggests that it may be much more fruitful to extend the search for explanations for racial violence to social institutions, structures, and processes, underpinned as they are by racism, than to limit it to just "deviant individuals" or "impersonal social forces."

3. THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE

The Canadian and British cases of interracial violence have not been studied as systematically as the American ones. Thus, the few studies that do exist on the former two do not provide sufficient information for a thorough understanding of the situation.

There is, for example, hardly any published research on interracial violence or tensions in Canada. Anthony Richmond's (1976b) article on urban ethnic conflict in Britain and Canada is the only analysis that deals directly, though in a very limited way, with this issue in the Canadian context. Other studies, such as the Pitman (1977) and Ubale (1978) reports on the South Asians in Toronto, are more in the nature of useful descriptive accounts than analytical studies.

Some of the works on specific groups sometimes make brief references to tensions and violence, such as the anti-Chinese riot of 1887 (Roy, 1976), the anti-Chinese and Japanese riot of 1907 (Adachi, 1976), both in Vancouver, or the anti-Jewish riot of 1933 (Betcherman, 1975). However, the analyses of these events are not as extensive nor as rigorous as to be very useful for our purpose.

Richmond (1976b) presents a theoretical multivariate model, based on the assumptions of anomie and alienation from society of those involved in violence, and raises some points of interest regarding prejudice and discrimination. However, as he himself admits, his paper "states a case for a multivariate approach" and "reports secondary data from Britain and Canada, but falls short of providing a systematic comparison that would enable scientific conclusions to be reached or general propositions substantiated" (p. 196).

So, presumably Richmond is only suggesting ideas rather than arriving at firm conclusions when he asserts:

Key factors in the generation of urban ethnic conflict are clearly the prevailing socioeconomic conditions including objective inequalities in the distribution of wealth, income, employment, and educational opportunities between ethnic groups. These in turn are related to historical conditions that have resulted in the institutionalization of racism and patterns of discrimination supported by prevailing legal and social sanctions... The major factor perpetuating the conditions of objective inequality is the political and community power differential (which itself is reinforced by existing inequalities)... (p. 167).

Richmond goes on to state that "feelings of *relative* deprivation and *perceived* social injustice are frequently of even greater importance" than objective inequality. In this context, the mass media play an important role in generating an awareness of deprivation, as well as in creating a consciousness of injustice and in placing domestic conflicts in a global context, thus facilitating an "exchange" of viewpoints, strategies, and tactics between participants in conflicts in different countries. Also, the reality of international economic relationships, both historical and contemporary, has direct repercussions on domestic racial and ethnic situations.

Finally, he refers to two additional points: the way in which the socio-psychological variables (socialization, attitudes, values, etc.) are mediated through the personalities of those involved in conflicts, and the size and growth of "minority" relative to "majority" populations.⁶

It should be noted that Richmond does not order the different variables in terms of importance, except to give "relative deprivation" greater importance than objective inequality, an assertion which, as we have seen, has been shown to be of questionable validity.

As Richmond points out, no systematic research in the area of interracial crime, violence, and relations with police has been undertaken in Canada. Studies of native citizens that touch on this area may not be applicable to the situation of black or Asian groups whose experiences in major urban centres are likely to be quite different. Recent studies, such as the Pitman and Ubale reports on Toronto mentioned earlier, shed some light on the question, though they are quite limited.

Both reports take a very general look at the alleged causes of discrimination, harassment, and violence against South Asians and make recommendations. Ubale's report catalogues a series of case histories of racial incidents, as related by the South Asian victims, which indicate that the individuals responsible belong to all age groups and socio-economic categories, and even include policemen and immigration officers. Ubale suggests that racism is the root cause and that it pervades the major institutions of Toronto society, including the police, courts, schools, public and private agencies, and the media.

Pitman presents a composite characterization of a racial attack, based on interviews with seventy-five white assailants involved in thirty-one racially motivated incidents, their victims, and witnesses. From this, he observed that all of the assailants were male, few were above the age of twenty-two, all were from low-income families, and virtually always had experienced the extended absence of the male parent while growing up; they were usually unemployed, had erratic work histories, and appeared to believe that their generally middle-class, brown-skinned male victims were more socially cohesive and "smarter with money" than they were. Alcohol had usually been consumed by the assailant immediately prior to the attack. The predominance of British surnames among the assailants indicates the influence of the hierarchy of racial inequality.

Pitman suggests that the pressures of urban growth on resources contribute to racism by producing a "culture-shocked citizenry," parts of which see new (non-white) immigrants as a threat to their well-being and which can use them as scapegoats (see also Filson, 1978).

Although Pitman raises questions about the role of schools, parents, and media in influencing racist attitudes and behaviour, as well as the role of the law enforcement agencies in dealing with racist attacks, he ends up diverting attention from the fundamental, institutional changes that are necessary when he concludes: "Most of all, a change of attitude is demanded."

The Ontario Human Rights Commission (1977) states: "The number of reported incidents of racial violence in public places has increased dramatically recently. Commission staff have found that incidents of assaults and verbal abuse directed at non-whites usually involve two or more white youths between the ages of fourteen and twenty-two. As was the case during the Great Depression, severe job shortages and economic constraint provide the climate for hostility against members of visible minorities who are seen as illegitimate competition for economic and social rewards." Unfortunately, the report does not provide further details on the incidents.

Historically, however, established leaders in Canadian society (both individual and institutional) have made key contributions to interracial violence, for example, to the anti-Chinese riot of 1887 and the anti-Chinese/Japanese riot of 1907 in Vancouver. In both cases, the local newspapers, respectable individuals (businessmen, clergymen, politicians) and organizations played a very prominent role in at least preparing the groundwork and instigating the violence, which claimed "scores" of Chinese lives. The timing of the riots seems to have been related to white workers' alleged fears of economic competition, especially at a time of recession (Roy, 1976; Adachi, 1976; and Stewart, 1976). Adachi notes also that the predominantly British-origin population was "preternaturally obsessed" with the desire not only to maintain their British heritage but also to exclude the "undesirables" who were considered racially and culturally inferior, an idea not limited to only British Columbia or that period in Canadian history (see, for example, Ferguson, 1975; Porter, 1965; Winks, 1971; Stewart, 1976).

Although Betcherman's (1975) account of the anti-Jewish riot of 1933 in Toronto is limited, it is clear that some of the same basic ingredients were present: the Great Depression was in progress, anti-Semitism was at its height in Canada as well as in Europe and was openly and widely expressed and practised, and the fascists were very active. The riot was started by a gang of about a hundred "bored and unemployed" youths, all of whom were of "Anglo-Saxon parentage."

The importance of *latent* hostility is further illustrated by the violent reactions in Montreal to the destruction by some black students of the computer centre at Sir George Williams University (now Concordia) in 1969. Many blacks, according to Tunteng (1973, p. 234), were "indiscriminately assaulted" in Montreal streets, shopping centres, and other public places, while some were summarily dismissed from their jobs; "countless letters" were written and switchboards of radio stations "jammed" with telephone calls demanding the deportation of all blacks from Canada. And these demands were not made by "ignorant and irrational" or obscure people alone. Indeed, a "prominent" media personality stated (a month *before* the centre had even been *occupied*) that if the students' six-month old charges, accusing Professor Anderson of racial discrimination, were not proved, then they should all be deported! After the occupation, signs urging "Kill the Niggers" were prominently displayed within the university. In the public outcry that followed the destruction of the computer centre, the charges of racism were forgotten. Furthermore, this happened in times of economic prosperity.

The attacks on East Indians in recent years in Vancouver are described by Wood (1978, p. 554) as being part of "an Anti-Asian racism which, in Vancouver at least, had alternated between latency and open virulence for nearly three generations." A "minor wave of hoodlum attacks" on East Indians and their property in 1973 led to the formation of an East Indian Citizens Defence Committee (EICDC). Tensions rose when a few white teenagers were beaten by EICDC members. Although extra police protection for East Indians eased tensions somewhat, there were further racial incidents in 1974 and 1975. It should be mentioned that dissension within a section of the East Indian community itself had erupted into violence. This was sensationalized by the local press, which increasingly projected a negative image of East Indians (Scanlon, 1975).

It must also be noted that overt hostility towards Canadians of Asiatic and African origins has a long history in Canada. Racist ideology has been of importance in creating this hostility and perpetrating violence from the beginning of Canadian society. Western colonial expansion, of which Canada has been an integral part, required justifying and rationalizing the domination of other peoples, all of whom were darker than the invaders; the ideology of racism answered this need only too well.⁷ Its effects are still being felt today. In the words of a former chairman of the Ontario Human Rights Commission, Daniel Hill (1977, p. 7):

Racist themes originate deep in Canada's past, reverberate through the country's development and ring clearly in many

of our contemporary social conditions and institutional practices.

Finally, the role of violence in the development of Canada has to be acknowledged frankly if we are to understand ourselves better. In general, as McNaught (1970) suggests, collective violence has not been absent in Canadian history as is often believed; indeed, not only has violence been applied frequently by the authorities as well as groups, "but such resort to violence has been so frequent as to be an essential ingredient in our historical evolution." He argues further that "if our Canadian history teaches us anything it is that racist doctrine contains more potential violence than any other socio-political notion."

These studies suggest then that racial violence in Canada cannot be explained sufficiently in terms of the "deviant-individual" or the impersonal "social-forces" perspectives alone. The earlier violence initiated by the dominant community against the Japanese and Chinese and the more recent violence against non-whites in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver are two cases in point: prominent, respectable individuals and social institutions and organizations played an important, if not a critical, role in the former case, and the strength and pervasive nature of at least latent racism is indicated in the latter. The maintenance of the racial *status quo* was the main issue, in both cases, although the evidence is less clear in the more recent period. And this cannot be explained fully without taking into account the institutional-structural dimensions of the problem. As Hughes and Kallen (1974) point out, "...racism, whether overt or covert, polite or rude, is as deeply rooted in the Canadian hierarchy of ethnic inequality as it is in the American system."

The recent post-war immigration of non-whites to Canada has simply helped to bring to the surface the latent racism within the Canadian ethnic stratification system.

4. THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE

From the British experience, Richmond (1960) concludes that overt discrimination and conflict are likely to be precipitated in periods of economic insecurity, when "coloured immigrants"⁸ are perceived as competitors for employment and housing and as a threat to social status. He states that the British riots of 1919 in seaport towns and 1958 in London and Nottingham coincided with sudden increases in unemployment and competition for employment.

Particularly striking is the sudden increase in unemployment among male juveniles (under 18) in those areas where the disturbances occurred [in London and Nottingham] during the immediately preceding weeks of August 1958.

The connexion between the increase in unemployment and the prominent part taken by juvenile gangs in the violence shown

towards coloured immigrants is evident (p. 20).

However, Richmond's conclusions should be treated with great caution for several basic reasons. Firstly, it is not clear whether other comparable cities in Britain had similar problems, especially high unemployment, as Nottingham and London; since the *national* rate of unemployment had almost doubled in the last quarter of 1958, it would be reasonable to assume that comparable non-riot cities experienced high levels of unemployment as well. If so, then one has to explain why no riots occurred in such cities, which Richmond does not.

Secondly, it seems curious that no major riots occurred in Britain during the Great Depression--all the riots documented by Glass and Pollins (1960) occurred outside this period: 1919, 1943, 1948, 1949, 1954, and 1958.

Finally, as Hiro (1973) points out, race riots have occurred in Britain, as in Liverpool in 1948, "when jobs were going begging." Also, racial violence on a smaller scale has continued during periods of prosperity as, for example, in the 1960s.⁹ Hiro also notes that most of these riots, especially those before the 1950s, occurred when (and sometimes in places where) the non-white population was very small. The total was not more than 30,000 in 1919. The rioting consisted chiefly of whites attacking the persons and properties of blacks who tried to defend themselves as best as they could, a pattern that has been repeated over and over again.

It may be that this pattern is changing now. The more recent violence has often involved the police, 'fascist' as well as 'radical leftist' organizations, and black youth. Blacks in Britain, and especially black youths, are less willing to accept violent attacks without fighting back (White, 1977; Ballard, 1976).

It seems that the British situation may be approaching the American one in some important respects: segregation, widespread discrimination, and the rapidly diminishing confidence of the blacks in the willingness and ability of the majority white community to treat them justly.

In spite of the arguments about what specific factors spark off interracial violence in the three countries, there seems to be one major theme that underlies the experiences of all three. This is the theme of racism expressed in its various forms: personal prejudice, ideological rationalizations and justifications, and institutional discrimination. Which form has predominated, and to what degree, has varied from one time to another and from one place to another.

It is therefore important that we explicitly examine, albeit briefly, the existence of racism in its different forms in these three countries.

5. BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND DISCRIMINATION

It is not possible here to summarize the vast literature that exists on these phenomena, especially in the United States and Britain.¹⁰ What this lit-

erature shows is that racist beliefs and attitudes as well as racially discriminatory practices are common among substantial sections of the populations of the United States, Canada, and Britain; they have not been as well documented for Canada, but the little evidence that has been collected points to the same kinds of conclusions.¹¹

In the Canadian context, there are hardly any published national studies on this question. One of these is the study on multiculturalism by Berry, Kalin, and Taylor (1977, p. 245), which concluded that, although there is "little evidence" of "explicit racism" or "overt bigotry" in the sample, "there is some evidence that race is an issue and is being employed by Canadians in their acceptance or rejection of groups of people": the racially different groups were placed at the lower end of the evaluative ranking of groups in Canada.

Bibby's (1976) national survey found that 19 per cent of his sample held anti-Indian prejudice and 23 per cent anti-Jewish prejudice, and about 15 per cent expressed the view that they would feel uneasy in the presence of blacks or Orientals.

Henry's (1978) recent study on Toronto found that 16 per cent of her sample "can be considered to be extremely racist" and another 35 per cent "incline towards some degree of racism." From his study of Calgary, Frideres (1975b) concludes that "white Canadians hold strong prejudicial attitudes. In fact, attitudes toward Third World immigrants by native whites seem to have become more negative in the past ten years. Immigrant whites also tend to have negative attitudes towards non-white immigrants, but not as intense as their native counterpart."

Studies of minority groups themselves have revealed that such groups feel that prejudice and discrimination against them are widespread, at least in certain parts of the country.¹²

It is very likely that, for the reasons given below concerning conceptual and methodological inadequacies, most of these studies significantly underestimate the level, the intensity, and the extent of racial prejudice and discrimination in Canadian society. The reactions to the 1969 Montreal computer incident as well as the studies by Ubale (1978), Pitman (1977), and Head and Lee (1975), discussed earlier, suggest that there is probably considerable underestimation. The following observation by Hughes and Kallen (1974) underscores this point well:

Canadians, it appears, are "polite racists." They *politely* move slightly away from a Black co-passenger on the subway; they *politely* refuse to rent to or hire a Black; they *politely* refer to Blacks as negroes rather than "niggers"; and in general, they *politely* continue to discriminate against and segregate themselves from all but the most impersonal, formal contacts with their Black fellow (or potential fellow) Canadian citizens.

The relationship between objective conditions and opinions or attitudes is difficult to determine. For example, from her study of Canadian public opinion, Tienhaara (1974) concludes that economic conditions play a major role in shaping opinion on immigration: during downturns, opinion turns against immigrants (or certain racial groups), and this is most marked among the unemployed and becomes more conspicuous the longer they are unemployed. On the other hand, Henry (1978) found that, in Toronto, the unemployed in her sample were among the least racist and certainly less racist than the employed.

However, the validity of these studies is being increasingly challenged on the grounds that they do not adequately explain the persistence, pervasiveness, and subtlety of racist beliefs and practices in any of these societies. Wellman (1977), for example, argues that sociologists have assumed that racist sentiments are expressed as prejudice, which is usually described as overt hostility towards and faulty generalizations about groups. But this limits racism to the obvious hostilities expressed by bigots and it is found only among lower- and working-class people (like Archie Bunker); the more subtle, elusive, and widespread type is completely overlooked and ignored.

The reasons for these "oversights," according to Wellman, are partly conceptual (i.e., sociologists have not 'looked' for these latter manifestations of racism because of their middle-class perspective or bias) and partly methodological (traditional large-scale survey instruments are not yet sensitive to these expressions of racism).¹³

A more comprehensive and valid approach, proposed by Wellman (1977), would see racist beliefs as culturally sanctioned, rational responses to struggles over scarce resources, and as sentiments that, regardless of intentions, defend the advantages whites have because of the subordinated position of racial minorities. This approach is more useful because it goes beyond the limited perspective of seeing racist attitudes as a psychological problem and places them in the broader social contexts and organizations. It views racial division as a form of stratification built into the structure of society; the roots of this division are located in the structure of the division of labour or in the organization of political power. Thus the crucial features of race relations are *not* the *ideas* that whites have about others, but their own superior position *vis-à-vis* non-whites, the benefits following from their position, and the institutions that maintain this relationship. When non-whites demand institutional or structural changes, which would give them better access to resources, at least some groups of whites stand to lose certain advantages. And as Wellman (1977) demonstrates, such losses may be suffered not only by prejudiced bigots, but also by people with unprejudiced, tolerant world views who justify or explain their opposition to change towards racial equality on ostensibly non-racial grounds, such as shortcomings in the *culture* of non-whites.

Such an approach would thus include the entire area of institutional and structural racism, which may be overt or covert, intentional or unintentional. The inclusion of these two areas is critical to the understanding of interracial violence, since they are linked directly to it and since they have a very long

nistory that meshes them intricately with the ideology of racism. Thus, although the publicly espoused ideals of "liberal democracy" may be non-racist, at least the effects of several centuries of racist ideology and present racial inequality are very much with us today and play a large role in determining the daily lives of many.¹⁴ Hence, it is imperative not only to include these areas in any study of interracial conflicts, but also to make them integral parts of policies and programmes attempting to reduce or resolve such conflicts.

6. SUMMARY

This brief overview of the experiences of interracial violence in the United States, Canada, and Britain suggests that attempts to explain such violence or, for that matter, the underlying conflict that gives rise to it, in terms of the "deviant-individual" or the "social-forces" perspectives alone, are clearly very limited. Although some of this violence may be explained using these perspectives, most of it has involved, in fact, a direct or indirect challenge to the racial *status quo*, and this is explained more adequately by the "institutional-structural" perspective. The search for specific causal factors (within the areas of individual "pathology," socio-economic conditions, etc.) has been of only limited success because the phenomenon of racism has pervaded and become embedded in all areas of society, particularly its institutions and structures, which give rise to the basic conflict that is manifested in racial violence.

NOTES

1. These three perspectives may be subsumed under two very broad theoretical approaches--the "breakdown-deprivation" and the "solidarity-mobilization" approaches--that social scientists have developed to explain the different kinds of conflict and violence that may exist in societies. See Clark, 1975; Oberschall, 1978; and Williams, 1975.
2. Other analysts (e.g., Button, 1978 and Kopkind, 1971) use different labels.
3. See, for example, Lipsky and Olson, 1977; Feagin and Hahn, 1973; Fogelson, 1971; Skolnick, 1972.
4. The problem of terminology in this area is quite serious, as important interpretative and analytic implications are attached to different terms by different groups. For example, black leaders, who insist the "disorders" were politically motivated, prefer to call these events "rebellions" or "revolts." See Lipsky and Olson, 1977, p. 26, and Skolnick, 1972, pp. 47-70).
5. The exclusion and suppression were not limited to one or two areas alone, but included all areas of life.
6. See also Breton, Armstrong, and Kennedy, 1974.
7. Van den Berghe (1978) argues that the socio-biological theory of kin selection better accounts for the appearance of racism than any other competing theory. However, as he himself admits, the ideas he sketches are "still tentative."
8. It should be noted that this is another of those terms popular both with the layman and social scientist, especially in Britain, which is misleading if not dangerous. It is used almost always to refer to all non-whites, even if they were born in the country, or have lived there for years.
9. Holmes' (1975) observation about the "absence of group violence" in Britain between 1963-1968, with the exception of the well-known 1958 riots, and about whether individual acts of violence "witnessed at times" were really "racially inspired," is, in the light of the other evidence, a very limited one.
10. See, for example, Katz, 1975 and Williams, 1975 who provide a good overview of the American literature. See Smith, 1977 and Hiro, 1973 as examples of some recent British studies; the latter also provides a useful brief critique of the now famous (or infamous?) E.J.B. Rose-edited study on British race relations *Colour and Citizenship* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

11. Berry, Kalin, and Taylor, 1977; Bibby, 1976; Brown, 1968; Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), 1977; Frideres, 1973, 1975b; Hameed, 1975; Head and Lee, 1975; Helling, 1965; Henry, 1965; Henry, 1978; Hill, 1977; Kehoe, 1978; Ramcharan, 1974; Richmond, 1976a; Scanlon, 1975; Tienhaara, 1974; Winks, 1971.
12. See, for example, Brown, 1968; Chandra, 1973; Head and Lee, 1975; Henry, 1965; Ramcharan, 1974; Richmond, 1975-76; Sen, 1978.
13. The inadequacy of traditional approaches is illustrated, for example, by the Rose study (mentioned in note 10 above), which concluded that the majority of the British were "tolerantly inclined," while another study done at about *the same time* found widespread racial discrimination; as Hiro (1973) states, put together, the two studies were saying: "there is massive discrimination against coloured people by whites, 73 per cent of whom are 'tolerant' or 'tolerant-inclined'!"
14. Knowles and Prewitt, 1969; Terry, 1970; Barnett, 1976; Hiro, 1973; Rex, 1973; Feagin and Feagin, 1978.

Chapter Two

POLICY RESPONSES

The history of interracial violence, as we have seen, is a long one. The explanations offered for such violence are varied and quite complex as they might well be expected to be, given the nature of the phenomena they attempt to explain, the politically controversial issues they raise, and the 'state of the art'.

Policy responses, however, often cannot wait until definitive answers or explanations have been settled upon. Whether such answers could play a major role in policy decisions is of course a moot point; indeed, it has been argued forcefully by some analysts¹ that political considerations and perspectives may be more important and may pre-empt certain kinds of answers and hence policies.

The questions we now turn to are the following: what have been the policy responses in different countries to the problem of interracial violence; how effective have these policies been; and what lessons can one draw from them?

The analysis that follows will generally be limited to the last fifteen years, which are of direct relevance and interest for our purposes. It will concentrate largely on the United States and Britain, as these two countries have developed extensive policies in this area.

Two general points are worth noting at the outset. The first is that, on the whole, the policy responses developed in these countries have usually been based on the impersonal "social-forces" or "deviant-individual" perspective; although the "institutional-structural" perspective has not been completely absent, at least in the United States, it has played, until recently, a relatively secondary role. The second important point, which is related to the first, is that the emphasis of policy responses in practical terms has *more often* been on the mechanisms and techniques to control and prevent outbreaks of violence than on dealing with the underlying social conflict that leads to violence.

1. AMERICAN POLICY RESPONSES

The most immediate government responses to past race riots and civil disorders have been, according to Lipsky and Olson (1977, p. 74), "to suppress the violence as quickly as possible to demonstrate the inviolability as well as the might of public authority."² After the initial expression of surprise ("it couldn't happen here"), public officials generally develop interpretations of racial violence responsive to mass needs of reassurance. These interpretations "usually minimize the severity of the violence, vastly underestimate the number of persons involved, describe participants as irresponsible troublemakers lacking stable social and economic attachments, and summarily dismiss as nonexistent or

illegitimate the grievances that allegedly give rise to violence." The consistency of such explanations leads to the conclusion that public officials "need to give the impression that racial violence is not an indictment of the municipality or its political representatives, and that it will not happen again."

Such assurances have usually not been enough to ease public anxieties, and influential community groups have generally insisted that "something be done" to prevent recurrence of such violence: white interests petition for improved capacity to suppress future violence, while black interests demand changes to improve economic and political conditions in the black community. Public officials have responded by creating *ad hoc* commissions to investigate the racial violence and develop reform proposals, thus giving the appearance of taking corrective steps without making binding commitments.

By appointing representatives of a community's dominant interests to the commissions and charging them with comprehensive duties, public officials try to reassure the public that a thorough investigation will be done by prestigious and representative study groups, whose views will form the basis of future policy.

However, being *ad hoc* and temporary, such commissions are often handicapped by insufficient funds, severe time constraints, and inadequate staffing, and they sometimes fail to achieve consensus. More seriously, they often emphasize politically acceptable explanations. This is most apparent in two forms: in the tendency to exonerate public officials of blame, even in the face of evidence, and in the tendency to defend or sympathize with the economic and political interests represented by commission members (and, conversely, to single out and condemn unrepresented interests, usually those sympathetic to blacks, for contributing to the outbreak of violence). Thus, they do not and cannot be expected to seriously challenge the *status quo*.

"Riot commissions," Lipsky and Olson (1977, p. 77) conclude, "have historically been relatively ineffectual. By and large their recommendations have not been implemented." Others have come to similar conclusions. In testimony before the Kerner Commission on the 1967 civil disorders, Kenneth Clark recalled that riot commissions in the past had issued reports and observed that the undertaking had an Alice-in-Wonderland quality, "with the same moving picture reshowed over and over again, the same analysis, the same recommendations, and the same inaction" (Lipsky and Olson, 1977, p. 139).

The Kerner Commission itself, however, was somewhat unusual in that, unlike its predecessors, it was a national body with the unprecedented mandate, as chairman Kerner put it, "to probe the soul of America." The report of this commission "epitomized the liberal response to the riots and embodied the liberal approach to the ghettos" (Fogelson, 1971). It viewed the riots not as deliberate political protest, but as the inevitable result of the neutral problems of migration, urban overpopulation, family structure, economic deprivation, racial discrimination, and so on, which can be resolved *within* the existing institutional structures.³

The report, therefore, advocated "middle" road solutions, rejecting outright repression of or capitulation to the demands of the blacks. It recommended a policy to enrich the ghetto and simultaneously to encourage integration through large-scale, long-term, private and public programmes to eliminate white racism. All of this would leave the basic institutional structures relatively untouched.⁴

The ghetto's grievances were to be alleviated through more programmes to increase employment, improve education, reform welfare, and upgrade housing. But if the ghetto's grievances also resulted from misguided policy, then the value of such programmes would be doubtful. They might lead to some improvements, but would not touch the inequitable distribution of wealth, which underlies the ghetto's grievances.

The blacks' frustrations were to be reduced by the authorities opening channels of communication through joint community-government agencies, which could discuss and redress neighbourhood grievances. If, however, the blacks' frustration is essentially a political problem, then what is required is an effective mechanism for participation.

Finally, realizing that white racism (seen as individual prejudice) might eliminate these programmes, rather than the other way around, the report recommended the removal of racial barriers to employment, the curtailment of *de facto* school segregation, and the abolition of racial discrimination in housing by basically extending the civil rights legislation. All of this assumes that individual prejudice rather than institutional racism is responsible for racial inequality. Such legislation may benefit some, especially middle-class blacks, but it will not end racial inequality, for, if individual prejudice once made blacks "inferior," institutional rigidity, particularly in the police, schools, welfare, work, housing, and other institutions, now keeps them so. This is due not only to racial antipathy, but also to the centralization, professionalization, and bureaucratization of these institutions, which have made them so unresponsive to the needs of their users, especially racial minorities.⁵

Thus, critics have argued that "the most comprehensive study of the (1960s') riots" (Button, 1978) made recommendations that are quite limited. But what happened to these recommendations? Was this commission any more effective than its predecessors? Lipsky and Olson's (1977, p. 139) answer is: "Unhappily, the impact of the commission's work on public policy is substantially similar to Clark's bleak portrait" (quoted above). Feagin and Hahn (1973, p. 232) have concluded that "the federal law enforcement response to the ghetto rioting and other civil disturbances does seem to have been perhaps the most substantial reaction at any level of government," a response in keeping with historical patterns. There were no or, at least, only token social or economic reforms.

From his study of executive officials at the relevant federal agencies, Button (1978) concludes that federal responses to the riots can be divided into three distinct patterns of activity: the early riots (1963-1966), the intense riots (1967-1968), and the later riots (1969-1972).

The public policy responses to the earlier riots tended to emphasize long-term, preventive measures as the chief method for reducing racial violence, which was viewed from the "social-forces" perspective. Thus, the riots were then seen as being caused by either feelings of relative deprivation among blacks (due to deplorable social and economic conditions in the ghettos) or by white discrimination (due to individual prejudice) against blacks. This was particularly true of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the national anti-poverty agency that focused most directly on poor blacks.

It responded in non-traditional and innovative ways to try and meet the blacks' demands, at least in the earlier period, through a variety of programmes: summer youth programmes, education and social services, greater local mobilization of blacks (primarily through the Community Action Program--CAP), and more jobs and job training.

Similarly, the Departments of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) responded significantly to the earlier riots, though in more traditional ways. HUD, for example, poured vast amounts of urban renewal funds in riot-affected areas, while HEW increased its funding for compensatory and vocational education programmes in these areas. The HUD approach, emphasizing the old "brick-and-mortar" renewal of selected sites, was strongly criticized by many blacks as being equated with "Negro removal." In a similar way, HEW funding still attempted to "gild the ghetto" rather than encourage racially integrated schools. The only moderately innovative programme, according to Button (1978), was HUD's Model Cities Program (MCP) in 1966 under which living conditions in the slums were to be improved by a concerted local attack on social, economic, and physical problems over a six-year period.

However, according to Batley (1978), the main effect of many of these programmes, especially CAP and MCP, was simply to boost certain existing services (by "throwing dollars" at the problems as some critics have dubbed this process), rather than bring about any fundamental changes. For instance, opposition to CAP, with its rhetoric of citizen participation and of challenge to the established power structure, came early from mayors and congressmen who accused it of wasting funds after only one year of CAP, which became dominated by the established local service agencies that were in fact to be redirected and reformed by CAP. The MCP, on the other hand, seemed deliberately designed to restore the initiative in reform to established authority, with much more emphasis on the need to develop co-ordination between services and to encourage their administrative competence. In practice, however, the MCP "financed laundry lists of projects rather than coordinated programs."

The federal agencies' responses to the later riots became effectively diluted and somewhat limited because of various cross-pressures and the "backlash" phenomenon. As Button (1978) explains, most agencies and departments felt that they were doing all they could and they did not want to appear to be "rewarding" rioters; local OEO employees were often blamed for fermenting some disorders and for unduly raising black expectations; the growing war in Vietnam and congressional disillusionment with many Great Society programmes drained off resources;

and not only did the persistent rioting somewhat "condition" public officials but, more importantly, it led to a growing public "backlash" which ended up in greater emphasis on "law and order."

The new Nixon Administration, using the "deviant-individual" perspective, viewed the disorders as anarchistic and unnecessary and as being caused primarily by black militant agitators. Thus, it emphasized the reassertion of "law and order" through increased riot control expenditures and greatly expanded domestic intelligence activities. Not only had "law and order" become politically popular, but it also provided an immediate and seemingly simple and inexpensive method for quelling disorders; social and economic reforms, in contrast, were seen as long-term and costly and did not necessarily prevent riots. So, although some of the earlier social and economic programmes were continued at least up to 1972, the major emphasis since 1969 was on "the more immediate short-term problems of law and order."

This was done through substantially increased funding of the Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) for major police support programmes, particularly to improve their riot control capabilities, and for domestic intelligence activities. The long-term, riot-prevention role of the Community Relations Service (CRS), which was finally establishing continuous working relationships with black leaders and local officials in racially troubled areas to help create constructive change, was transformed into a short-term, riot-control role;⁶ in early 1973, its staff was reduced by two thirds and its funding, by half due to easing of tension. The agency's present activity (1978) continues to be limited to a response to racial and ethnic difficulties through the mechanism's informal conciliation, formal mediation, and technical assistance or consultation or community relations problems (CRS, 1978b).

Button (1978) observes that, while many executive officials almost adopted the "institutional-structural" explanation of riots, they were unable to respond accordingly for several reasons: the paucity of knowledge on how to alleviate fundamental social problems, the general nature of the political system that prohibits the rapid institutionalization of such reforms, and the "social-forces" perspective itself, which denied any fundamental restructuring of basic institutions. Thus, the responses proved to be somewhat limited, transitory, and flexible.

Feagin and Hahn (1973, p. 261) conclude that "only limited reforms are likely to occur in American cities as long as those in power do not wish a significant reallocation of power and resources to take place." They go on to cite a 1972 study, which concludes that conditions of the cities visited have worsened since 1968--housing, schools, crime, unemployment, disease, drugs, higher welfare rolls and, with few exceptions, hostility between minorities and police.⁷ In short, the wide acceptance of the basic Kerner finding, that ghetto conditions were a major cause of the disorders, did not signify that those in power were willing to take the drastic action necessary to make American cities livable again.

Although the responses to the riot commissions have been quite limited, there have been other ongoing activities stemming from the civil rights legislation of the early 1960s. These important legal and other changes were achieved largely by the relatively non-violent but militant direct action strategies of the blacks who had been mobilized into such organizations as the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) (see, for example, Bracey, Meier, and Rudwick, 1971). The changes dealt mainly with the issues of racial discrimination in various areas (employment, housing, education, services, etc.). We shall now look more closely at these specific issues, because they are probably more directly relevant to the Canadian situation.

The traditional approach to racial discrimination in the United States (and elsewhere) views it as the result of racial prejudice; also, this view was generally optimistic, at least up to the late 1960s, about eliminating discrimination by eradicating prejudice, which was seen as "an archaic survival of an irrational past" (Feagin and Feagin, 1978). This was not surprising, given the fact that, until the mid-1960s, overt, often blatant, direct discrimination was common in many areas of life.

However, as Feagin and Feagin (1978) observe, although recent polls show that white prejudice has declined sharply over the last few decades, discrimination has decreased at a lesser rate, despite the civil rights legislation of the 1960s. What seems to have happened is that the most overt discrimination took on more subtle forms (e.g., selectively placing ads for unskilled or semi-skilled jobs (only) in the minority press instead of ads with explicit racial designations). In any case, the more institutionalized form remained largely intact. Thus, a different approach was called for, and this involved examining "institutional" racism or discrimination.

Feagin and Feagin (1978, pp. 20-21) define "discrimination" as "actions or practices carried out by members of dominant groups, or their representatives, which have a differential and negative impact on members of subordinate groups." Wellman (1977, p. 39) points out that institutional racism is expressed "in the form of systematic practices that deny and exclude blacks (as well as members of other minority racial or cultural groups) from access to social resources" (parenthesis added). Both these definitions are more concerned with effects and mechanisms than with intentions, and they go beyond the individual and into the wider social contexts within which individuals operate.⁸

Feagin and Feagin (1978) delineate four of the basic types of discrimination --from the 'isolate' and the 'small-group', to the 'direct' and the 'indirect' institutionalized discrimination. They stress that all these forms interact, overlap, form a complex web, and change. (We deal with this in greater detail in the final chapter.) They also point out that this discrimination occurs within the broader cultural context. In North America, this culture has been shaped and dominated by certain ethnocentric white groups which have devalued other cultural and subcultural traditions and thus perpetrated "cultural racism" as well. Hence,

"the deep underpinning of the discrimination lies in the underlying white (male) cultural perspective."

Let us briefly look at some of the major areas of racial discrimination in the United States. In employment, it was not until the 1960s that any significant anti-discrimination action could be seen at the federal level. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) was set up in 1965 to require government contractors not only to stop discriminating, but also to take "affirmative action" to eliminate discrimination in their employment practices.

The concept of affirmative action basically involves remedial practices going beyond passive non-discrimination to active, positive actions to bring in previously excluded minorities and women; it ensures that seemingly neutral recruiting, training, hiring, and promotion practices do not operate to the disadvantage of minorities and women. It is widely misunderstood as "reverse discrimination," "preferential treatment," and "quotas," giving unfair and unjustified advantages to these groups in the job market and elsewhere. We shall return to this issue later. It is sufficient to note at this point that it is not surprising that such terms should be used for something that is really threatening to many whites. However, the effectiveness of OFCC-sponsored affirmative action has been seriously questioned.⁹ On the whole, the OFCC has taken little direct action to ensure desegregating federal contractors' employment.

The other major federal agency dealing with employment has been the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), created to enforce Title VII of the 1964 *Civil Rights Act*. The EEOC investigates legitimate complaints, attempts conciliation and failing that, goes to court (since 1972) to end discrimination in employment. A very large backlog of cases had built up by the mid-1970s due to management problems and lack of staff.

The impact of such activity on the economic mobility of minorities is difficult to assess since systematic evidence is lacking. Available data point to greater pressure on employers to desegregate their work-forces. The actual results are mixed: overall employment for blacks had increased, but this was generally limited to certain low-status, low-paying occupations--such as clerical, craft, and service work.¹⁰ Feagin and Feagin (1978) point out that studies show these increases began *before* significant EEOC, Labor Department, and court actions had been taken in the affirmative action area. These increases were probably the result of the wartime boom of the 1960s.

In fighting discrimination in education, the main thrust has been aimed at desegregating the public school systems, traditionally controlled by local government bodies. As the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1977b) notes, the first ten years after the 1954 *Brown* decision were largely devoted to fighting (relatively successfully) *de jure* school segregation in the South. However, when efforts were directed at the *de facto* segregation in the North in the 1960s and 1970s, opposition, especially centred around "busing" school children, became so widespread that little progress was actually achieved. The commission warns that, without positive action, segregation in urban areas will probably increase and the

urban-suburban racial divisions will be intensified. It observes that most fears have proved groundless and desegregation generally is working where it has been genuinely attempted.

Affirmative action programmes in employment and in the student selection process in higher education were undertaken in the 1970s. How widespread such programmes are, particularly the privately initiated programmes to increase minority students in colleges and universities, is difficult to ascertain, but the total number may be modest. Many have been token and/or short lived because of lack of community and financial support and enforcement. Some are now endangered by adverse court decisions (e.g., the *Bakke* case).

In the area of housing discrimination, the efforts made by various levels of government have been even more limited than in the other two. Until very recently, racial discrimination by real estate agents, builders, developers, mortgage lenders, landlords, and public officials was openly practised (U.S. Civil Rights Commission, 1977a). What little legislation existed was weakly administered by government agencies. Indeed, as the commission points out (p. 171), the federal government "has been a major factor in the creation of segregated residential neighborhoods throughout metropolitan areas of the United States." Although legislation has been strengthened since the mid-1970s, housing remains at least as segregated now as it ever was and discrimination, both direct and indirect, persists. Feagin and Feagin (1978) point out that, if anything, residential segregation has increased slightly and conclude that the "established patterns of segregated housing [will] persist for a very long time because of indirect discrimination."

From his examination of criticisms and evaluations of public policies in general and racial discrimination policies in particular, Burkey (1971) indicates five very *general* variables which have affected effectiveness: internal organizational efficiency, research, enforcement, support and resistance, and the comprehensiveness of the policy.

The first variable, internal organizational efficiency, will depend on the degree of *cognitive clarity* of policy among administrators, sufficiency of resources and their efficient utilization, and the degree of autonomy. On all these, the public agencies have been found lacking and hence their organizational efficiency has been low.

The extent of verified knowledge regarding the causes of racial discrimination, its specific effects, and the most effective methods in reducing or eliminating it is low. It therefore becomes even more important for public agencies to carry on extensive monitoring and feedback research of their programmes. Utilization of even a partial research programme has been shown to have favourable implications for policy effectiveness. However, few agencies have in fact done this.

Discriminating behaviour that has been institutionalized for centuries cannot be changed merely by passing laws. Just as sanctions have been used to en-

force discriminatory norms, sanctions must be used to enforce anti-discriminatory norms. On the whole, enforcement has been absent or only minor: the weakest method, which has been favoured by public agencies, is the individual-initiated criminal and civil court action; the strongest is enforcement by a government organization with sanctioning powers, which have been either non-existent or used only rarely.

Support and resistance come from specific targets of policy, from organized groups who see benefits and advantages, or threats and disadvantages from the policy, and from elements of the unorganized citizenry. Several specific and interrelated variables have affected the degree of support of, or resistance to, anti-discrimination policies: white self-interest, at least in the short run, and white prejudice have put up much resistance and have even begun to question the legitimacy of at least some of the anti-discrimination programmes if not policies. The black movement is now quite diversified (especially in terms of "integration-separation" continuum), and hence support for civil rights and integration policies is not as clear-cut as it once was. The American system of government (checks and balances plus localism) enhances resistance and thus undermines enforcement effectiveness.

Finally, the degree of comprehensiveness of policy--that is, a holistic or 'systems' as opposed to 'piecemeal' approach--will affect the effectiveness of anti-discrimination policies. The degree of comprehensiveness has been very low: most of the policies have been 'piecemeal' attacks on the problem.

Burkey concludes from his study that "the major cause of the relative ineffectiveness of public policy to produce change has been the lack of enforcement." Although he wrote that in 1971, the evidence presented earlier seems to indicate that his assessment may still be applied today.

Thus, the gains achieved in the major areas of employment, education, and housing¹¹ have ranged, for various reasons, from very little or token to modest. Yet there has been a tremendous outcry against many of the remedial programmes. White males argue that "too much" is being done to combat discrimination, which they claim is no longer serious, and that "reverse discrimination" is now a serious problem.

Some critics, like Nathan Glazer (1975), argue that "affirmative action" programmes in fact result in "affirmative discrimination" against white Americans in general and white males in particular. He further argues that the programmes and the philosophy behind them are un-American, that the merit principle is being sacrificed, that the rights of the majority are being infringed, and that all that is necessary for a just society is the traditionally defined equality of opportunity. He claims, for example, that enforcement of measures designed to combat racial discrimination (e.g., busing or preferential treatment of minorities) infringes on what he considers the rights of the majority; or that preferential treatment, particularly in employment, usually leads to the acceptance of "unqualified" persons. Although it is not possible to discuss these arguments here, it should be noted that most of them have been shown to be

unconvincing because they are based largely on unwarranted assumptions and false ethnic analogies.¹²

Whatever the merits or demerits of the various arguments, the most striking aspect is the great passions affirmative action seems to have aroused,¹³ and it is understandable that great resistance is put up when a system of entrenched privileges and benefits is being seriously challenged. Feagin and Feagin (1978, p. 177) summarize it aptly. Given the fundamental racist and sexist tradition of the United States, "it is not surprising that great resistance mounts when anti-discrimination procedures begin to cut significantly into the benefits that members of dominant groups derive from the existence of discrimination. And such resistance may well explain the token-to-modest character of many remedial programs."

It seems likely, then, that such resistance will increase. The question thus arises whether meaningful changes can be achieved without really major changes in the structure of the existing economic and social system.

Whatever the answer to that question, one thing is certain. This is that, as Barnett (1976) states, "structural constraints must be squarely faced and challenged." She points out that the present has a disturbing similarity to the Reconstruction era when blacks made dramatic political gains, only to see them eroded year by year, until the compromise of 1877 finally reconciled southern whites and northern whites at the expense of southern blacks. "Fears that redistribution of resources, political access, benefits and political legitimacy could lead to black group equivalence (i.e., black ethnic group status) with whites stimulated the vehement, and sometimes violent, white reactions which shaped the politics of the late 1960s and early 1970s" (p. 32). If the events of the 1960s and 1970s carried a message, it was that, *at the minimum*, major meaningful reforms on the racial front will have to be undertaken.

From the discussions of American policy responses, the problem seems to have been less in formulating the necessary policies and programmes (although these could be improved further) than in effectively implementing them to obtain significant results. The latter have been generally limited, due, as we have seen, to the inadequate nature of some of the perspectives used, the various cross-pressures, and the resistance to significant change. Better enforcement of existing programmes and development of new ones, and effective strategies to overcome present resistance to change will have to be undertaken if the situation is to improve substantially.

2. BRITISH POLICY RESPONSES

British concerns have centred mainly around the issues of non-white immigration and, to a lesser extent, "race relations" in general and discrimination in particular. The dominant underlying perspective on race-related matters has tended to be, as will become apparent, the "deviant-individual" one, although the "social-forces" perspective has not been altogether absent; there are some

recent signs suggesting that the usefulness of the "institutional-structural" perspective may now be in the process of being recognized.

Initial general British reaction to the racial violence in Nottingham and London in 1958 was, according to Glass and Pollins (1960), one of 'acute shock', accompanied by rebukes for the 'dastardly attacks' based on the idea that "racial discrimination is un-British."

The only tangible response, from the public policy perspective, was to 'debate' the issue in terms of "immigration control," which was "a polite term for some sort of colour bar" since most immigrants were white.¹⁴ Although the violence was seen generally as the work of 'hooligans' (albeit white), thus absolving the vast majority of the population from any responsibility, the implication of the 'immigration control' debate was to blame the victims, that is, the 'coloured minority', for the problem, an idea that subsequently influenced policies.

Suggestions (and earlier efforts) to even begin combating racial prejudice or discrimination through legislation were rejected on various grounds, including the argument that it was 'un-British' to legislate on such 'private', individual matters (Glass and Pollins, 1960; Claiborne, 1974). Thus, the public policy reaction in the aftermath of the 'race riots' of 1958 was to do nothing, except perhaps to obtain informal agreements from (non-white) Commonwealth countries to voluntarily limit emigration to Britain. As Glass and Pollins (1960, p. 222) state: "...a unique opportunity to define a code of official standards on race relations in this country was missed." The government statement on the 'incidents' mentioned their 'long-term implications' for policy but only in terms of control of Commonwealth (i.e., non-white) immigration; not one word was said about the official attitude toward tolerance.

It is not surprising, then, that the government's policy reaction, when it came in 1961, was to legislate immigration control mainly for (non-white) British subjects for the first time: the *Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962* restricted the admission of Commonwealth immigrants for settlement to those who had been issued with employment vouchers. However, this was not enough, and further restrictions were subsequently introduced at regular intervals in the form of the White Paper on Immigration of 1965, the *Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1968*, and the *Immigration Act of 1971*. With each successive change, the measures became more and more racist, at least in effect, culminating in the removal of the right of entry and settlement of new non-white immigrants, and draconian and arbitrary powers of control over new immigrants. But this may still not be enough: the (then) Conservative Official Opposition has been talking since January 1978 of not only ending immigration altogether (to avoid being 'swamped' by people with a different culture, as the Opposition leader put it), but also of 'induced repatriation' (Sivanandan, 1978a).

However, while the government institutionalized racism and made it look respectable through its electorally popular immigration laws, it also tried, particularly in the late 1960s, to counter their increased social and political

consequences, thus displaying an ambivalence that persists to the present.

Thus, the 1962 *Immigrants Act* was accompanied by the setting up of the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Committee (CIAC) to advise the home secretary on immigrant welfare and integration. The seriousness of the government's intention and effort can be seen by the fact that it took *two* years to appoint a full-time secretary and allocated an annual budget of £6,000! This national body continued the 'tea party' and 'social-welfare-for-the newcomers' approach, which had already proved so unsuccessful with local liaison committees (conducting liaison between social and religious welfare organizations and not between black and white communities) that existed briefly in the 1950s. There seemed to be a reluctance to admit that there was a 'race relations' problem (Hiro, 1973).¹⁵

The 1965 White Paper, which imposed further restrictions on 'coloured immigration', replaced the CIAC with the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI). Although the NCCI had more funds and staff than its predecessor, 'the old school of 'social-welfare-for-the newcomers' was again in the saddle, backed now by government money and prestige' (Hiro, 1973, p. 229). The new body adopted the existing committees and formed new ones, now called community relations councils, consisting of social workers, churchmen, local councillors, trade unionists, and 'coloured' immigrant leaders, all appointed by the NCCI. These councils were to have joint projects of the immigrants and 'host' community with the full backing of local authorities, and were to be non-sectarian and non-political. However, most local authorities' support was lukewarm at best, and its 'non-political' approach meant that it could not come to grips with the problem, which was basically political. The welfare of 'coloured citizens' depended on the *political* decisions of the local authorities, whose support was lukewarm for precisely political reasons (see Hiro, 1973).

The government also introduced the first piece of anti-discriminatory legislation--the *Race Relations Act of 1965*, which also created the Race Relations Board (RRB) to enforce it. Given that the 'colour problem' was still seen to be a small one, the faith in the tradition of tolerance and in education and persuasion strong, and fears of a 'backlash' against stronger measure great, it is not surprising that the act was weak and declaratory in nature. It outlawed incitement to racial hatred and discrimination only in public places through conciliation by the board's local conciliation committees; it did not provide for much enforcement machinery and it excluded the more important areas of employment, housing, services, and so forth.

With the hasty passage of the 1968 *Immigrants Act* and the 1967 U.S. civil disorders still fresh in peoples' minds, the government introduced the Urban Aid Programme (UAP) to give further help to local authorities to alleviate the 'transitional' problems 'experienced' and 'caused' by immigrants in housing, education, and health. However, not only were the resources allocated very limited (e.g., about £4 million annually for 60 towns and cities), but also the lukewarm support for immigrant concerns by local authorities, which were to submit the applications, meant that these concerns received low priority. Essentially, then, the programme was to expand services somewhat *within* the existing local power structure.

Attached to the UAP was the Community Development Project (CDP), which was to be "an action research programme where teams of locally based workers would explore the reasons for urban deprivation and test the scope for boosting self-help in [twelve] communities and for improving the responsiveness of local services" (Batley, 1978). For various reasons (unclear strategy, organizational structures, and co-ordination between the action and research teams), the exercise was not very successful. Perhaps because of this, the government's policy direction is moving away from treatment of 'pathologies' towards adjusting the economic infrastructure of inner city areas.

To deal more specifically with racial discrimination, the *Race Relations Act* was extended to cover discrimination in employment and housing (both with exceptions) as well as credit and insurance facilities. Although the RRB was given some limited enforcement powers, these were inadequate to deal with the problem of widespread discrimination.¹⁶ The reliance was still on individual persuasion, education, and conciliation.

More generally, the NCCI was transformed into a statutory Community Relations Commission (CRC) to promote "harmonious community relations" by co-ordinating national effort through the local community relations councils, to disseminate information about matters affecting minority groups, and to advise the government. The basic aims and approach were unchanged. The local committees were still weak in financial resources, low in status, and lacking in executive power and, hence, failed as before to meaningfully involve the crucial local institutions, particularly the local authorities whose support continued to be lukewarm. The CRC itself continued its predecessor's obsession with the structure of local councils and the issue of bureaucratization to the detriment of clear thinking about objectives and policies. This may have been partly due to a desire to avoid the more fundamental political questions (Hill and Issacharoff, 1971). Perhaps this was inevitable, given that government policy still did not admit the problem in its institutional-structural aspects.

These 'new' measures, then, were not much better than the previous attempts. One extensive study (Hill and Issacharoff, 1971) concluded that, although the CRC was pointed to as evidence that something was being done about race relations, it was in fact the worst form of 'tokenism':

Above all, the community relations movement has not been able to emerge as an effective force because of the unwillingness of the government to back it effectively, either with sufficient funds, sufficient power, or with other policies compatible with the doctrine of racial equality for which it is supposed to stand (p. 295).

Rex (1974, p. 181) has gone even further: "In fact, the view can be argued that the Community Relations Commission functions in a manner roughly equivalent to the South African Ministry of Bantu affairs, although in a much more half-hearted and amateurish way."

Part of the problem, as Abbott (1971) points out, has been that "the race relations legislation in the United Kingdom has been established without very much attention to the views of groups it is designed to protect." It is therefore understandable that such legislation has not been very useful and that these groups lack confidence in it.

The fact that the efforts by the government were largely ineffective was confirmed by the introduction of a new *Race Relations Act* in 1976, which replaced the previous legislation. In addition to an organizational rearrangement--the old Race Relations Board and the Community Relations Commission were absorbed into a new Commission for Racial Equality (CRE)--there are major changes in the powers and the procedure. Individuals will now be able to take their complaints to an industrial tribunal in the case of employment, or to the courts in all other cases. The CRE itself may help individuals prepare their case, but its main functions are those of independently initiating investigations (of patterns of discrimination), issuing of 'cease and desist' notices, and monitoring compliance; the new body also has full subpoena powers. Another important novel feature of the act is to extend the definition of discrimination to include the application of requirements or conditions which tend to disfavour particular racial groups, intentionally or unintentionally (Smith, 1977).

Underlying these changes, which were unthinkable and un-British twenty years earlier, was the fear, as the Commons Select Committee put it, of the "growing lack of confidence among the ethnic communities, especially the young--the second generation non-immigrant population" (quoted in Macdonald, 1977; see also Sivanandan, 1977).

How much confidence this new piece of legislation will inspire will really depend on how effective it will be in remedying the situation that has been allowed to build up over two decades. Although it is still too early to assess its effectiveness, there are doubts that it will get very far. Perhaps the most important reason is the contradictory assumptions of the successive race relations laws and the racist immigration laws. The former assume that the black minority are part of the community and there to stay, while the latter assume they are there on sufferance and that, if things get bad, they should go; the former assume that the threat to law and order comes from denying the black minority the protection of the law, while the latter assume that the minority are a threat to law and order by their mere presence. The government itself places much more emphasis on maintaining tight immigration controls than on improving race relations. Macdonald (1977) quotes an ex-minister who sums up well the contradiction between the two acts: "One cannot say to a man who is black, 'We shall treat you as an equal member of this society as a full citizen of our community', and say to him at the same time 'We shall keep your wife and children waiting seven years before they can come and live with you'."

Or as *The Times* columnist Bernard Levin (quoted by Rodger, 1978) stated

If you believe and talk as though a black man were some kind of virus that must be kept out of the body politic as far as

possible and discussed in terms of the ill effects it is having as it multiplies in the national bloodstream, together with calls for the production and use of more powerful antibiotics to counter its dire effects, then it is the shabbiest hypocrisy to preach racial harmony at the same time.

Thus, until this fundamental contradiction is resolved, it is unlikely that race relations legislation will have much effect and that race relations will improve. The promptness and even unseemly haste with which immigration controls have been slapped on with harsher and harsher provisions¹⁷ is in stark contrast to the foot dragging over anti-discrimination legislation. In the process, the minority communities, which have virtually become an 'underclass', are losing confidence in the system and are moving toward 'more militant consciousness and organization' (Rex *et al.*, 1977/78).

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the relations between the police and the minorities, especially the young black who experiences "with greater range and intensity the discrimination by white society and has few resources--material, psychological and cultural--with which to combat them" (sic) (Clarke *et al.*, 1974).¹⁸ The trends have been perceptible for a decade now in this area as in other areas (employment, housing, education, etc.) (*New Community*, 1974). However, not much seems to have been done about it, at least not much that has made significant difference to the situation (see, for example, White, 1977).

The basic difficulty here, as in other areas, is one of the interpretative framework used to define the problem and hence propose solutions. Clarke *et al.* (1974) illustrate, in their critique of the *Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration*, the "continuing incapacity of governmental and social control agencies to define the situation in terms of racialism," which has become institutionalized in the main structures of British society. The relationships between young blacks and the police are so "potentially and actually explosive" precisely because the brown and black minorities, especially the youth, "are subjected to discrimination of such unrelenting tenacity" and rejected so systematically. The official and predominant approach, however, tends to see the problem in its narrow confines of specific subject matter and the difficulties as isolated, special, deviant occurrences. It fails to see that, in their daily contacts, "for many black people the policeman is not a figure of respect or authority, a helpful if hard-pressed arbitrator and enforcer of social order. He is rather the last powerful link in the chain of institutionalised racialism in which the black person may feel helplessly and angrily shackled" (Clarke *et al.*, 1974, p. 189).

Given that the select committee did not want to consider other approaches or perspectives, it sifted from the evidence what it wanted to hear rather than what it was told; the race relations context in Britain is far more serious, bitter, and conflictual than is suggested by the committee, and cannot be reduced to incidents of special difficulty nor to solutions in terms of improved communica-

tions. The committee chose to provide a reassuring definition of the situation which endorsed and justified current practices.¹⁹ Clarke *et al.* conclude that, in doing so, the committee displayed the ability to sift and choose, to control the terms on which race relations and immigration matters were to be presented to a wider audience, and to conceal the harsh reality of racialism, thus furnishing "a prime example of the institutionalised nature of racialism in Britain today."

British policy reactions concerning race-related matters have generally been dominated by the "deviant-individual" and to a lesser extent by the "social-forces" perspectives, at least up to 1976. The very limited effectiveness of policies based on these perspectives in significantly changing the situation seems to be recognized now: the 1976 *Race Relations Act* for the first time sees, in however limited a way, the issue of racial discrimination in its "institutional-structural" aspects. This is a step in the right direction although, given the problems that have built up over the past twenty years, there is still a long way to go. Whether these problems will be resolved peacefully will ultimately depend on the willingness of the dominant groups to accept the minority groups as legitimate and equal members of society.

3. DUTCH POLICY RESPONSES

It has been pointed out by Bagley (1973) that the proportion of 'coloured immigrants' in the Netherlands was similar to the proportion in Britain and that the former was much more crowded, had a more acute housing shortage, and received its immigrants in much heavier concentrations, than the latter. However, despite the relatively more adverse conditions, the levels of racial discrimination and violence were very low or non-existent (at least up to 1970 when Bagley did his field-work), in sharp contrast to the British experience.

Bagley explains the difference between the two countries in terms of low levels of racial prejudice and, hence, discrimination due to a tradition of greater tolerance induced by the unique *verzuilde* structure (four vertical, parallel religious blocs or pillars within which Dutch social life and institutions are organized). Dutch society is profoundly religious and matters of moral responsibility are taken very seriously.

Equality of treatment for members of different blocs, as long as they conform to the Dutch code of civility and inter-bloc relations, is a strongly institutionalized social system mechanism in the Netherlands. Immigrants join one of the existing blocs or form their own and are treated equally regardless of their colour. Conversely, non-conformists (e.g., long-haired youth, and Italians) are not so treated. Thus, racism is not built into Dutch institutions and has not been part of Dutch colonial history.

The policy towards non-white immigrants (especially the Indonesians) has been, according to Bagley, much more generous and systematic than in Britain. It consists of providing very "positive and active services" for the newly

arrived immigrant by the government and private foundations, in the form of residential accommodation, social work and counselling, orientation, and language courses. The policy is one first of integration, and then of gradual assimilation. Public tolerance of activities on behalf of immigrants, and of immigrants themselves, relates to the need to make the immigrant groups part of the bloc system in an orderly way, and to the extent that immigrants conform to Dutch norms of public and inter-bloc behaviour.

Bagley's study, which is the only recent work in English on the Netherlands, has been strongly questioned by some Dutch critics. For example, both Bovenkerk (1974) and Ellemers (1975) state that, because Dutch society has undergone, since the late 1960s, "fairly drastic social changes," which are connected to changes in the *verzuilde* structure, Bagley's analysis, based on the situation before the late 1960s, is of doubtful validity today. These critics suggest that the traditional accommodative structures are now so weakened as to be unable anymore to successfully manage social change and conflict as they did earlier. One of the results has been the rapid decrease in public tolerance since around 1972, with a concurrent increase in racial violence and incidents in various large cities. Both critics are pessimistic about the prospects for Dutch racial tolerance.

Ellemers is critical on other grounds as well. He points out that Bagley very much overrates the 'policy factor' as well as the issue of 'tolerance', and is generally too optimistic and uncritical of the situation in the Netherlands. While both critics concede that his analysis is fairly accurate as it applied to the earlier repatriation of Indonesians in the 1950s, it is much less valid as far as the later immigrants (e.g., West Indians) and migrant workers (North Africans) are concerned. These critics use the "social-forces" perspective to explain the 'breakdown' of Dutch social institutions, which is responsible for the decrease in racial tolerance and peace. Neither provides any information about what, if any, policies have been developed by the government to deal with the rising incidence of racial violence and discrimination in the Netherlands in recent years.

4. CANADIAN POLICY RESPONSES

In sharp contrast to the fairly extensive studies of American and British problems and policies concerning "race relations," there are virtually no general systematic studies of the Canadian situation. As was noted earlier, there are some scattered historical references, some contemporary attitude surveys, and some *ad hoc* studies of particular situations. But there is nothing in terms of general policy studies in this area. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that contemporary policies are based mostly on the "deviant-individual" perspective as we shall see.

The general Canadian public policy response to at least collective violence, according to McNaught (1970) and Torrance (1978), has usually been concerned with promptly and firmly quelling the violence and with avoiding future out-

breaks. This also seems to apply to the anti-Chinese/Japanese riots of 1887 and 1907 and the anti-Jewish riot of 1933, although, according to the accounts of these events, the local authorities, particularly the police, were unwilling and/or unable to act to prevent the riots themselves (Adachi, 1976; Roy, 1976; Betcherman, 1975).

In the case of the 1887 riot, the British Columbia government temporarily took over Vancouver's police powers and sent in special constables "to restore peace." As Roy (1976) clarifies, given the province's history of official and unofficial hostility to the Chinese,²⁰ protecting them was "an incidental consequence" of the government's determination to avoid any appearance of a "wild west" or "frontier democracy" in British Columbia; it was as anxious to attract (British) settlers and capital as the CPR and others were to use Chinese labour.

Although the 1907 riot did not provoke, for some reason, any provincial government intervention as in 1887,²¹ the federal government was quite concerned. It wired the mayor of Vancouver to demand the maintenance of law and order and full protection of Japanese lives and property as guaranteed by Canadian-Japanese treaty obligations. Among other things, it sent a minister to Japan to negotiate restriction of immigration, and set up the Mackenzie King Royal Commission to investigate Japanese property losses during the riots. Adachi notes that the issue of Chinese property losses "lacked, in contrast, the international complications and had occasioned no such commotion as had been raised with the Japanese," although both groups eventually received "extensive reparations" (Buchignani, 1977). Both the local and provincial leaders, however, were extremely unhappy and the province passed a new anti-Oriental immigration act only to be once again disallowed by Ottawa. Of course, the latter was to change its policy later to virtual exclusion of Asian and black immigrants until well after World War II.²²

Thus, historically at least, public policy responses (at the various levels of government in Canada) to the racial violence of the white majority seem to have been governed more by racist and economic considerations than by any concern for justice or humanitarianism. Indeed, since racism had already taken root in the Canadian hierarchy of racial inequality, such responses should not be surprising.

Canadian public policies, as embodied in immigration, electoral, and other legislation,²³ were clearly racist up until after the end of World War II. The forced removal of the entire population of Canadians of Japanese origin from the West Coast for unfounded "security reasons" and the deportation (or allegedly voluntary "repatriation") of 4,000 of them *after* the war were the final culmination of these policies. Hill (1977) notes only two minor exceptions: Ontario amended its *Insurance Act* in 1932 to prohibit racial and religious discrimination in the provision of coverage, and Manitoba amended its *Libel Act* in 1934 to enable individuals to sue for injunctions against the publication of a racial or religious libel likely to "raise unrest or disorder among the people." In addition, Tarnopolsky (1978) notes that the British Columbia *Unemployment Insurance Act*, 1932 prohibited racial discrimination in employment.

After the war, further measures to combat racial discrimination were undertaken in the form of human rights legislation.. However, this was done very hesitantly and only after public pressure from labour, religious, and other groups. This legislation was initially very limited and amendments were most often restricted to meet only specific situations that arose. Administrative structures to enforce these laws were also "patched up" and expanded bit by bit; eventually, human rights "codes" and commissions with full-time administrative staff were established (Hill, 1977).²⁴

It is not possible to go into the details of the legislative actions of the eleven jurisdictions in Canada in dealing with the issue of racial discrimination; that has been documented elsewhere.²⁵ Suffice it to say that, although the statutes differ significantly in detail,²⁶ there is a fundamental similarity in their content and administration. For example, all prohibit racial as well as other types of discrimination in hiring, terms and conditions of employment, job advertisements, job referrals by employment agencies, and membership in unions and (in most jurisdictions) professional, trade, and business associations. All prohibit discrimination in residential property rentals or sales; most also cover commercial properties. And all cover accommodation, services, or facilities to which the public normally has access.

All jurisdictions now (1979) have full-time advisory and policy formulating commissions which enforce the legislation and conduct research and public education programmes.

It should be mentioned that most of these legislative actions, particularly the consolidation and the creation of enforcement mechanisms, are very recent developments (of the 1970s). For example, the *Quebec Charter* was established in 1976 and the federal *Human Rights Act* was passed as recently as 1977 with the commission still in the process of becoming operational. Hence, in most cases, it is still too early to evaluate the impact or effectiveness of these initiatives.

However, certain important points need to be noted. Firstly, there are serious legal anomalies. For example, as Tarnopolsky (1978) observes: "Although all human rights codes in Canada apply to the Crown and every agency thereof, only Alberta, Prince Edward Island and Quebec have provisions giving their Acts overriding effect." In the absence of such a provision, it may become difficult to resolve questions of "paramountcy" in relation to other statutes and even special provision for exemption of public officers, as in Ontario.

An even more fundamental problem is the general public policy approach that these statutes signify: their main thrust is complaint-based, individual, case-by-case conciliation. Although most acts allow someone other than the aggrieved person to lay a complaint, it is still not clear, as Tarnopolsky (1978) points out, whether any commission may initiate investigations of discriminatory *patterns* or *practices*.. Thus, the present approach attempts to fight the problem of overt and intentional discrimination at the isolated, individual level and not within the institutional or structural contexts. The effectiveness of the

present approach in Canada and elsewhere has been demonstrated to be very limited.

For example, the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) (1977), the first such body established in the country, has concluded from its fifteen years of experience that "the most pervasive discrimination today often results from unconscious and seemingly neutral practices which may, none the less, be as detrimental to human rights as the more overt kind of discrimination." The commission therefore has recommended that the legislation be amended to broaden its mandate to enable it to deal with what it calls the "root of discrimination."

Even here, the commission may be understating the extent of *conscious but covert* discrimination practised by institutions, because the complaint method it uses will usually not uncover it. For example, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (1977) has documented such discrimination in the case of intermediaries (e.g., employment, real estate agencies) through the method of "testing." Hill (1977) notes that this method is controversial because its opponents say it is covert, clandestine, and ungentlemanly; but it is the covert and clandestine nature of the discrimination that requires the method. He concludes that, "if governments can test elevators, hospitals and restaurants for safety and cleanliness, surely tests can also be conducted to protect the human rights of citizens."

The importance of institutional discrimination cannot be under-estimated and, unless it is dealt with seriously, discrimination will not be eliminated; the individual complaints approach will not be sufficient. This is because, as Hill explains, "there probably is no more subtle form of discrimination, none more pervasive, none more difficult to combat, than institutional discrimination. With its roots buried deep in Canadian social history, it makes many of our major institutions--notably our businesses and schools--operate to the detriment or exclusion of racial minorities."

The fact that overt, official, and even "legalized" racism has been a very basic part of Canadian society right from its very beginnings should alert us to the very serious nature of the phenomenon we are dealing with. Given this, is it surprising that, as Hill indicates, "the early legislative approaches are proving to be less sophisticated and effective than initially expected"? These approaches wrongly assumed that Canada is free of racism except for some racially prejudiced individuals who act on their prejudices; they therefore advocate measures to deal with individual acts of discrimination. Although the pervasive and deep-rooted nature of the problem is being slowly recognized, there has been little action to date. For example, the recently passed federal *Human Rights Act* "lacks the all-important stipulation of contract compliance procedures to deal positively with the hiring practices of employers coming under federal jurisdiction" (Hill, 1977); at least earlier legislation may be excused for not having such provisions.

Other public policies, such as that of multiculturalism, at both the federal and provincial, and even the municipal levels for that matter, seem to be

similarly limited in dealing with the more basic issues. As conceived of and implemented at present, the policy of multiculturalism, as Davis (quoted in Frideres, 1975) concludes, "simply recognizes and legitimizes, for example, East Indian ceremonies and Ukrainian dances, nothing more." This is not to say that the policy is without merit, only that its priorities may be misplaced, as is suggested by Kalevar (quoted in Toronto Board of Education, 1978): "The issues facing the colour of my skin are more pressing than those facing my culture" (see also Burnet, 1975). In the same vein, "the concept of public education," Hill argues, "is often invoked by people more interested in maintaining the status quo than bringing about change. Even the bigot sometimes preaches 'education' while practising discrimination. More distressing, though, is that proponents of brotherhood often preach it while doing nothing!"

All of this raises the critical question about how serious we are in Canada about eliminating racism in all its forms. In the light of the resurgence of racism over the last five years or so, what effective short- and long-term policies have been developed seriously to come to grips with the problem? To answer this question adequately, one would require a separate study, but the indications are not encouraging. For example, the province of Ontario, one of the major provinces affected, has not only not instituted an official inquiry into this question²⁷ but it has not even considered, let alone implemented, any of the recommendations made by its own commission in its extensive review of human rights in the province. Furthermore, the resources provided are a pittance compared to not only what is required but also to other provinces and "other programs that may not be correspondingly more important than human rights" (OHRC, 1977).

The profound doubts about how serious public policy makers are about eliminating racism are not limited to any particular level of government; the fact that we are using Ontario as an example should not mislead us into thinking that these doubts do not apply elsewhere or at other levels.²⁸ For example, the most recently established body--the Canadian Human Rights Commission--has an annual budget of about \$3.5 million, an amount which is even less than what the Ontario commission estimates it requires to do its work adequately, and its work is limited to only one province! The OHRC (1977) has calculated that Ontario spends approximately 15 cents per person annually on the work of its commission, the same as the new federal commission will be spending in 1978-79. This amount is less than a third of what Nova Scotia (at 47 cents) and Manitoba (45 cents) spend and much less than half of what Saskatchewan (39 cents) and Alberta (36 cents) spend; only Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland allocate less than the Ontario and federal amounts.

The amounts that go into fighting racism are even smaller since these pittances have to be divided among a whole host of other areas of discrimination (sex, religion, physical disability, etc.); this would be true of the division of other resources as well. The OHRC (1977) recognizes the dangers and problems related to such dissipation of its resources, and recommends that it be empowered to establish subdivisions within the commission; one of these would focus on race-related problems, which, it stresses, need always to receive adequate attention.

The new federal commission too is in danger of becoming overwhelmed by the whole omnibus grounds of discrimination it has to deal with; it would not at all be surprising if it tends to neglect certain areas, like racial discrimination, given its very inadequate perspective, human, financial, and other resources and its present make-up. The danger of loss of confidence on the part of the relevant constituents will become a reality with unfortunate consequences.

One of the major reasons for the relative neglect and belated piecemeal, knee-jerk policy reactions in this area has been the strong, pretentious make-belief that Canada is free of racism and racial problems that plague other countries. The problems which have manifested themselves in the last few years have therefore been seen and dealt with largely in the "deviant-individual" or "social-forces" perspective. Although there seems to be some awareness now that they go deeper than that, this awareness has yet to be translated into concrete policies and programmes.

Whatever the reasons for this neglect at different levels of government and whether they are justified or not, the problem of racism will not go away. If anything, it will get worse, as similar neglect in other countries has shown. The present *ad hoc*, "fire brigade" approach will not be sufficient to stem the tide: we may already be locking ourselves into the unhappy and futile process of merely reacting in knee-jerk fashion instead of preventing, of doing too little too late instead of anticipating and ensuring the problems do not occur. To do this we will have to tackle the problems at the "institutional-structural" level. For as Hughes and Kallen (1974) conclude, despite the proliferation of human rights legislation and a marked increase in positive governmental activities, "structural and institutional forms of racism against ethnic minorities, particularly those defined in racial terms, persists in Canada today."

It is true we are going through a difficult period, but that is when the real tests come; ensuring that vulnerable sections of citizens do not have to live in constant fear due to society's ills, which make them the hapless scapegoats, is a sign of strength and maturity. Unless Canada wants to abandon the principles of equality and justice and revert to its earlier racism, as some people are loudly and aggressively advocating, it should act and act urgently since time may be running out. Otherwise, it might find itself in the same sorry state as some other countries are now in.

5. SUMMARY

The policy responses to race-related problems, including violence and conflict, in the United States, Britain, and Canada have generally been based on the "deviant-individual" and "social-forces" perspectives. The problems have persisted, however, because these perspectives, and hence the responses based on them, do not adequately take into account the more fundamental difficulties in the institutional and structural aspects of society.

There is growing recognition, at least in the United States and more recently in Britain, that, unless these fundamental difficulties at the "institutional-structural" level are resolved, racial violence and conflict are likely to continue. Whether the new policies developed in the light of this recognition will have more success than earlier efforts still largely remains to be seen, not only because the policies are relatively new, but also because they have not been fully or vigorously enough implemented (where they have been in existence for some time, in the United States) for various reasons.

NOTES

1. Button, 1978; Feagin and Hahn, 1973; Fogelson, 1971; Lipsky and Olson, 1977.
2. However, during the race riots of the two world wars, when anti-black sentiment was unambivalent, police officers often encouraged and sometimes joined the white mobs in attacks against the blacks.
3. For detailed criticism of this approach, see, for example, Lipsky and Olson 1977; Feagin and Hahn, 1973; Button, 1978; and Fogelson, 1971.
4. This is surprising, in the light of the commission's conclusion, that the "ineffectiveness of the political structure and grievance mechanisms" and the "inadequacy of (government) programs" were major complaints (Button, 1978, p. 9).
5. Fogelson, 1971; Knowles and Prewitt, 1969; Feagin and Feagin, 1978.
6. The Community Relations Service (CRS), an arm of the Justice Department created in 1964, returned under the new administration to its earlier "fireman's" approach which it had de-emphasized during the late 1960s in favour of long-term riot prevention. By the early 1970s, it "moved increasingly into smaller cities on an *ad hoc* basis to attempt to control racial crises" (Button, 1978, p. 150).
7. The CRS (1978a) states in its 1977 annual report that its recent experience suggests that "the country suffers from as much racial divisiveness today as the Kerner Commission warned us about 10 years ago"; and that "police use of deadly force is as volatile an issue as ever."
8. Knowles and Prewitt (1969, p. 5) define institutions as "fairly stable social arrangements and practices through which collective actions are taken."
9. Feagin and Feagin, 1978; Bullock and Rodgers, Jr., 1975; the Potomac Institute, 1973; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1978b.
10. The results at the state and local levels do not appear to be any different--if anything, they have been worse. See the Potomac Institute, 1973.
11. Feagin and Feagin (1978) also deal, in Chapter 5, with other areas, namely, health, and social services, politics and the courts. For an update on industry, see Flint (1978). It should be noted here that Williams (1977), in what one reviewer (Katznelson, 1979) has called "one of the most encyclopedic compilations of research findings on conflict management," argues the uncommon view that, among other things, the United States has moved significantly towards racial equality. However, this view has been criticized as being "optimistic" (Katznelson, 1979; Himes, 1978; and Lamare, 1978), or even

"supremely optimistic" (Eisinger, 1978), and often based on selective evidence and the false ethnic analogy.

12. Jennings, 1977; Coser, 1976; *Contemporary Sociology*, 1977; Feagin and Feagin, 1978.
13. It is curious, but the subtitle of Glazer's 1975 book is differently presented in three of the reviews just mentioned.
14. The non-white population of Britain has been estimated to have risen from about 75,000 in 1951 to about 337,000 in 1961 (Richmond, 1973).
15. As Hiro points out, the existence of a local liaison committee in Nottingham did not prevent the race riots there in 1958.
16. A study conducted for Political and Economic Planning Ltd. in 1967 concluded that racial discrimination varied "from the massive to the substantial" and it is greatest against the better qualified (Daniel, 1968). The situation does not seem to have improved since (Smith, 1977).
17. As we noted, there is talk (and likelihood) of introducing even harsher measures than the 1971 *Immigration Act* which initiated a system of surveillance, some internal controls, and arbitrary powers of deportation regarding new immigrants (Sivanandan, 1978a and Mullard, 1973. See also Lestor and Bindman, 1972).
18. It is not possible here to go into the major areas of concern--employment, housing, education, services, etc. These are dealt with in various studies (e.g., Smith, 1977; Rex *et al.*, 1977/78). Suffice it to say here that there are major problems right across all these areas.
19. It is not surprising then that the committee should continue to recommend recruitment of blacks to the police force while acknowledging that such recruitment was "massively rejected" by the black and brown communities as a whole.
20. Official anti-Asian hostility was expressed in statements and legislation at both the provincial and the federal levels (see also Adachi, 1976). Strangely enough, Roy (1976) makes no mention of any Chinese being killed, which Stewart (1976) does; Stewart also states that no one was ever punished.
21. Adachi does not mention any such intervention, nor does he explain why there was none.
22. Palmer, 1972; Richmond, 1976a; Winks, 1971; Wood, 1978.
23. For example, citizens of Asian descent and blacks were denied, by law, political, economic, and other rights up until the mid-1940s: see, for example, Hill, 1977; Palmer, 1972; Lee, 1976; Tarnopolsky, 1978; Winks, 1971.

24. This section draws extensively from Hill's useful document on the area of human rights in Canada.
25. See, for example, Hill, 1977, Canada, Department of Labour, 1977, Kerr, 1975, Tarnopolsky, 1978.
26. Tarnopolsky uses the phrase "with minor variations."
27. The City of Toronto has, of course, conducted a limited inquiry on the problem of individual racial violence (i.e., the *Pitman Report*, 1977), and the attorney-general requested a brief (the *Ubale Report*, 1978) from the South Asian community. But in no way do either of these constitute thorough systematic investigations.
28. For example, the 1975 Green Paper on Immigration (Ottawa: Information Canada), according to Richmond (1975), tends to give the impression, through explicit statements and inuendos, that it is the "newcomers" who are to blame for social tensions, thus exonerating the basic underlying racism, which, as we have seen existed before the newcomers arrived, of any responsibility.

Chapter Three

POLICY PROPOSALS

So far we have examined the policies developed by selected countries in their attempts to deal with the problems of interracial violence and related matters; we also examined the underlying "perspective" or explanation, which formed the basis of these policies, in the light of each country's experience in this area. What lessons can be drawn from this and what policy alternatives can be suggested for consideration in the Canadian context?

1. LESSONS

Before these questions can be considered, however, it is necessary to discuss the issue of the relevance of the experiences of other countries to Canada. While this issue cannot be discussed fully here, some key points can be noted briefly. These points suggest that the experiences of the United States and Britain are certainly relevant.

It could certainly be argued that the historical and contemporary economic, social, and political developments in the United States, Britain, and Canada are quite distinct, producing quite distinct social structures, processes, and problems. Thus, for example, interracial violence in each country has not been the same in terms of scale, intensity, or frequency, nor have other relationships between different racial groups been the same.

Yet the same historical and contemporary developments did not take place in isolation from each other; indeed, not only are there strong links, but also the origins of many of these developments were common.

So the experiences of the three countries examined have not all been the same, yet there are basic similarities. In both the Canadian and British cases, the evidence indicates that the white majority has usually been responsible for perpetuating the violence (physical as well as psychological) at the individual, collective, and institutional levels; it has also been responsible for the continuous and relentless practices of the common day-to-day discrimination.

The American situation followed the same pattern until the 1960s when the major black violence occurred. Even here, however, this violence was directed at property, particularly the symbols of power and exploitation (police, local stores) and not people; the earlier white violence, on the other hand, was directed principally at people (blacks), as has been the interracial violence in Canada and Britain so far. Whether these two countries in the future will approach the pattern of the 1960s in the United States is difficult to say. For instance, although there are signs of increasing militancy, particularly on the part of black youth in Britain, it has been argued that conditions there are more

conducive to white-led pogroms against black people than to "revolts by the racial minorities themselves" (Bentley, 1976).

The research presented earlier shows also that interracial violence in the United States has not generally or often been of the "irrational" or senseless type; on the contrary, it has been quite "rational" and instrumental since it has been aimed at preserving or challenging the racial *status quo*. This has been true in Canada as well, at least historically, when key leaders and institutions openly encouraged and instigated against racial minorities; although the links are not so direct in the case of the more recent violence, they are certainly there.

This brings up the critical issue of the perspectives used to examine and explain the problem of not only interracial violence, but also interracial relations in general. As was indicated at the beginning, this issue is of more than just academic interest; what perspective one adopts will largely determine what one looks for and what one finds, and ultimately what solutions one proposes.

Of the three perspectives we discussed earlier--"deviant-individual," "social-forces," and "institutional-structural"--the first two have been shown, at least on the basis of the American evidence, to be inadequate in explaining why interracial violence and discrimination take place; even some of the limited Canadian and British situations cannot be explained completely on the basis of these two perspectives alone.¹ This is not to suggest that they are totally without merit; indeed, they are useful, but only up to a point. Thus, the solutions based on them alone have been of limited usefulness and effectiveness. Hence, it is necessary to go beyond them to include the "institutional-structural" perspective in any analysis and policy development.

The more recent incidents of interracial violence in Canada have usually been at the individual level, unlike the ones in the earlier period which involved collective violence. Such violence can be explained more fully by the racism built into the basic institutions and structure of Canadian society. This is certainly clearer in the earlier period when racism was not only more "respectable" but also openly institutionalized (through, for example, racist immigration and electoral laws and other public policies), and the links with violence more open. Although these links are less open and less obvious today, they nevertheless exist. The fact that unprovoked racist attacks (and discrimination) are so widespread, occur in such diverse situations and locations, and are perpetrated by people with such varied backgrounds (including authority figures like policemen and immigration officers) indicates that the problem goes much deeper than the "deviant-individual" or "social-forces" perspectives suggest. Individuals and groups do not exist outside the social structure, which ultimately affects the relationships between groups and individuals through the various institutional orders and spheres. So the racism built into the Canadian social structure from its very beginnings permeates the major social institutions and, through them, groups and individuals within Canadian society. Thus, for example, both the policeman or immigration officer and the unemployed, little-educated, or mal-adjusted youth have been socialized by the educational system, family, mass

media, and so forth into Canadian values and beliefs (hence behaviour), which consider non-whites inferior and a threat (see, for example, McDiarmid and Pratt, 1971). Similarly, the issue of discrimination is also directly linked (as we shall see in section 4(b) below) to the operation of major social institutions that make up the Canadian social structure with its hierarchy of racial (and ethnic) inequality. The importance of searching for solutions at the "institutional-structural" level, in addition to the other levels, has to be recognized.

As we have seen, the Americans began in the late 1960s to deal somewhat with the problems of discrimination at the institutional level; however, the scope and impact of these efforts to date have been quite limited for various reasons. The British may only just be emerging from their tokenism stage and may only be beginning now to think in institutional terms, although, given their blatantly contradictory and hence ambivalent approach to the whole issue of racism, and the loss of confidence on the part of the minorities, the success of this broader strategy remains in doubt. The unique Dutch social structure and culture ensured the absence of racism; it is not clear what long-term effects the apparent 'breakdown' of that structure will have on 'race relations'.

The situation in Canada is even more difficult at the moment, for the problem of racism is either denied smugly out of existence by the powers that be (even including some officials of human rights agencies) or its significance is reduced to the level of a few "deviant" individuals and exceptions or to (temporary) social conditions; this is what the British, for example, have been doing. But the danger signals are there for all to see, as are the consequences of inaction or token or half-hearted action. And, in Canada, we have generally responded with only this kind of action so far; unless we start acting more seriously now, we may find that time has run out as we find ourselves faced with virtually intractable problems.

There are some general lessons suggested by not only American and British but also Canadian experience that should be taken into account in developing systematic policies to deal with race-related problems. The most important of these is that, unless the basic *institutional and structural difficulties* are recognized and resolved, the problems will persist. The piecemeal, individual-level approaches alone have been shown to be quite inadequate.

Another critical lesson is that developing policies aimed at resolving these difficulties may be relatively easy compared to implementing them effectively. Given some of the changes entailed by such policies, there is likely to be serious resistance to them; how such resistance can be successfully removed, at least in the short run, is a problem that has not been resolved.

Devoting *inadequate resources* for tackling the deep-rooted problems of racism can also be a severe limitation in effectively resolving such problems. The seriousness of the issue of racism has often not been recognized until the deterioration of the situation becomes manifested in some dramatic incidents, usually involving violence.

Another major point that emerges from some of the experiences is that, unless the concerned groups, but especially minorities, who are usually situated outside the power structure, are *adequately* involved in making inputs into policies and programmes in this area, the chances of producing effective policies will be low.

2. POLICY OPTIONS AND PROPOSALS

For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that Canada will not revert to the earlier forms of "legalized" racism and that "repatriation," voluntary or otherwise, of racial minorities remains the cry of only a minority of whites. As we noted earlier, there is a precedent for this in Canada; the French have already instituted a policy of repatriation, and it is under active consideration in Britain. Whether our assumptions are correct or not, only time will tell. In the meantime, there are two broad policy options open to us at present: continue the present, very inadequate, piecemeal, individual-level approach, or adopt the broader and more inclusive "institutional-structural" perspectives and develop new policies and programmes to deal with the more fundamental problems of institutional and structural racism.

The first option is the one that is being currently pursued. However, the experiences examined earlier suggest that the present, limited, individual-level approach will not be adequate in resolving the basic problem of racism. For if the more recent immigration and human rights laws are a reflection of Canada's new and fragile ideals of non-racism and justice, then the historical and the recent racially motivated violence, harassment, and discrimination are a reflection of a long-standing and deeply rooted tradition of racism and injustice. Canadians as a whole have to decide whether these new ideals are to be effectively pursued and realized and, hence, made really meaningful, or are to be merely trotted out on appropriate occasions to be displayed as some kind of hollow proof of the country's commitment to non-racism and justice.

From the trends of the last fifteen years or so, it would seem that Canada wants to seriously eliminate racism and injustice. In order to do this, however, it will be necessary to exercise the second option by developing new policies aimed at resolving the more basic underlying institutional-structural problems. The discussion that follows suggests the broad outlines of the kinds of initiatives that need to be undertaken.

As was noted earlier, there are two basic, closely interrelated aspects to the problem to be dealt with: the short-term aspect of individual and collective interracial violence, harassment, and so on, and the more long-term aspect concerning the underlying social structure and conditions that lead to such violence. Thus, two sets of closely interrelated policies and intervention strategies will have to be developed.

The development of specific strategies that will be effective will necessitate the systematic and regular collection of specific data that, in the Canadian

context, are still very meagre and unsystematic. A monitoring system such as that outlined below could provide such data which could indicate, for example, whether racial tensions were rising in a community and why or whether the problems in specific institutional areas (e.g., law enforcement) were more serious than in others. Most importantly perhaps, it would provide a continuous feedback from which the effectiveness of policies could be evaluated. Thus, such a monitoring system could not only constitute a kind of early warning system of situations that may lead to violence, but also could pinpoint the state of specific underlying social structure and conditions that need to be corrected.

3. MONITORING SYSTEM

It must be noted that, although the following is divided up into different segments for analytical purposes, these segments are closely interrelated, even to the point of considerable interlocking and overlap.

a. Short-Term Problems

In the short term, the major problem is that of the physical expression of hostility by members of one group towards those of another. Since this expression of hostility is more likely to occur in certain communities than in others (what these communities are will have to be determined empirically), and since resources will be limited, it would be more useful to set up the monitoring system for the selected relevant communities only, although it might be useful to include other selected communities for comparative purposes. Local communities are not, however, little islands; they are an integral part of the regional, provincial, and national communities. It would therefore be necessary at least to keep these larger perspectives in mind.

The most serious and highly visible expressions of hostility take the form of physical violence against persons or property. This can take place at the community level, involving two communities, at the 'gang' level, involving small groups; or at the individual level, involving only a few individuals (including members of certain institutions). Since incidents involving physical violence are easier to identify than non-violent incidents, they can be more easily incorporated into a monitoring system, though some non-violent incidents (e.g., harassment) should be included too where possible. To the extent that they are reported to public or other agencies, the records of such events would be an important source of information. Also, the media are more likely to report such events.

Non-physical (including verbal, written) expressions of hostility may be less visible and perhaps less serious than the physical expressions. Being less visible, they would be less easy though not impossible to monitor.

Finally, the various types of discrimination are, in fact, expressions of hostility and, hence, should be excluded here. Although the more overt, door-

slamming type is easier to monitor, the more subtle, indirect, institutionalized types (see section 4 (b) below) have to be included too. It should be noted that these various levels are related to each other as well as to the more long-term problems.

Major Elements of a Monitoring System

From the above, it seems that the major elements of a monitoring system in a given community would ideally consist of regular surveys of specific key institutions and agencies as well as the relevant groups in the community at large, as outlined below. To what extent such a system will be practical in operational terms might have to be determined after careful examination in a feasibility study.

However, it is essential that, at least initially, as many independent and varied sources of information as possible be included in the monitoring system, so that as reasonably accurate a picture as possible can be obtained. The system will probably have to be modified and refined in the light of experience.

The basic purpose of this system would be to provide us with basic information about the state of and trends in interracial relations, the major areas of concern, and their immediate causes and possible solutions.

The major elements of the system would include the following:

1. Regular opinion surveys of the community as a whole, but especially the majority groups, to monitor the general feeling in the community in this area. Such surveys may be latched on to the kinds of surveys regularly conducted in major cities by opinion poll or other such organizations.
2. Regular opinion surveys of minority group organizations, particularly the opinion leaders and other key individuals in the relevant groups.
3. A regular survey of key voluntary groups, agencies, and individuals working within the community in the area of interracial relations, especially those in touch directly with the various relevant groups.
4. Human rights commissions could provide records of cases of complaints as well as other useful information concerning interracial relations in general.
5. Police records and/or reports involving the number, type, and seriousness of confrontations (including complaints) between individuals or groups of different racial backgrounds, and the current status of the cases.
6. It may be useful to investigate the possibility of obtaining information from hospitals, particularly for cases which may not be reported to the police. This source, however, may be difficult to tap.

7. Media, including minority community media, will have to be monitored, at least to obtain clues about what may be happening in the community. Their communication role assumes greater importance in times of rising tensions and overt conflicts.
8. The activities of racist organizations which promote hostility and may even be actively involved in violent or quasi-violent acts should be monitored.
9. Finally, the vast area of institutional discrimination will have to be monitored as suggested in section 4 (b) below. The major emphasis here would be not only on individual prejudice and discrimination alone, but also on the formal and informal, routine, institutionalized rules and practices that have discriminatory effects.

It may be necessary to add other elements and to modify or even eliminate some of those proposed. It is possible that the cost of such a comprehensive system may become prohibitive, particularly with regular surveys of the population at large, in which case more modest and less frequent surveys or suitable substitutes such as surveys of opinion leaders and organizations may have to be used.

The suggested feasibility study would indicate what changes would have to be made and how the system would be operationalized. The system could be either tested in a pilot project or modified in the light of experience, and it could be established and operated within an existing agency such as the human rights commissions, which would also help to minimize the overall cost to some extent. However, the powers and resources available to such agencies will have to be increased considerably if they are to deal effectively with the more long-term problems of institutionalized discrimination.

b. Long-Term Problems

The short-term problems discussed above are certainly linked to the more long-term, underlying conditions, although the relationships between the two, as we have seen, are not always clear or direct. Most of these require further research, especially in the Canadian context, before they can be incorporated in the monitoring system.

The most basic underlying condition is the all-pervasive nature of racism. It is a general enough condition to affect all the others; the economic, social, and political structures as well as psychological perceptions of individuals and groups. This makes it all the more difficult to monitor such a general condition: new techniques and instruments will have to be developed, as we have noted, before it can be measured and monitored successfully. Some of these are already being developed in the United States and should be examined for adaptation to Canadian conditions.

Discrimination, albeit of a subtle, indirect, or even unintentional nature, is the most obvious manifestation of racism and it can be measured and monitored. It is essential that the *emphasis* here be more on the institutional structures than the individual, although the latter should not be ignored. For, as the evidence from the United States and Britain has clearly shown, dealing with only the individual and not the institutional level does not make much difference to the situation.

In principle, this would mean monitoring all the major institutional structures of Canadian society--the economic structures (related to employment, housing, services, and facilities); the educational structures (the school and university systems); the political structures (the governments, parties, media); the legal structures (police, courts); and, finally, the cultural institutions (especially the mass media). The institutions operating within each of these would have to be monitored for the different kinds of discrimination but, in particular what Feagin and Feagin (1978) call "direct" and "indirect institutionalized discrimination" (see section 4 (b) below).

Obviously these institutional structures do not function in isolation from each other; on the contrary, they are very much interdependent, even interlocked sometimes, and form a network, or as Baron (in Knowles and Prewitt, 1969) calls it, "the web of urban racism." Nor do these structures operate in a vacuum; they are subject to the general economic, social, and political conditions, which vary from time to time. These variations usually affect the operation of these structures, "highlighting" certain aspects and bringing to the surface phenomena, which at other times remain latent. It would therefore be important to monitor these conditions as well.

The monitoring system proposed earlier would partly cover these areas, from the point of view of subjective perceptions of groups regarding the major areas of institutional and structural difficulties and social conditions that affect them.

In addition, however, it would be necessary to monitor the performance in different areas. For example, the illegal but unofficial and routine discriminatory practices of employment and real estate agencies uncovered by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) "testers"² illustrates not only the need for such monitoring but also how it could be done. Even when there is no intention to discriminate, certain institutional practices may automatically exclude some groups;³ these need to be monitored and can be by examining their effects. We shall return later to this issue of the different types of discrimination that exist.

The point is that the systematic monitoring of such institutional policies and practices in the various societal spheres is essential. It could be carried out by the existing human rights commissions, which would have to be given wider powers and greater resources to perform this important function.

4. INTERVENTION STRATEGIES

The ultimate purpose of monitoring short-term interracial violence and long-term, underlying, institutional-structural difficulties is to reduce and eventually eliminate them. Thus, two sets of effective policies and intervention strategies will have to be developed and implemented, the first dealing with the more immediate aspects of tensions and violence, and the second with the more long-term aspects.

a. Short-Term Intervention

Given that interracial violence occurs at two different though often closely interrelated levels, the individual and the collective, it will be necessary to devise two sets of interrelated strategies.

It would seem, from some of the evidence at least, that interracial tensions build up over a period of time and that there are often warning signals beforehand: verbal expressions of hostility and even physical attacks on individuals increase. An effective monitoring system would presumably pick these up and effective preventive action would have to be taken without delay.

Cases of interracial violence and harassment at the individual level may be more difficult to anticipate and prevent; nevertheless, they will have to be dealt with firmly. For a racially motivated attack on an individual is carried out precisely because the attacker sees his/her victim as a representative member of the group that he/she dislikes or hates sufficiently to take such action. For the same reason, the group to which the victim belongs becomes apprehensive and outraged, especially if it perceives that such action is punished only symbolically or not at all. Its confidence in the system of justice would begin to be eroded and become difficult to reverse; tensions between groups would increase and collective violence might break out over the smallest incident. The erosion of confidence in the system of justice might also lead to some form of collective self-defence.

Thus, the protective role of the law and firm action will be crucial, especially in the initial stages. A firm and clear policy, supported by authoritative actions, on the rights of minorities in society to the protection of the law would help towards allaying fears, reducing tensions, and maintaining confidence. The issue of "free speech" (for racists) is indeed a very thorny one. Yet the eradication of racism and racial violence will require, among other things, that society not allow racists to promote racial hatred and provoke racial confrontations and violence behind the smoke-screen of "free speech," just as it does not allow slander, defamation, or incitement to murder.⁴

The role of the law, however, is limited and it is necessary to develop more informal, flexible, and broader mechanisms for dealing with the problem of racial tensions. The Community Relations Service (CRS) in the United States may provide a useful model.

The CRS, located in the Justice Department, deals with all types of racial or ethnic disputes, disagreements, and difficulties, which it seeks to get settled peacefully and outside the courts. Its specialized and experienced staff consists of administration of justice specialists, criminal justice researchers, education specialists, community development specialists, and human relations experts. The experience of this staff in dealing with the critical concerns of the minority community, together with a regional structure that permits on-site assistance to troubled communities, enables the CRS to perform its functions effectively.

There are three basic mechanisms used by the CRS: conciliation, mediation, and technical assistance. Conciliation is primarily an informal communications process aimed at getting the parties to establish meaningful dialogue, combat rumours, and suggest co-operative ways of resolving mutual problems. This involves conducting third-party assessment; helping in examining and clearly defining issues and opposing views, and identifying and enlisting relevant resources; consulting and advising law enforcement officials; helping disputants to understand the nature of conflict, crises, and protest; helping them overcome long-held stereotypes and prejudices, and so on.

Mediation is a more formal process, similar to that used in labour disputes, and attempted only if both sides agree and are willing to reach a settlement. Its aim is to reach a signed agreement setting out specific steps to be taken by each side to restore racial harmony and peaceful relations. Among other things, it involves chairing negotiations, setting priorities, discussing affirmative steps to prevent future problems, identifying relevant technical resources, moving towards realistic settlement goals, and determining appropriate mechanisms for follow-up implementation of the agreement.

The technical assistance programme consists of providing local officials with consultation on community relations problems by identifying techniques, resources, materials, and experience models to address specific community concerns. It involves, for example, planning assistance for improving communications with minorities, problem-solving training for local human relations commissions, training in conflict intervention for local police departments and school officials, and guidance in citizen participation mechanisms.

The different areas in which the CRS has been successful in dealing with problems have included police/community relations, education and industrial disputes, local economic and community development issues, racial problems in prisons, and problems related to the Hispanic influx/undocumented aliens. In addition, thousands of local leaders and others have received training in the technical skills necessary for improved human relations and conflict management.

The CRS experience suggests that this kind of permanent, structured approach, based on voluntary co-operation, is effective in resolving the more immediate problems. It would be useful to develop a model along these lines which could be tested in one or two communities in order to examine systematically what kinds of mechanisms would be best suited to Canadian conditions, and how the monitoring system could be usefully tied in with such mechanisms.

No amount of consultation, however, is likely to be effective in the long run in preventing overt conflict if the disputing parties are unwilling to co-operate with each other, or if the more long-term problems are not resolved. While the strategies for dealing with the more urgent problems of violence and tensions are necessary and useful, they are really a kind of "holding operation" using stop-gap measures; they will not be very effective in dealing with the more long-term underlying problems of racism, inequality of opportunity in employment, housing, and so forth. As was stated earlier, a different set of strategies will be necessary to tackle these problems, to which we now turn.

b. Long-Term Intervention

What the specific strategies should be in the Canadian context are difficult to state at this stage because we do not have sufficient information. However, the experience of the other countries we have examined suggests that these strategies will have to be developed within the following broad area. Further research will be necessary to identify some of the specific strategies that will have to be developed within particular contexts.

As we saw earlier, the problem of interracial violence in particular and race relations in general is still seen in Canada largely as an individual-level problem. The evidence we have examined suggests that this is a very limited approach, which does not get at the more basic area of institutional or organizational structures where the larger problem lies. Thus, it will be necessary to examine this area more closely and to develop new policies and programmes to deal with the problems, which, as we have seen, are quite different from those at the individual level.

It is within institutional and organizational contexts that much of the discrimination occurs and many of the tensions arise; these organizations could be schools, the police force, industrial, commercial, or governmental organizations, and so on. The problems may occur within the organization among its members, who may belong to different groups or, as is probably more frequent, they may arise between organizations and those outside when, for example, the police force or the welfare agency is called upon to deal with individual, family, or community problems.

Thus, it will be important to examine the organizational or institutional dynamics in each type of context. That is to say, in order to develop policies and programmes that will have any effectiveness, one must take into account the peculiarities of the structure and process of each type of organization. These will vary considerably, depending on whether the organization or institution is a hospital, bank, school, university, local authority, and so forth.

The role of organizational authorities also needs to be underlined. As norm setters, authorities not only determine the specific directives to be followed, but also define the organizational climate concerning the presence of various groups in the organization.

Many people in organizations are at the interface of race relations: they are either the agents of the organization in contact with a racially diversified public or the intermediaries between levels in an organization (for example, foremen, supervisors). It is not enough to think in terms of the attitudes alone of people in these positions; it is particularly important to focus on the organization support system they require for the performance of their functions.

In so far as the presence of different racial groups in the public or in an organization creates special kinds of problems (special in the sense that they are not the routine problems with which organization functionaries usually have to deal), people who occupy such interface positions need particular kinds of means to deal with the problems that arise. What they need will vary considerably depending on the nature of the task and the nature of the organization. It will be necessary to identify these special kinds of resources or support (in terms of funds, skills, assistance, etc.) that such people require to perform their roles effectively.

As we noted earlier, Feagin and Feagin (1978) have identified four basic types of racial (and other) discrimination for which policies and programmes will have to be developed. It should be noted that these basic types interact so that they overlap in a given setting, produce a complex web of discrimination in the society, and allow a change in the character of the same discriminatory behaviour. Which type will be predominant at a particular time or in a given context will vary from one situation to the next.

The first type is the "isolate discrimination," isolate not in the sense that it is not common, but in the sense that it involves the action taken by an individual without the immediate support of norms in a large-scale organizational context. Thus, it refers to intentionally injurious action taken by an individual against members of minority groups, without being embedded in the large-scale organizational or community context. An example would be a prejudiced personnel officer not hiring better-qualified minority candidates, a practice which may be contrary to the organization's regulations or policy, or a policeman beating minority prisoners at every opportunity, even though police regulations specifically prohibit such actions. This type covers prejudice-motivated as well as other types of intent-to-harm-motivated discrimination; it includes both the "flamboyant" and the less visible acts of discrimination; and the intensity of feeling behind the act can range from "white-hot, irrational bigotry to cooler feelings of protecting one's self-interest."

The second type, "small-group discrimination," is a somewhat larger version of the first one; the only difference here is that the actions are taken by a small group, the motivation, the visibility, and the feeling being the same. Examples of this kind of discrimination would be "conspiracies" by (white) male personnel officers to subvert organization regulations requiring promotion on a merit basis, simply because the disliked persons are minority employees, or physical attacks on members or property of minorities by a small group. It should be noted that both these types ('isolate' and 'small group') are nevertheless linked to institutions and organizations because the prejudice on which the dis-

crimination is based is learned, in fact, formally and informally, in institutional or organizational settings such as family, schools, mass media, and so on.

The third type, "direct institutionalized discrimination," occurs when organizationally or community-prescribed actions have an intentionally differential and negative impact on minority group members. These actions are usually carried out continually or routinely, and not intermittently, by a large number of individuals guided by rules of a large-scale organization. Thus discrimination here is institutionalized or bureaucratized in, for example, legally required or unwritten rules and informally prescribed practices, resulting in the exclusion of minority group members or assigning them inferior facilities. It can be overt or subtle and covert, and can be motivated by prejudice and intolerance or economic or political self-interest. In addition, institutional or community sanctions against non-conforming members who refuse to discriminate can often be overwhelming. This kind of discrimination requires only substantial, not unanimous, support for its persistence.

The fourth and last category indicated by Feagin and Feagin is "indirect institutionalized discrimination," which has a negative and differential impact on minorities, although the norms or regulations and resulting practices appear, on their face and in their intent, fair or at least neutral. This type can be subdivided into "side-effect discrimination" and "past-in-present discrimination."

"Side-effect discrimination" refers to practices in one institutional area which have a negative impact, usually because they are linked to direct discriminatory practices in another institutional area, since most societal spheres are closely interlinked. For example, direct institutionalized discrimination in the education and training of minorities often handicaps them when they attempt to compete with white males for jobs, since hiring and promotion standards in the employment sphere often incorporate educational requirements; these requirements often have a negative impact, although they were usually not established on the basis of prejudice or intent to have a negative impact. A number of the usual substitutes for ability used by employers as criteria to screen out potential employees can often be seen as examples. Also, indirect discrimination in one area can shape it in another.

"Past-in-present discrimination" involves apparently neutral practices in an institutional (organizational) area, which systematically reflect or perpetuate the effects of intentional discriminatory practices in the past in that same area. For example, established neutral seniority and tenure practices can discriminate against minority persons who, because of intentional past discrimination, have not been able to accumulate the necessary experience or tenure for continued employment during recessions. Another example is the present rules and practices (as in the case of height and weight requirements) which reflect the physical characteristics possessed by those dominant group members who have traditionally filled the positions in an organization (e.g., police and fire departments). If early, non-discriminatory access had been provided, the built-in physical or appearance bias might not have been there and minorities would not be screened out in disproportionate numbers. The screening regulations of business organizations,

which assume that employees must have the physical traits common to most white males, have the same impact.

Although the criteria guiding the practices may be functionally relevant to the practices, the criteria *assumed* to be so relevant are often poor substitutes for ability or competence. Even if some criteria are shown to be related to job performance, they are nevertheless discriminatory.

As was noted earlier, these types interact intimately to produce a complex web of discrimination whose deep underpinning rests in the underlying "cultural racism," which social psychologist James Jones (quoted in Feagin and Feagin, 1978) has defined as those basic cultural "values, traditions, and assumptions upon which institutions are formed and within which individuals are socialized to maturity."

This would mean that the elimination of not only discrimination but also racism in general will require action in the "cultural" area as well, especially in the educational and communication media, which are the major purveyors of cultural values, traditions, and assumptions.⁵

Clearly, therefore, what is necessary is a comprehensive approach to deal with the issue of racism and racial discrimination in Canadian society; the present "piecemeal," half-hearted attempts are inadequate. This broader approach will have to examine the issue within the major institutional or organizational structures in the key areas of society--economic, political, social, and cultural--and develop policies and programmes to deal with the peculiarities and dynamics of specific situations.

We have outlined very broadly the kinds of problems that need to be tackled and, by implication, the kinds of broad strategies that need to be developed. For instance, the "isolate" and "small-group" discrimination can be dealt with within existing institutional structures through better monitoring, enforcement, and sanctions, while the institutionalized discrimination will require changes in the institutional structures themselves. The goal of these changes should be substantially greater social justice and equality, not only equality before the law and equality of opportunity but, ultimately, *equality of results*.

It is not possible here to go into detailed proposals for policies and programmes, since these will have to be tailored to meet the varying needs of specific situations. Some of the studies mentioned earlier contain quite specific suggestions, which, although often made in reference to particular communities, would nevertheless have broader applications.⁶ We may, however, suggest the following tentative, broad ideas. The major emphasis in all cases should be on locating and changing "direct" and "indirect institutionalized discrimination" discussed above. It will become apparent that, in most areas, all levels of government and the private sector will have to share the responsibility for correcting the broad interlocking discriminatory situation.

I. *The Economic Area.* Included here are such specific topics as employment, housing, economic services and facilities, and so on.

In the case of employment, it will be necessary to review practices in all of the following and remove any direct or indirect discrimination that exists: (1) recruitment and soliciting practices, for example, selective advertising, word-of-mouth recruiting; (2) employment screening practices, for example, unnecessary or inflated qualifications; (3) 'tracking systems', which place and keep non-whites in lower-paying, lower-status job lines or tracks; (4) promotion practices, for example, psychological tests, educational credentials, informal networks, or unfavourable recommendations; (5) conditions and terms of employment, for example, lower pay levels, job categories and fringe benefits for non-whites; and (6) lay-off, discharge, and seniority practices, which systematically and differentially affect non-whites.

It would be necessary to tackle these issues industry by industry through the *organizations* representing the particular industry; in the case of the larger firms, the issues can be raised directly with these firms.

Similarly, the problem of discrimination in housing should be tackled at the level of the organizations, which play the major role in the housing market, particularly the real estate and lending industries. The aim here would be to eliminate (in addition to overt discrimination) such discriminatory practices as informal manipulation of listings to restrict access of minority real estate brokers, "steering" white and non-white clients to different areas, the formal and informal assessment policies and practices of lending institutions. Furthermore, government policies and regulations at different levels concerned with housing that may be discriminatory in effect (e.g., zoning laws) will also have to be dealt with.

In addition to the service industries operated by employment and real estate agencies mentioned above, it may be necessary to examine and correct discrimination in such industries by other institutions, for example, consumer credit bureaus.

Finally, the role of government economic activities (beyond that of a direct employer) should be used to promote non-discrimination. Government contracts, for example, should not only provide for non-discriminatory clauses, which should be rigorously enforced, but should also be used to promote better opportunities for minorities.

II. *The Political Area.* The formal and informal rules of the political process (such as the required access to the already existing informal social networks, recommendation procedures, and the experience, educational or other candidate qualifications) can, in addition to direct discrimination, prevent members of certain groups from participating in that process.

Political organizations, especially political parties, therefore should examine and modify these rules and procedures and positively encourage members of minority groups to participate in the political process.

Moreover, appointments for non-elective political positions, such as those on boards, commissions, and so on, should include members of minority groups. It should be emphasized here that 'token' or minor appointments will be inadequate and may even be counter-productive in the long run.

Finally, if the idea of multiculturalism is to mean more than just 'ethnic' ceremonies and dances, then it has to incorporate an important if not substantial element of genuine power sharing at all levels. New and imaginative political and even constitutional arrangements and mechanisms will have to be developed to translate the notion of Canada as a 'community of communities' into reality.

III. *The Legal Area.* It is essential that the legal remedies currently provided for discrimination be thoroughly reviewed and revised to include *effective* remedies for institutional as well as other forms of discrimination. In this connection, it is important to review the operation of the *Bill of Rights* over the years; such a provision should be entrenched in any new Canadian constitution.

The procedures and practices of the constituent elements of the legal system--the police, prosecutors, judges, juries and prisons--have to be examined for discriminatory effects. This would include the hiring or selection process as well as the administration of justice which may be biased against minorities.

IV. *The Educational Area.* Educational authorities at all levels need to review and correct inadequacies in the educational system. This could include curricula, teaching materials, teacher training, and hiring practices, in order not only to remove the more negative aspects (of stereotypes, discrimination, etc.) but also to positively promote racial tolerance and harmony, and to present a more balanced and representative picture of Canadian society and the world (e.g., the contributions of minorities, the multicultural and multiracial nature of Canadian society).

V. *The Cultural Area.* Much more important than the presentation of 'ethnic' ceremonies and dances is the negative or even hostile images of minorities often presented by the mass media when dealing with both domestic as well as international issues. Minorities are portrayed as exotic animals or as problems, and cultural biases permeate both entertainment as well as documentary-type programmes. There is hardly any sensitive, imaginative, and creative presentation of the so-called Canadian mosaic.

It is necessary then to make efforts to portray a more positive and more balanced picture of Canadian society and the world. As in the case of other institutions, it is essential to review and revise the policies and practices (including those in the area of employment) of the various media institutions.

VI. *The Community Area.* It will be necessary to supplement the efforts in the other areas with concerted efforts aimed at community institutions such as religious organizations, service clubs, youth organizations, business, trade and professional associations and unions. Such groups should consider specific

methods (e.g., shared community involvement, exposure to life-styles of others) for improving intergroup relationships within their membership or among their employees, and also in the community at large. The minorities themselves should organize communities of people from diverse backgrounds to initiate projects (e.g., workshops and consciousness-raising devices) to improve relations.

There are also other areas, such as the entire area of social services, to which the same kinds of approaches will be necessary. The essential point that has to be emphasized is that the approach has to be comprehensive, covering all societal spheres, which are so often closely interrelated. The changes and the "sensitization" have, of course, to take place in very specific contexts.

Three important points nevertheless need to be recalled briefly. These concern the issues of affirmative action, meaningful participation by minorities and, finally, the effectiveness of policies and programmes.

Some of the studies just mentioned, especially those representing minority viewpoints, strongly recommend governmental initiation of "affirmative action" programmes for minorities in Canada.

As we noted earlier, the concept of "affirmative action" has caused heated controversy in the United States; although the prospect of it being used on any large scale in Canada is likely to create at least apprehension on the part of some people and opposition on the part of others, it should nevertheless be given a fair trial. As we also noted earlier, opponents have tended to misunderstand, misrepresent, or misinterpret this concept as meaning reverse discrimination, quotas, preferential treatment, and so on. Whatever the merits or demerits of the arguments, the important point here is that the advocates of this concept should be well prepared for the opposition and resistance that are likely to surface to their efforts in this area. This applies particularly in times of economic recession such as the present. Yet fundamental social change is never easy or painless.

The second point is that any policies and programmes that are developed should be done with the active and meaningful but definitely not token participation of the groups concerned, especially the minority groups. Being minorities, they do not form part of the present power structure and hence do not have an automatic or direct say in the important decisions that are made concerning them. If they have no meaningful say in these decisions, then the policies and programmes developed are likely to turn out to be quite irrelevant (as they have in Britain) to the real problems on hand.

The minorities, themselves, have to mobilize and organize their forces effectively if their struggle for equality is to succeed. Indeed, such struggle has been and will continue to be of greater significance in achieving civil liberties and equalities than any policies from the top. Racial minorities in Canada can examine the experience of similar minorities elsewhere for the most successful approaches that might be usefully applied to their own struggle.

The effectiveness of the policies and programmes that are being implemented, if they are relevant to the problems, will depend, however, on the five general variables (together with the various subvariables) delineated by Burkey (1971). Since these have been discussed already, we will only recapitulate them here briefly. They should prove helpful in formulating, implementing, and evaluating existing as well as new policies and programmes.

The first variable is organizational efficiency, which includes *clarity* of policy among administrators, *resources* (personnel, financial support) and the efficient utilization of the two, and finally *autonomy*. The second variable is the extent of verified knowledge based on continuous research programmes including extensive monitoring, feedback, and evaluation. Enforcement--the degree and methods--constitute the third variable. The fourth refers to support or resistance to policy, which can be affected by white self-interest, activities of "black" organizations, white prejudice, legitimacy of policies, and enforcement effectiveness. Finally, the comprehensiveness of policy--the degree to which a policy envisions and utilizes a "systems" or comprehensive approach rather than a "piecemeal" attack--will affect the effectiveness of policies directed against racial discrimination and/or racial inequality.

From a wider perspective, the following major elements suggested by Ujimoto (1978) should also be taken into account: the barriers or resistance to change (cultural, historical, sociological, psychological, political, and organizational or bureaucratic), the strategies to be used for social change (facilitative, re-educative, persuasive, power, or a combination of these) and the change management system (organizational, target, and communication subsystems).

5. RESEARCH

Not only is research in Canada in the field of interracial relations in general and conflict in particular very limited, as we have seen, but it is virtually non-existent in the important action areas of policies and programmes, especially in relation to the key institutional or organizational aspects of racial discrimination. Thus, the potential areas for research are vast. That much more research needs to be done and done urgently is obvious; for, in the light of the multi-ethnic, multiracial, and multicultural composition of the Canadian population, the special difficulties this composition creates, and the important implications it has for Canadian society, such research is no longer a luxury but an absolute necessity.

The important question then is: what kinds of research need to be done? Given the vastness of the potential areas, it is only possible here to indicate broadly, on the basis of the analysis presented earlier, three principle inter-related areas that the research should cover. The common thrust of all three is that they are actions and hence policy oriented.

The first area would include research aimed at improving our knowledge and understanding of the immediate and the more basic underlying causes of interra-

cial conflict in the Canadian context. This would involve examining more systematically and more closely the events mentioned in this study, for example, the 1887, 1907, and 1933 riots and others we may have overlooked, as well as the more recent small-scale events of violence. In addition, it would involve initiating systematic studies on the current situation in major centres with significantly diverse racial populations, in terms of the basic problems encountered and the solutions proposed.

The information gained from all this would be relevant to the second area which would concentrate on the systematic development of monitoring systems for both the short and long terms as proposed earlier in this chapter.

Finally, and most importantly, the third principal area of research, which is, in turn, related to the other two, would deal with the key issues of short-term and long-term intervention strategies necessary for conflict resolution and for promoting equality. This would involve examining the short-term problems of overt conflict and the more long-term problems of institutional or organizational discrimination. We have already suggested the kinds of research that will be necessary to develop the short-term strategies.

As was also noted before, research for the more long-term strategies will have to concentrate on the four different types of institutional or organizational discrimination outlined earlier. However, it will have to be quite context specific, precisely because the contexts vary in important respects. For example, the problems associated with law enforcement institutions or educational institutions will be quite different from those associated with industrial or commercial or communications organizations. It will thus be necessary to research the organizational dynamics in each type of context and determine its peculiarities of structure and processes that lead to the kinds of results that this study is concerned with.

This kind of research would lead to the identification of the specific problem areas and hence the specific kinds of policies and programmes necessary to deal with them. It would involve, for example, the identification of the special kinds of resources (personnel, funding, skills, etc.) necessary for effective role performance on the part of the majority or visible minority community incumbents, who may each need different kinds of resources.

An area which minority group leaders have identified and which we have mentioned earlier as being important is the crucial role of the mass media, not only in news reporting, but also in the general approach they take on issues of racial and ethnic diversity. Systematic research on both the positive and negative roles that media play in this area is required in Canada. This would suggest the kinds of changes that would enhance their positive role.

Similarly, the whole question of affirmative action advocated by some human rights commissions as well as minority group leaders needs to be examined systematically. Although the concept of affirmative action is not entirely new in Canada (since it has been operative for women--see Ahlawat, D'Oyley and Hayes,

1977), Canadian experience is of "recent vintage" (Jain, 1978); it would be useful to evaluate even this limited experience and see how it would apply to other areas. Moreover, given the fact that the concept is a very broad one, it will have to be specified considerably, in the process of which a distinction should be made between actions that lead to greater equality and conflict resolution and those that may lead to less equality, segregation, and further discrimination (at least in the long run).

In any case, the kind of research that will be most relevant is that which is situated in the organizational or institutional contexts, for it is these contexts which are the most important if any significant and ultimately meaningful improvement is to take place.

Since the areas of research mentioned above are so vast and cover practically all the major societal spheres, serious consideration should be given to the idea of establishing a Canadian race relations research institute or centre. Such a body would provide a focus for the systematic and co-ordinated research effort necessary for analysing and solving the race relations problems within specifically Canadian contexts.

6. CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to examine the issue of racial conflict from a broad comparative perspective. The principle objective was to suggest how the question of racial conflict may best be resolved, peacefully and justly. But before this could be done, it was necessary to try and understand why racial conflict occurs in the first place; and since it has occurred frequently in different places and at different times and therefore has had to be dealt with, it was thought useful to examine these experiences for the insights and ideas they might offer.

Thus, we started off by examining the various approaches that have been used to explain why racial conflict occurs: the "deviant-individual" approach focused on the deviant, pathological "riff-raff" as the principal cause, the "social-forces" approach on presumably "neutral" problems of migration, urban overpopulation, and so forth; and the "institutional-structural" approach on the basic economic, social, political structures of society. Then we examined the evidence on the events and policy responses to deal with them. From this, it became clear that the main approaches used were of the first two kinds--"deviant individual" and "social forces."

However, the problems persist because the basic causes embedded in the various societal structures have been left untouched; and until these are addressed, there is little hope for resolving the problems. Thus, our main suggestions are focused on dealing with the problems in the institutional or organizational contexts.

From the brief review, it is apparent that the present public policies concerning interracial violence and discrimination in Canada are very limited and that it is unlikely that they will be able to resolve the basic causes of the problems which we have attempted to outline. They deal with the symptoms only, and not with the deeper issues that need to be resolved.

In the course of this study, we have attempted to show what kinds of things need to be done in order to get to the heart of the problems of racism, which have to be resolved if Canada is to avoid some of the more serious difficulties experienced by other countries. And they have to be done now before it is too late.

NOTES

1. For example, the anti-Oriental riots of 1887 and 1907 were not caused by 'irrational, deviant, alienated individuals' nor by 'impersonal social forces'; they were largely structured, purposeful, rational, and politically meaningful acts.
2. The CCLA "testers" found that about 70 per cent of the employment and 90 per cent of the real estate agencies in major Ontario cities accepted discriminatory requests over the telephone to screen out non-whites, even though this is illegal, and the Association of Professional Placement Agencies and Consultants (APPAC) has an agreement with the Ontario Human Rights Commission to abide by the Ontario Human Rights Code (CCLA, 1977).
3. For example, a CCLA survey of Toronto fire stations found only 2 non-white firemen out of a total of over 1,150, apparently mainly due to the method of recruitment which involved interviewing those applicants who were on file the longest; the small turnover and lengthy list of applications effectively excluded most non-whites, most of whom are recent immigrants. The height and weight requirements of some organizations (e.g., the police) have similar effects.
4. For example, Hunter has pointed out that various sections of the Criminal Code "could, if imaginatively deployed and prosecuted with vigour," assist in curbing some of the activities of racist groups without bringing up the "free speech" issue (The Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto and Urban Alliance on Race Relations, 1976).
5. For examples of racism operating in these areas in the Canadian context, see Head and Lee, 1975; Hill, 1977; Kehoe, 1978; McDiarmid and Pratt, 1971; Pitman, 1977; Rosenstock and Adair, 1976; Scanlon, 1975; Ubale, 1978.
6. For example, Head and Lee, 1975; Henry, 1978; Hill, 1977; Jain, 1978; Kehoe, 1978; Pitman, 1977; Ubale, 1978; Canada, Minister of State for Multiculturalism, 1978; OHRC, 1977; Toronto Board of Education, 1978; Canadian Human Rights Commission, 1979; CCLA, 1977.

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